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A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE
AND
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION 1
DAVID PERKINS

PART I
A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE
The existence of caricatures has proved something of a
nuisance to philosophers and psychologists bent on analyzing
pictorial representation {Gibson 1971 ). The contrast between
caricature and customary "realistic" representation poses
part of the problem. A portrait caricature clearly represents a
certain layout of spatial form, a face-like layout with nose so
long, mouth so wide, and so forth. This spatial layout
typically diverges substantially and in calculated ways from
the true form of the subject's head. What sort of picture is
this? It is deliberately inaccurate, yet the subject is often
quite recognizable- perhaps more recognizable than in an
accurate portrait or photograph. It lies about its subject's
shape, but in doing so often comments delightfully on that
shape. If conventional picturing is to be analyzed in terms of
the picture conveying information to the viewer about its
subject, then caricature is not strictly part of, but builds on,
~hat _co~vention, bending it to special purposes. What exactly
1s gomg on?
Another part of the puzzle is the variety of pictures
sometimes called caricatures, but which deviate in obvious
respects from the most typical usage of the term. Political
cartoons in general need not represent any known political
figure. Grote~ Da Vinci's famous set
{Gombrich 1961 :95) need depict no actual individual or class
of individuals. A child's cartoon monster labelled "teacher"
may offer a funny face without satirizing that teacher's
specific physiognomy. Mergings of human and animal features as in Figure 1 by Levine (1969) are a bonus: caricature
allows but does not demand such a mix.
The natural attack on these problems is a quest for
definition, a framing of conditions for caricature which
would on the one hand specify its relation to realistic

David Perkins is Co-director of Harvard Project Zero at the
Harvard Graduate School of Education. His research interests
include rhythm perception and visual perception, error
making, and thought processes in poetry writing and drawing. Some current publications are: "Probing Artistic Process:
A Report from Harvard Project Zero," Journal of Aesthetic
Education, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1974; "Toward a Notation for
Rhythm Perception," {with Vernon Howard}, Interface (in
press); and "Compensating for Distortion in Viewing Pictures
Obliquely," Perception and Psychophysics, Vol. 74, No. 7,
7973.

Figure 7

- Samuel Beckett

portraiture, and on the other admit or exclude, and in any
case elaborate the relation of caricature to, the various sorts
of pictures which sometimes are so named.
Two concepts merit special attention in the search for
definition. One is exaggeration: a caricature typically exaggerates features of its subject. The second is individuation:
a caricature typically exaggerates so as to differentiate the
subject from his fellows. Exaggeration and individuation
alone promise some unscrambling of the problems sketched
above. Exaggeration seems a meaningful concept only in a
symbol system where one can also tell the truth. This might
illuminate caricature's dependence on and relation to a
tradition of realistic portraiture. Individuation commands
that the caricature remain true to the subject's physiognomy
at some level, reflecting the intuition that mere distortion, as
in the child's cartoon monster, is not caricature.
Such factors prompt a preliminary and very traditional
definition: a caricature is a symbol that exaggerates individuating characteristics of its subject. Indeed, a refinement
of this will provide the final formulation. But along the way
some major difficulties demand attention. First, prior writers
have proposed other conditions in addition to exaggeration
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION

becomes little more than a game of word substitution unless
these terms themselves can be explicated, particularly as they
relate to realistic representation. Third, it is not enough that
a definition simply stake out roughly the class of pictures
usually called caricatures. Many definitions could do about
equally well statistically, including the above, the above with
"humor" also required, or "grotesque drawings which represent real subjects." The discussion will argue that the above
definition and its elaboration, far from being arbitrary,
illuminate the essential psychology of perceiving caricatures.
FURTHER CONDITIONS?
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Prior definitions of caricature are mainly introductions,
asides and ornaments to a body of work with quite a
different focus. Most of the surprisingly extensive literature
on caricaturing deals with the evolution of the form,
biographies of caricaturists, and presentation of examples
without technical discussion. The range of art treated is
generally wider than portrait caricature, encompassing also
the political cartoon or grotesque figures. "Caricature" is
sometimes used synonymously with either of these. The
details of the relation between drawing and subject are
persistently neglected. Rarely does one even find a portrait
and a caricature of an individual side-by-side. For some
happy exceptions, see Berger (1952), Gombrich (1963),
Rother (1966).
Definitions, when attempted at all, have their favorite
vocabulary. Besides "individuation" and "exaggeration," key
words are "humor," "idealization," "defects," and "personality" as well as near synonyms of these. Whether such terms
can add to the conception of caricature sketched above
demands appraisal. The concl11sian will be that they cannot.

Humor.
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Figure 2

- Nazi caricatures of jews

and individuation; for instance, a caricature must be
humorous. On what grounds are these additional constraints
dismissed? Second, individuation and exaggeration are themselves concepts hardly clearer than caricature. The definition
2

Hum9r stands · J+-i.o.!imate relationship to caricature,
often figuring in the definitions put forth by various writers.
Proposals that caricature is the exaggeration of an individual's characteristic features to comic effect, or the like,
appear frequently (American Heritage Dictionary 1969;
Murray, quoted in Ashbee 1928:1, 25; Berger 1952: 7; Davies
1928:1). But hum~ubious as a condition for
caricature.
First of all, there are dr_awings which clearly deserve the
label but are of doubtful humor. Figure 2 from Gombrich
(1963) illustrates caricatures of Jews devised by the Nazi
propaganda effort, caricatures which are too vicious to be
funny. Commonly, one finds political cartoons incorporating
portrait caricatures which in themselves are at best very
mildly humorous. They primarily serve as reference mechanisms for the real joke of the caption or whole cartoon. It
seems strange to place the humor of the caricatured face so
much in the center of things by definition when it is often
rather peripheral to the entire comic effect. Figure 3 points
up another problem. Some artists such as James House
(Figure 3), and Oscar Berger (1952) often emphasize likeness
of personality rather than humor; the product is not
intended to prompt a laugh. Finally, there are contrast
enhancement techniques in photography and caricature-style
drawings of complex machinery (Ryan and Schwartz 1956).
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in keeping with his behavior, but can injure the likeness. All
the above considerations sum to the conclusion that humor is
best considered a contingent property of some caricatures.
If humor should not be a necessary condition for
caricature, then what accounts for its undeniable close
association with the form? A historical answer is in part
legitimate: caricature has in fact been persistent!~ used t~
humorous ends. But such a reply is incomplete if it does not
confess that caricature lends itself to just such use. The point
is that exaggeration, a prime tool of the caricaturist, is also a
key device of the humorist. This does not mean that all
exaggerated faces are funny, any more than it means that all
exaggerated faces are identifiable. Exaggeration in various
cases may serve a humorous end, an individuating purpose,
both, or neither. That it so often serves both, reflects the
psychology and the individual culture of the human perceiver
and the caricaturist's happy exploitation of both psychology
and culture.

Idealization and Defects

Figure 3

- Fritz Kreisler

These are hardly comic subjects, but the term caricature, if
humor is not a condition, seems an illuminating name for
such pictures.
If one's area of interest is portrait caricatures, the added
condition of exaggeration "to comic effect" would narrow
very little the class of drawings satisfying the requirements;
exaggeration and individuation fix the range of the term
adequately. And a requirement of humor would connect
caricature logically with the snarl of philosophical and
psychological issues surrounding the topic of humor. It seems
prudent to stay as much on the periphery of that as possible.
Furthermore, there is a certain tension between the aim of
humor and the aim of individuation. The political cartoonist
Paul Szep, of the Boston Globe, has emphasized to me the
particular difficulty of producing a caricarture in which the
human face is merged with an animal form. The combination
can be marvelously appropriate, but the amount of differentiating information available is certainly reduced. Worse,
a long nose for an inquisitive but short-nosed person may be

Idealization seems intuitively the very contrary of caricature. Both depart from faithful portraiture, but somehow in
opposite directions. Roughly speaking, idealization means
producing a picture of a subject so as to emphasize various
canons of beauty, masculinity, or whatever, established in
the artist's society. As such, idealization is one form of
exaggeration. This encourages the complementary view that
ugliness is as central to caricature as idealization is counter to
it. Caricature is seen as the exaggeration of the defects of a
physiognomy {Davies 1928; Baldinucci, quoted in Gombrich
1961 :344; Grose, quoted in Lynch 1927:9; Bergson, quoted
in Lynch 1927:5; Random House Dictionary 1968).
But such a formulation reflects a philosophy in which
any departure from an ideal counts as a defect. The usage of
these terms is more tolerant today. Individuality itself carries
certain positive values. There is a large middle ground
between what counts as ideal and what counts as defective.
Exaggeration of individuating features may not produce ideal
types, but need not produce ugliness. Oscar Berger {1952)
presents a number of benign caricatures of various public
figures, done in sittings with their cooperation. In sum,
exaggeration of defects is simply too specialized a requirement to be called a necessary condition for caricature; there
are too many pictures called caricatures that would not be so
described.
Furthermore, ugly caricatures are not really needed to
satisfy our hunch that caricature runs contrary to idealization. Another symmetry besides beauty and ugliness serves as
well. Idealization is a transformation that blurs the distinctiveness of the particular face; a range of individuals all
idealized are depicted as sharing many features that comprise
the ideal standard and hence are less differentiated. Thus
while caricature individuates, idealization disindividuates.

Personality
Many caricaturists often emphasize conveying personalities through their art {Low 1932). In their work, this aim
accompanies or replaces humor. Those that take this approach must gather information about a subject's character;
the personal interview and/or sitting is a favorite device
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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(O'Connell 1970; Berger 1952). But Paul Szep has explained
that personal contact is often impossible where major
political figures are concerned. First of all a physiognomic
likeness is the goal. Next, the political cartoonist must
generally work from his target's public character, not his
"home" character- both because that is what is accessible
and that is what the public knows. Finally, the aspects of
character to be emphasized naturally turn on the particular,
and generally critical, function of the cartoon. Thus the
extent to which conveying personality is a primary aim varies
considerably from artist to artist and from circumstance to
circumstance. Personality is not the focus consistently
enough for it to serve as a further necessary condition for
caricature.
Indeed, expression of personality competes considerably
with physiognomic individuation. Topffer and numerous
other artists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
systematically explored variations in cartoon and normal
portraits that yield various personality impressions (Gombrich 1961, ch. 1 0). More recently, psychological research
employing photographs and sometimes composite line faces
reveals that observers will readily - and often consistently
across observers- attribute personality traits to strange faces
(Shoemaker,
South, and
Lowe
1973;
Hochberg
1964:105-110; Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955). But
these personality attributions do not accurately reflect the
true personalities of the photo's subjects; that is, a subject's
face will likely suggest a personality not in keeping with his
actual personality. A caricature or portrait which is both
recognizable without labels or context and also a faithful
expression of the subject's true personality (not the superficial personality projected by his face) must be counted as
an especially fine achievement.
REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION
If humor, ugliness and expression of personality are
inessential to caricature, then exaggeration and individuation
by themselves must resolve this art form's paradoxes. Two
symbolic functions of special concern are reference - a
caricature is of a person - and description - a caricature
delivers certain shape information about the subject's face.
In order for the caricature to speak about its subject, the
subject must be designated. Sometimes audaciously direct
means are employed: human figures in pictures are simply
labelled with their names, or relatively unambiguous contextual cues are provided - a white house in the background.
Another major means is to provide a picture recognizable
from the face as representing a particular individual. Indeed,
some caricaturists hold it an obligation of their art to eschew
other techniques, especially when a familiar, plausibly
recognizable, public figure is the subject.
Nonabstract pictures, the sorts of concern here, will be
said to describe. This will simply mean that they provide to
the viewer information specifying spatial forms and surface
properties- the shapes, textures, colors of chairs, houses,
faces, or whatever. This quite deliberately ignores the often
important distinctions between pictorial and linguistic means
of symbolizing discussed by Goodman (1968, ch. 4). It
should be mentioned that in general a description, linguistic
or pictorial, need not be a description of any actually
4

existent thing; whether the description is ascribed to a
referent is an independent matter.
That description should be an important function of
caricature appears implausible, considering that a caricature
of a person is manifestly and necessarily inaccurate (if it is an
accurate portrayal we do not normally call it a caricature).
But the problem disappears once one recognizes that a
caricature is two descriptions in one. A caricature can be read
as picturing a face-like spatial form with, for instance, a nose
three inches long, an absurdly weak chin, and so on. On the
other hand, that same caricature can be read as providing
information about the person it stands for, a person
therefore whose nose is long as noses go, though not that
long, a person whose chin is weak as chins go, though not
that weak. In fact two different systems of description are
involved. One specifies a spatial form - but not the form of
the subject- with metric accuracy; the other, relevant to the
form of the subject, need speak only of trends. Exaggeration
necessarily involves just these two levels of description.
The interaction between description and reference is
varied. Sometimes, description may be the means of reference. The descriptive trend information in the drawing is
assimilated by the viewer's face recognition system, which
accomplishes identification of the face. Sometimes, the
descriptive role of a caricature may not begin until reference
is accomplished. If the letter T is displayed with the caption
"Charles Atlas," then clearly the T does not assume its role
of caricaturing Atlas' physique until the reference is
established. And more complex situations abound. For
instance, a drawing prompts recognition, and then descriptive
aspects of the drawing which were not involved in recognition become meaningful in the light of knowledge of the
subject.
The descriptive powers of caricature should not be
considered just narrowly appropriate to pictorial comedy.
For example, a study by Ryan and Schwartz (1956)
compared accurate line drawings, photographs, shaded drawings, and caricature-like "cartoons" as means of picturing
complex spatial layouts, including machinery. The pictures
were exposed tachistoscopically and the caricatures most
successfully conveyed the general organization of the spatial
layouts at shorter exposures.
Furthermore, caricature-like techniques of exaggeration
are actually employed in a number of communications
contexts. Relief maps amplify the vertical scale. Photographers utilize contrast enhancement methods. Examples
occur among pictograms used in international traffic warning
signs, although however clear and emphatic these may appear
to the acculturated viewer, Kolers (1969) warns us to be
wary of any claim that such signs are universally readable.
TRUTH AND REVELATION
A true description is simply a description that specifies
properties true of a referent. Portrait caricature, involving
exaggeration as it does, is never a true description as far as
metric accuracy is concerned. But a caricature may be a true
trend description of its subject. Indeed, if a viewer remarks
that a caricature doesn't look like its subject, he is not likely
to mean that the drawing lies about the subject's exact
metric shape; that is taken for granted. Similarly, if a drawing
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depicts a political figure with a bulldozer body, it would
probably be superfluous to complain that the bulldozer does
not resemble the subject's body. Whether a picture, caricature or not, offers true descriptions must always be judged
relative to an analysis of the multiple kinds of descriptions it
might offer.
The aesthetic functioning of a caricature depends
critically on the viewer's evaluation of its truth and falsity as
description. (A corollary of this is that a caricature cannot be
fully appreciated unless one is familiar with its subject's
physiognomy). Humor in caricature serves as an example. If a
caricature is not taken as a true trend description, then it
becomes simply a funny face, lacking a manifest kernel of
physiognomic truth. But if only the trend description is
noted, there is no perceived overstatement to laugh at.
A viewer's assent to a caricature as a trend description is
not just a piecemeal matter, the nose approved but the
cheeks not, and so on. Judgments of that sort can often be
made, of course, but overall assent may depend as much on
an interplay of features, a gestalt which itself cannot appear
unless all or most of the contributing trends are themselves
correct. Furthermore, a description false in some respects is
brought into question as a whole. Those other propositions it
offers which seem true, seem no more than accidentally true
and lose their merit as commentary. None of this applies to
the falsity of caricature as metric description; this falsity is
recognized as part of the art form, is systematically separable
from the trend description and does not bring it into
question.
When a viewer assents to a caricature's description, his
assent lends credence to ascriptions of the drawing that the
viewer does not have the knowledge to judge. This is entirely
natural; one estimates the overall truth of the message from
those parts of it that one can evaluate. But this phenomenon
allows such misuses of caricature as the Nazi cartoons of
Jews. The caricaturist may couch lies in the very visage itself,
by selectively exaggerating his subject's features so as to
suggest some personality trait such as meanness. If the viewer
knows the subject, but has seen in his face or behavior no
contrary personality indications, the viewer, recognizing the
face, is likely to take the meanness as an aspect of the true
face he had not noticed before, exposed by the art of the
caricaturist. On the other hand, the sophisticated viewer will
have learned to distrust ascriptions of personality in caricature. That is a part of being sophisticated.
In sum, the viewer's assent to, dissent to, or inability to
evaluate a caricature's trend description plays an intimate
role in his whole reaction to the work. In many cases of
humor in caricature, the viewer's judgment of the falsity of
the picture as metric description plays just as important a
role. Further, the viewer's reaction is highly individual,
depending on the prior knowledge and the habits of
categorizing that he brings to his encounter with the picture,
on his familiarity or lack of familiarity with the subject's
face, his preconceptions about the subject's personality, the
degree to which he separates physiognomic, political,
personality, and other ascriptions, and separates metric from
trend descriptions. The viewer's response is as much bound
up in the information he has available and his general habits
of information processing as it is in any exclusively aesthetic

capacities he might have (if exclusively aesthetic capacities
exist at all).
This theme can be carried further yet. The fine caricature
of Beckett as a buzzard, done by Levine and displayed in
Figure 1, exemplifies "relevation." Levine has delivered a
construction that reveals an unexpected visual affinity
between Beckett's physiognomy and that of a buzzard, an
affinity that gains depth because of Beckett's morose literary
works. The example will be discussed further later, but
certainly revelation is not limited to cases of representing a
person as an animal, or as anything else at all. I particularly
recall a caricature of Pushkin by Levine, where the exaggeratedly large and limpid eyes led me suddenly to realize
how those eyes dominated Push kin's face in realistic portrayals. In sum, a caricature reveals when it exposes unnoticed
physiognomic relationships, or the unrealized influence of
particular features on the whole face, or the like.
Accordingly, revelation is a frequent achievement of, but
not a requirement for, caricature. In political cartoons, the
same public figure may recur again and again in the same
style. His reappearances, offering little further physiognomic
revelation, accomplish other functions within the cartoon
such as reference or expression.
'
Some requirements of revelation can be specified in terms
introduced earlier . . First, revelation is part of caricature as a
description; that is, a caricature offers a proposition about a
subject's physiognomy, such as, that it is like a buzzard's in
certain respects. Second, the viewer must affirm the proposition; he does not reserve judgment or accept the proposition
on faith as one might do when viewing a caricature of an
unfamiliar subject. And third, the affirmation is not of an
often entertained and tiresomely familiar proposition, but of
freshly revealed truth. In sum, the caricature entices the
viewer into affirming a novel proposition.
Why is a novel proposition affirmed? Relating the
proposition to accumulated knowledge is required: for
instance, the proposition may complete a pattern of other
propositions; it may neatly sum up a co llection of subordinate propositions, as does the Buzzard-Beckett equation;
it may bring into focus a series of half-realized prior
observations, as with my reaction to Pushkin's eyes. Whatever the relation to prior knowledge, it is a characteristic of
revelation that the very organization of the viewer's perception is changed. Just as, after identifying a camouflaged
figure, it is very difficult to recover one's original naive
perception, so Pushkin and Beckett will never appear as
they did, or not for a long time. In its very rapid, but
long-term, reorganization of the viewer's perceptions, revelation contrasts with more gradual and painful means of
shifting one's perceptions of the world.
Revelation, important throughout the arts, is related to
discovery as the word would be used in science or
philosophy. Both revelation and discovery involve apprehending a new structure or coherence in a body of
accumulated information. Revelation emphasizes some
agent's role in serving up the novel proposition, whereas
discovery emphasizes the creative role of the apprehender in
devising his own coherence. A discovery "comes as a
revelation" just when the creator is largely unconscious of his
own constructive role. Recent research (Muller, Kennedy,
and Tanimoto 1972) has demonstrated that persons prefer
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION

5

viewing sequences of pictures where initially distorted,
unrecognizable letters become recognizable over viewing the
reverse sequences, even though they judge the unrecognized
distorted letters as by themselves more interesting than
undistorted but readily identifiable letters. Discovery, that is,
is valued for itself, independently of the value attached to
the content discovered. Each of us can echo this subjectively;
discovery and revelation are rewarding, often exciting experiences. This is one source of affect in caricature and in art
in general.
In considering revelation, there is no need to confine the
viewer to a passive role. If he does not invent the proposition
that the caricaturist lays before him, at least he must read it
out of the caricature, and furthermore he must relate it to his
own knowledge and perceive that the proposition does lend
that knowledge coherence or structure. These operations of
the viewer are themselves active, constructive, and creative.
Every revelation by an agent is to that extent a discovery by
the recipient. Again, a viewer's response to a caricature
emerges as a highly judgmental process very concerned with
fact and logic; his prior information and information
processing habits will determine whether he discovers what
the caricaturist aimed to reveal.

EXAGGERATION AND INDIVIDUATION
In discussing how caricatures are "read," the previous
sections have underscored the central roles of exaggeration
and individuation. In employing exaggeration, caricatures
provide a trend description but not a metric description of
their subjects. And by providing a true trend description,
caricatures individuate.
At once it is clear that exaggeration must not be taken
narrowly, for instance, to mean "making larger., Caricatures
of aggressive chins may be larger, but weak chins are
--.. . . _rendered weaker yet. Some general techniques of exaggeration are: making darker or lighter, larger or smaller,
longer or shorter, and accentuating contours- special cases of
this include rendering hair curlier or the profile more
pronounced. Non-physical traits, as of personality or expression, can also be exaggerated.
In all these cases, exaggeration involves displacement
along a scale measuring (if crudely) some property. More
generally, exaggeration could be defined in terms of a partial
ordering relation on mutually exclusive classifications of
some classification system. If a symbol exaggerates, it refers
to a certain subject, but read according to convention, it also
implies a measurement (classification) of the subject not in
fact cqrrect, but greater than or less than the correct measurement.
But merely distortion is involved if for the same subject
and circumstances "greater than, and "less than, are not
differentiated. Overstating the role of alcohol in accidents is
exaggerating that role, but an understatement does not
exaggerate the role. Neither is what counts as exaggeration a
question of conventional "greater than" scale directions for
various scales; as mentioned above, exaggerated strong chins
are stronger, exaggerated weak chins are weaker. Rather,
exaggeration seems to involve implicit reference to a "normal
point" on a scale; the exaggerated symbol indicates a
6

measurement for a subject which is, starting from the normal
point, beyond the subject's correct measurement. When the
scale has an endpoint (e.g., zero on a length scale), in some
contexts this endpoint serves as the norm and there is only
one direction of exaggeration. In other contexts exaggeration
is relative to interior normal points suggested by population
averages, or by conventions of beauty or health, or the like.
Exaggeration aside, how can scales and normal points
individuate? Common usage provides a clue. We speak of
people as tall or short, fat or thin, and so forth, with implicit
reference to an average height or build. In this way, a scale
like height and a normal point like the average height allow
us to individuate members of a population. Of course, many
scales and norms have no individuating value. In a cartooning
context where all noses get longer, the normal point for
exaggeration is zero nose length. But no one has less than
zero nose length, the scale and norm do not divide the
population, and the cartoons exaggerate without truly
caricaturing. From a standpoint of general informational
efficiency, the population median provides the most individuating norm. But for any number of reasons, other
normal points may be used in sorting: the basketball coach's_
professional standards for "tall" versus "short" will be high.
Caricature involves a triad: the cartoon itself, the subject
caricatured, and scales and individuating norms (often
determined by a standard population) against which the
subject is measured. The caricaturist selects cert'ain of these
~scales and exaggerates along these scales the departure of his
subject from the normal points. Accordingly, the same
subject against a different population might be caricatured
quite differently; Gulliver is a giant among the pygmies and a
pygmy among the giants. Another consequence is the
traditional remark that people with especially ordinary
features are hard to caricature; many of their measurements
fall on the norm points and no proper direction for
exaggeration is defined.
Even for other subjects, the circumstances may not
unambiguously suggest the scales and norms against which an
artist should work; he may have to choose. For example,
suppose an artist aims to caricature a profile which is rather
flat as profiles go (Figure 4, center). Among many alternatives, he might choose to work from the human average, and
render the profile flatter yet (Figure 4, right). Or he might
take a straight line - the average of all wavy lines- as his
origin, and accentuate the contours (Figure 4, left). It seems
plausible that either manipulation, in its own way, might
contribute to a recognizable caricature.
The viewer as well as the artist has problems and options.
In seeing how a caricature is exaggerated, he faces the task of
determining the scales and norms with respect to which
exaggeration was attempted. Does a certain drawing depict a
nose exaggerated in length, an ear-nose distance exaggerated,
a tip-of-nose exaggerated, or what? Such questions are
resolved (with an element of arbitrary choice perhaps) by
cues in the pictures themselves, by knowledge of conventions
of picturing and caricaturing, and through intuitions about
what sorts of scales and norms are psychologically likely. To
say just that much is to touch a complex matter lightly.
Although "reading" a picture as exaggerated is a largely
automatic and unconscious accomplishment, substantial
cognitive activity is clearly involved.
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But just that much is enough for the present purpose,
illuminating caricature. The thrust of this section can be
condensed into two definitions. A scale and norm, relative to

a given population, are individuating just when the members
of the population do not all have measurements on the scale
less than, equal to, or greater than the norm. And a symbol
referring to an individual, describing a measurement along a
scale, and relative to a given norm, exaggerates just when the
individual's true measurement on the scale lies between the
described measurement and the norm. Of course, this is an
abstract from the realities of the human condition, where
judgments of degree are uncertain and normal points
indefinite intervals.
DEFINITION
The prior sections lend support to a formal definition. A

symbol referring to an individual and relative to a given scale,
norm, and population is a caricature just when the scale and
norm relative to the population are individuating and the
symbol relative to the individual scale and norm exaggerates.
Of course, a symbol is called a caricature not just because of
one- perhaps coincidental-measurement. Therefore, a

symbol referring to an individual and relative to a whole set
of scales, norms, and populations is a caricature just when it
is a caricature with respect to some of those scales, norms,
and populations and accurate with respect to the others. For
a capsule statement and leaving some terms implicit, a
caricature is a symbol that exaggerates measurements relative t
to individuating norms. This definition is not new; an
essential equivalent was given by Samuel Johnson (Lynch
1927:1 ). Nor is it a radical departure from the trend of prior
proposals. It simply says a little less than some, for instance
in omitting humor, and a little more than others, for instance
in insisting on the central role of exaggeration for individuation's sake.
The definition functions by paring away pretenders to the
name "caricature," to reduce the concept to its most central
core. First of all, the definition requires reference. Certain
sorts of pictures are at once excluded: grotesque faces,
gargoyles, harpies, monsters of various breeds, and so forth.
Referring to no subject, they cannot ascribe properties to
that subject and hence cannot deliver humor, revelation, or
expression of personality in the manner of true caricature.

Of course, realistic pictures and photographs refer to and
describe their subjects. But such pictures are not usually
called caricatures, and the exaggeration requirement excludes
these. Also, exaggeration emphasizes that caricatures occur in
the context of an established system of "more accurate"
representation. Caricature is not simply a trend description,
but a trend description by means of exaggeration, a means
which uses as its instrument the metric descriptive powers of
picturing.
Exaggeration by itself leaves some problems, however.
Portraying a person of average or smaller nose length and ear
size as having a long nose and large ears might prompt a
laugh, but cannot gain the viewer's affirmation of true
description that is so intimately involved in humor in
caricature, as discussed earlier. Such exaggeration does not
provide description differentiating between that particular
subject and any other, information necessary for most of the
other functions of caricature as well as humor. The insistence
that caricature exaggerate with respect to individuating
norms excludes drawings which to not attempt such differentiation.
Just as caricature denies transformations which exaggerate
without individuating, so it denies transformations which
individuate without exaggerating. For instance, an artist may
eliminate details of a face in order to throw the broader
. structural features into prominence. True, the manipulation
packages some individuating properties of the subject for
easy perceptual access. But the means of packaging is
critically different. Many portraits which would never be
called caricatures use such simplification, and though caricaturists often simplify as well as exaggerating, everythinga
caricaturist does need not be strictly caricature.
Finally, the relation between caricature as an abstraction
and caricature in a human context must be explored. In light
of the formal definition, the casual question "Is such-andsuch symbol a caricature?" is badly formed, incomplete
unless symbol systems, scales, norms, and so forth are
specified. Most any symbol will be a caricature with respect
to some trumped up specifications. But informally asking
whether a symbol is a caricature makes implicit reference to
our system of pictorial representation, the populations out of
which subjects must be differentiated, and the scales and
norms we routinely employ in perceiving and making
judgments about pictures or real world scenes.
Certainly to be avoided is an oversimple conception of
seeing a picture as a caricature, where a visual system
methodically and exhaustively checks through some list of
norms and scales to see whether the picture fits the
definition. A prime concern of the viewer is to make sense of
the picture, to determine its referent, and the relation
between referent and subject. If the viewer can discover
several scales and norms with respect to which the picture is
a caricature, and notices few other scales and norms where
the picture seems merely distorted (though there are almost
bound to be many} then he will construe the picture as
caricature. Therefore, whatever scales, norms and so forth a
psychologist might list as "usually attended to," some
pictures would formally be caricatures with respect to this
list without always being recognized as such, some pictures
would not formally be caricatures without the discrepancies
always being noticed, and some pictures would be caricatures
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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with respect to scales not on the list, but brought to the
attention of the viewer by the caricaturist's skill.

ANIMAL CARICATURES AND CARTOONS
The definition of caricature, abstracted from several
crucial examples, should now prove its ability to analyze
cases not figuring in its conception. Previously, various sorts
of pictures were placed relative to caricature: portraits refer,
describe their referents, but do not exaggerate; grotesques
may exaggerate norms of ugliness but do not refer to or
exaggerate an individual; and so on. Now the definition may
be tried on a fresh domain, the cluster of problems
surrounding the use of animal-like figures in caricatures and
cartoons. Levine's buzzard caricature of Beckett has already
been introduced, but the logical status of such a mix of
human and animal characteristics was not discussed and
remains puzzling.
Drawings wherein a recognizable subject is presented
wearing the clothes-as it were-of an animal, are often
especially engaging. Such drawings are generally called
caricatures, but whether or not they merit the name in the
technical sense proposed here is a subtle issue. A further
example
appears
in
Figure 5 from
Gombrich
(1963: 213-214), who comments on its economy. Establishing reference with such a drawing depends on (1) a few
effective clues- the cigarette holder, the smile, the tilt of the
chin, (2) a context of current events and conventional
symbols-the donkey, and (3) absence of counterevidence.
The interplay between (1) and (3) is worth stressing.
Recognition can take place with very few clues so long as
features in the picture serving solely humor or other purposes
(e.g., the ears of the donkey) are not taken to be attributes
of the subject's real face.
Cartoons of this sort have at their heart a pun-like double
reference, both to Beckett and buzzard, to Roosevelt and
donkey, and so forth. In Goodman's terms (1968:27-41),
Figure 1 denotes Beckett but is also a buzzard picture, and
pictures may represent individuals not only as animals, but as

buildings, volcanos, machinery, and so on. But how does
such double-reference relate to caricature, construed as the
exaggeration of measures relative to individuating norms?
Clearly "double reference" and "exaggeration of measures ... " are logically different formulas, inviting a search
for instances of one without the other. Furthermore, there is
nothing in the "double reference" notion about a natural
resemblance between the two entities referred to. Figure 5 is
an apt example. For the second point, the characteristics of
the picture that identify Roosevelt are not those that
identify donkeys. The Roosevelt features are grafted on, so
to speak, and the drawing turns on no particular natural
resemblance between donkeys and Roosevelt. Returning to
the first point, the Roosevelt features themselves are little
exaggerated, at least as compared to the accompanying
photograph. There is the lengthened cigarette holder, but on
the whole the picture is not much "caricatured" in our sense.
Levine's Beckett-as-Buzzard (Figure 1) is a contrasting
case. Here several characteristics of the drawing perform
double duty, describing both buzzards and Beckett. The
beak-nose, the neck and chin, the facial wrinkles, and even
the collar, are examples. Further, the portraying of the
buzzard, accomplishing the animal reference, goes hand in
hand with exaggeration of individuating trends of Beckett's
face. Finally, implicit in the choice of buzzard is the
exaggeration of personality characteristics of Beckett as
reflected in his work.
In qualification, it is worth noting that the ears, so
emphasized in the caricature of Beckett on the right of
Figure 1, are reduced in the buzzard-Beckett so as to avoid
an absurdly large-eared buzzard; the buzzard's ears seem even
smaller than Beckett's true ears. Further, the buzzard version
is certainly less recognizable all in all than the other, and
functions particularly well when placed beside it. As always,
there is this tension between manipulations for the sake of
humor or personality comment and manipulations for the
sake of individuation. As remarked earlier, many drawings
caricaturing several measurements would merely distort
others. But in the balance, the Beckett-buzzard caricatures a

Figure 5
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number of scales we are likely to attend to, while missing on
but a few. Applying the definition with the recommended
tolerance, the cartoon is a caricature.
The fact remains that established practice would label the
Roosevelt-donkey a caricature. This simply says that we have
two alternative standards for caricature: individuating exaggeration and double reference. This paper restricts the term
"caricature" to the first standard as the more commonly
applicable one. But that is ultimately a matter of philosophical strategy and choice. However the word is used, the
puzzling case of animal caricatures is resolved by recognizing
that history has established two alternative standards rather
than one.
Animal cartoon characters fail both standards; usually
they do not involve double reference, nor are they usually
caricatures in the present sense. A drawing of Donald Duck is
no.t intended to be identified as anybody but Donald Duck (a
fictional construct created by a series of such pictures) and is
certainly an accurate, not an exaggerated, portrayal of him.
True, Donald and many other cartoon characters exhibit a
mixture of various animal and human features, often
distorted - web feet and too-wide bill, the frontally located
eyes, and arms with four-fingered hands. The result of course
is a creature that is neither much of a duck or much of a
human, as Mad cartoonist Bill Elder points out in Figure 6.
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Figure 6

be pictorial. A mimic may offer an overblown version of his
subject's voice and gestures; a writer may satirize another's
work by exaggerating his idiosyncracies of style. Such efforts
can certainly be called caricatures. And the usage does not
reveal limitations in the present definition, because that
definition nowhere requires pictorial symbols. The generalization is already there.
Caricatures of fictive individuals-Clark Kent, for instance-also occur. A generalization to accommodate this
case comes fairly easily. If pictures of Clark Kent denote
nothing, at least they are still descriptions of threedimensional shapes which collectively and pretty consistently
establish what the Clark Kent face shape is. Accordingly, that
shape can be caricatured much as any other face shape. Such
a caricature, of course, can't be said to denote Clark Kent
any more than a "realistic" picture of Clark Kent does. But
both can be treated as fictive representations, for instance, in
the manner discussed by Goodman (1968:21-26).
However, some fictive individuals-Donald Duck, perhaps-may be quite difficult to caricature in any strict sense.
With Clark Kent, the usual norms of human appearance may
be invoked. But what norms apply to Donald Duck, when he
is one of a kind? Certainly one can make distorted pictures
of Donald Duck, but the distinction between individuating
exaggeration and mere distortion tends to collapse.
This leaves the present formulation constrained to caricatures of individuals, real or fictive. But caricatures of classes
are commonplace. The Nazi caricatures of Jews from
Gombrich (1963) have already been mentioned. Today blue
collar workers, hippies, intellectuals, and dozens of other
groups are routinely lampooned by the caricaturist's art.
Figure 7 offers a contemporary example. Ideals like
''beauty" or concepts like "cold war" can also be caricatured. Unfortunately, the easy substitution of "class" for
"individual" in the present definition does not yield an
adequate generalization. Caricatures of classes simply involve
more complex symbolic relationships, and require a more
general construal of the concepts exaggeration and individuation.

-Donald and other ducks

But Donald in shape is no effort to caricature either a duck
or a human, though his actions may caricature human
foibles. The distortions and mixing of human and animal
features must be attributed to different aims. One of these is
clearly the anthropomorphizing of the animal form, so that it
will appear less alien (the frontal eyes are important here!},
can manipulate objects with hands, and so on.
CONCLUSIONS
The context so far has been the pictorial caricaturing of
individual physiognomies. But the term caricature has a
wider application than that. First of all, a caricature need not

" ... SON ... I"

Figure 7
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These concepts, as well as those of describing, revealing,
truth judgments, and so on discussed earlier, have been the
instruments for drawing a fairly sharp line around the notion
of caricature of individuals. Certainly that line's placement
has been guided by a personal intuition, but not an arbitrary
one. The aim has been to systematically respect evident gulfs
between the T which is not a description and the hulking T
labelled Charles Atlas; between grotesques depicting no
subject and equally monstrous images lampooning a victim;
between the mere lie of the child's monster picture labelled
"teacher" and the truth-in-lie of caricature; between draw!ngs that in simplifying characterize and drawings that in
exaggerating caricature; between pictures merely half-animal,
half-man-the Roosevelt-donkey- and pictures with parts
simultaneously animal and man-the Beckett-buzzard. The
logic of the analysis hopefully does not blur or ignore, but
rather delineates and explains, caricature as a unique art
form.

PART II
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION
With all their distortions, we recognize caricatures. The
puzzle is how. But perhaps the emphasis on caricature as the
thing to be accounted for is wrong. Caricature recognition
need not be explained as some adaptation, adjustment or
success-in-the-face-of-adversity of the normal recognition
process. One can turn the issue upside down and suggest that
caricature recognition is a full manifestation of the normal
recognition process, which is itself to be explained. And
caricatures provide a means of investigation. The caricaturist
is a natural experimenter, exploring distortions for the sake
of satire, expression of personality, and so forth, while also
meeting the need to deliver an identifiable image. In
diverging from accuracy but preserving identity, his works
provide a measure of which facial properties are important
to identification.
The aim here is to explore these physiognomic invariants,
these constancies between caricature and subject and
between one caricature and another of the same subject. The
approach is analogous to that of J. J. Gibson ( 1950, 1966)
who bases his analysis of visual processes on invariants in the
optic array. But the sources of perturbation across which
constancies are sought are not only the shifting perspectives
of the viewer and changing illumination. The transformations are provided by the caricaturist, and the search for
constancies encouraged by his need to supply an identifiable
work in spite of these transformations, or even by means of
them.
E. J. Gibson's work (1969:102-105) provides a framework
for restating the subject in another way. She, like myself,
feels that the recognition of caricatures can be explained vi a
the normal face recognition process. Caricaturists exaggerate
"distinctive features" of the human face , those features by
means of which viewers discriminate face from face and
identify individuals. Choosing its own terminology, this
paper will speak of individuating "properties" or "attributes"
of the face, taking the terms in the broadest sense and as
synonymous.
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Like sonnet or sonata, this approach is a form needing
explicit content to be meaningful. Of necessity, recognition
depends on individuating properties of the stimulus. On what
else could it depend? The essential questions are which and
what sorts of attributes contribute to identification. Many
alternative sets of properties may be logically adequate bases
for discrimination over a given range of stimulus materials.
Which properties are psychologically relevant must be determined. These could vary from culture to culture, or even
from perceiver to perceiver. But the very phenomenon of
caricature recognition suggests that at least within a culture,
constancies prevail and await discovery.
Any such quest must acknowledge that a caricature
incorporates many devices irrelevant to recognition . Certain
features of caricatures are better accounted for as purely
comic devices, as conventions of cartooning, as means of
expressing personality, or in like ways. Furthermore, some
apt caricatures require the assistance of labels and other cues,
because the subject is not well known or because the
caricature abstracts too far from the subject's appearanceconsider a large capital T labelled "Charles Atlas." If
recognition from the image itself plays an important role in
caricature, there is no pretense that it is the only role. But
that role is the focus of this study.
A search for individuating attributes also demands respect
for the alternative hypothesis, that caricature recognition
occurs in spite of, and not because of, the selective
transformations wrought by the caricaturist. Perhaps a viewer
must become familiar with the distortions caricaturists
generally employ, so that he may discount this false
evidence. Perhaps the viewer must learn that certain information is generally absent, in order not to be confused by that
absence. Perhaps he must learn that caricatures often tell lies
in ways not involving exaggeration, such as displaying the
wrong number of wrinkles on a forehead. In short, possibly a
successful reading of caricatures depends on a sophisticated
familiarity with the genre .
The argument will be that this is not true to any great
extent. The circumstantial evidence points strongly to this
conclusion. However, the gleeful exploration of the caricaturist is not the methodical manipulation of the scientist.
Neither is the response of his audience carefully surveyed and
qu antified. Perfectly rigorous findings must emerge from
more engineered circumstances, in which both the drawings
presented and the responses of viewers are subject to
systematic control and analysis. The present paper will
perhaps point directions into such research, and anticipate
some of its conclusions.
AN EXAMPLE

As leader of the United States government, the President
seems always to acquire the uncomfortable status of "most
caricatured person." When this work began in 1970, cartoons
representing President Richard Nixon proved far more
available than those of anyone else, and a large collection of
these provided the basis for the study. Later on, some
tentative generalizations will be made from consideration of
this one case ; the reader may judge their plausibility for
himself. But one point deserves emphasis: this study concerns recognition of very well known faces and hence

STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION

concerns highly practiced acts of identification. Results will
require at least minor adjustments if applied to recognition
of less familiar or just learned faces. The caricaturist is well
aware of this difference. Paul Szep, political cartoonist for
the Boston Globe, has remarked to me that he can exercise
much more freedom in his treatment of a very well known
face. Less prominent public figures allow less latitude and
require more care if the caricaturist's effort is to prompt
recognition.
Mapping the relationships between caricature recognition
and the recognition of normal faces requires first of all
answers to two questions: which attributes of caricatu res of
the President distinguish them from caricatures of other
individuals, and do those attributes represent exaggerated
properties of the President's true face? The treatment of the
nose is pa rticularly interesting here. Figures 8(a-l) are in most
respects typical. First of all, the nose is long, but also quite
narrow. Such a shape is remarkably uncommon in caricature
in general, the usual "big nose" being much broader at the
base, large but not as thin. But the properties of thinness and
elongation are common to almost all caricature presentations
of President Nixon's nose. There is a further attribute,
common again to nearly all caricatures of the President, but
also not infrequent in caricature in general: the nose slopes
downward from the root.
The swelling toward the tip of this example and the
upward curl of the bridge are properties not as persistent as
the above, but nevertheless common devices occurring in
somewhat better than half of the cartoons examined. A final
feature frequent in caricatures of the President is the vertical
seam in the tip of the nose.
These observations argue that the treatment of the nose
does not merely invoke general conventions like an eye
represented by a dotted circle. Rather, several properties of
the nose are relatively specific to caricatures of the President.
The next section will pursue how important these properties
are to recognition. Here, the question remains whether the
attributes are simply conventions specific to the President, or
whether the caricatures reflect features of the real face. If
they do, this supports the interpretation that caricature
recognition borrows the normal recognition process.
Figures 9a through 9f present profile, three-quarter, and
full-face photographs of the President. The representationin-caricature of the nose as long and narrow seems amply
justified by the profile and three-quarter views. These
properties are not as evident in the full face photographs,
which instead display the rather broad structure of the nose.
More on this later. Most views show that the bottom edge of
the nose slopes markedly down toward the lip, a feature
common to most of the caricatures investigated. The
occasional vertical seam in the tips of caricature noses is
evident in Figures 9d, though few of the photos examined
were sharp enough to contain this detail. An upward curl is
also apparent in the photographs. The bridge of the nose near
the eyes is distinctly more vertical than near the tip.
Examination of photographs of other men reveals that this is
not generally so.
However, the bulb end is dubious as a caricatured feature
of the real face. Photographs 9a and 9d offer no signs of such
a physiognomic structure. Photographs 9b and 9c might be
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Figure 8a

-by Haynie

Figure 8b

- by Szep

- by Feiffer

Figure 8d

- by Feiffer
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thought to do so. But this is an illusion, a consequence of the
dark nostril denting the profile of the nose. Just the same
effect is apparent in photographs of other men with varying
types of noses. Whether the bulb end contributes at all to
recognition still remains somewhat uncertain. The bulb might
express some property other than shape- a fleshy quality for
example. But of course, there is no need to account for
everything in terms of recognition. Comedy is reason enough
in caricature. Such features as the seam, the elongation, the
downward slope, the curl, are on the face of it aspects

Figure Be

- by Oliphant

common to caricature and man. If this is not so of the bulb,
or at least not obviously so, then the feature can readily be
ascribed to objectives other than recognizability .
Full face caricatures of President Nixon pose an interesting problem for cartoonists. Above, it was remarked
that the long nose, a nearly universal feature of the
caricatures, was not apparent in the full face photographs.
Logically it should not occur in full face caricatures. The
natural expectation is that the cartoonist would caricature a
view as seen, indicating the wide nose with the tip dipping
well below the sides, but sacrificing indication of length. But
only one cartoonist to my present knowledge has taken this
course, Jules Feiffer (Figure 8c}.
What is the alternative? An obvious ploy is for the
caricaturist to avoid the full face view, and indeed the full
face view proves quite uncommon. But there are other
means. Figure 8g displays a caricature that is unquestionably
full face except in one respect. The artist, Mort Drucker, has
cocked the nose slightly to the right in order to portray its
length. Challenging the geometry of the viewpoint, he insists
on displaying an attribute he thinks to be important for his
caricature.
Feiffer does much the same in reverse. Just as Drucker
brings his particular conception of the nose, suggested by
three-quarter or profile views, to full face caricature views, so
does Feiffer employ his wide nose style in three-quarter
caricature views as well as full face. Figure 8d is an example.
Thus each artist emphasizes different properties of the nose,
and extends this emphasis to viewpoints where, in a
photograph, these properties would not be as apparent.

Figure 8f

Figure 8g
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Figure 8h

- by Hungerford

Figure 8k

Figure 81

Figure 8i

Figure 8j

-by Lurie

-by Drucker

-by Szep

- by Herb/ock

The hairline and hair also appear to contribute to
recognition. The photographs present the contour of the
hairline clearly. A very distinctive lock runs back along the
center of the forehead, a lock surrounded on either side by
bays. Viewing photos of other men of similar age reveals that
such a hairline contour in this pronounced degree is quite
unusual. Almost all cartoonists drawing the President have
capitalized on the uniqueness of the hairline by rendering it
in their cartoons. A deepening and rounding out of the bays
is the most prevalent means of exaggeration. Almost all
caricaturists do this. Slightly narrowing the center lock is
another common device. Fairly often cartoonists will also
represent waves in the hair, glossiness, and highlights (Figure
8a). Indeed properties of the real hair as photographs 9c and
9d illustrate, often are not indicated at all.
Well worth stressing is that the hairline with the nose, or
even by itself, seems remarkably distinctive of the President.
Caricaturist Haynie offers us in Figure 1Oa President Nixon
clearly recognizable from just the nose up. Concealing either
the hair or the nose with a finger gives some idea of the
relative importance of the two features, suggesting that the
hair, for a single feature, provides the viewer with a
considerable amount of distinguishing information.
The modest jowls evident in the photographs are treated
by virtually all caricaturists. The jowls, like the nose, are
subject not only to accentuation for recognition's sake, but
for humor's sake as well. In the popular three-quarter view,
the jowls are rendered by indicating the bulge in the profile
of the cheek, and, near the mouth, by proper manipulation
of the facial creases from the nose to the tip of the mouth
and from the tip of the mouth down toward the chin.
Sometimes one of these creases is omitted, or the two are
combined into one. Essentially the same technique serves in
full face views (Figure 8g). The degree of exaggeration varies
from the relatively benign Figure 8a, to the utterly grotesque, as in Figures 8e or 8f.
Earlier the awkwardness of portraying the elongate nose
in full face caricatures was discussed. Problems of full face
versus three-quarter versus profile views arise again with the
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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Figures 9a-f
- Photographs of
President Richard Nixon

a

b

e

c

cheeks. In photographs, neither the full face nor the profile
view displays the jowls distinctly. In full face, this situation
has dismayed caricaturists not at all. They proceed to employ
their normal techniques for the cheeks as mentioned above,
ignoring the fact that the jowls are less visible in full face.
The profile photographs, however, suggest difficulties; in
these the jowls though visible are apparent largely through
shading, a device not so much in the cartoonist's repertoire as
is pure line. Near omission (Figure 8j) or extreme exaggeration so that the cheek profile shows (Figure 8k), are two
resolutions. Caricaturist Herblock offers a third of particular
interest. The lacing of wrinkles apparent in Figure 81 serves
to indicate the jowls even in a profile view. These wrinkles
are not at all evident features of the real face. In a few of the
photographs examined, there was the hint of a single crease
dropping from the eye along the side of the cheek. Even in
those cases, there was only one. The truth-in -1ie nature of
caricature was never so bald. These creases, lying as they do
about themselves as specific features, nevertheless succeed in
conveying the slump of the cheek.
14

d

f

However, the general trend is that caricaturists employ a
three-quarter view, ::1nd part of the reason surely is that the
nose is difficult in full face and the cheeks awkward in
profile. Of some 38 caricatures of the President examined for
this work, only five were full face or nearly full face, and
only six were profile views. Paul Szep has told me that in
general a three-quarter likeness is usually easier than one in
profile or full face. Rother (1966), in a "how-to-do-it" article
promotes the three-quarter view. Berger says that the profile
comes easiest- a. minority opinion (Berger 1952). At least in
examples presented here, advantages of the three-quarter
view relate to particular difficulties in representing specific
properties of the face.
A further attribute common to almost all caricatures of
President Nixon is a "box chin." Figure 8g exemplifies,
portraying the tip of the chin as protruding below the basic
line of the jaw. The effect is often quite pronounced in the
caricatures, so that as in this example, the borders of the box
chin become vertical before touching the jawline. A look at
the photographs supports the box chin as a property of the
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and perhaps more so than the box chin. Thus there are
various potentially distinguishing features of the President's
physiognomy that are just as often omitted as used by
caricaturists.

THE QUESTION OF NECESSITY

Figure 70

-A partial view

true face. The tip of the chin in the photographic profiles
clearly depends below the jawline. In the three-quarter and
full-face views, the seams dropping from either side of the
mouth, and a slight shift in the angle of the jawline, serve to
set off an area in the front of the jaw.
Several attributes of Nixon's face in caricature and
in fact have been considered in some detail. Several others
deserve brief mention. Prominent in the former President, as
in many others, are the creases running from the sides of the
nose to the sides of the lips. Caricaturists generally represent
these, and use them to emphasize the cheeks as remarked
earlier. A less common pair of creases can be observed in the
photograph of Figure 9d falling from the sides of the lips
toward the chin. Caricaturists often, but not always, offer
these lines as well. Occasionally these two lines are combined
into one- Figure 8f.
The horizontal crease, or near-crease, falling between
Nixon's lower lip and chin is often depicted in caricature;
this again is a feature common to many human faces. The
cartoonists further generally supply crow's feet and furrows
in the forehead. These are rarely apparent in photographs,
but are real enough and can be seen in the particularly sharp
photograph of Figure 9d. There seems little effort to
replicate the exact patterns of these creases.
Further features near the eyes are of interest. The
eyebrows are dark, and have a distinctive shape, rising from
the middle toward the sides, peaking and then hooking down
again. A number of caricaturists represent this contour (see,
for example, Figure 8g). But better than half do not, even
though it would seem a plausible contribution to recognition-indeed, Rother (1966) claims that the eyebrows are
often an especially effective point of identification. Almost
all photographs reveal distinct bags under the eyes. Some
caricaturists represent these, but just as often not. Again this
is somewhat surprising, since this feature like the eyebrows
seems a priori fully as evident and characteristic as the nose

The four attributes, elongate nose, jowls, contoured
hairline, and box chin, occur persistently in caricatures of
President Nixon and not in caricatures of others. The
features reflect real properties of his face. These observations
suggest that the attributes make a genuine contribution to
recognition. But a more careful test is in order. In logical
terms, to what extent are these attributes necessary for a
portrait caricature to be recognized as the former President,
and to what extent are they sufficient for a portrait
cariacture to be so recognized? The first half of this question
is the concern just now.
An interesting observation, but not an answer to the
question, is that among the professional caricatures examined, having most of the four properties mentioned above
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a portrait
caricature to be an effort (however successful) at caricaturing
President Nixon. This is simply a rephrasing of the fact that
all the samples of Nixon caricatures do have most of these
properties and no samples of non-Nixon caricatures have
most of them. But fundamentally this is a statement about
the behavior of the artists. In spite of their habits, perhaps
fewer of these attributes would do.
Then what is the effect of eliminating one or all of the
four "key" properties from various "good" caricatures of the
President? Figure 11 is a sample. There, 11 a represents a
tracing of the original caricature (Figure 8a). Figure 11 b
copies the original except that is has been redrawn to alter all
four attributes. Further 11 c, d, e, and f copy the original
except that, respectively, jowls, hairline, box chin, and
elongate nose have been redrawn. Clearly the modifying of
all four in 11b utterly destroys its recognizability. For a
single attribute, absence of jowls in 4c perhaps most degrades
the resemblance, and the hairline in 4d the least impairs it. In
all cases, there is a marked detriment. Similar manipulations
of other caricatures bear out these observations.
Simple absence of one or more. of these four properties is
not the degrading factor. Recall the success of Figure 10. It is
not the invisibility of the key properties, but their replacement by counter-properties that degrades the resemblance by
providing inappropriate clues. But some other properties
logically just as distinctive (e.g., the eyebrows) may be
completely misrepresented with little if any effect on
identification.
What is the conclusion about the necessity of these four
properties? One might say casually that they - and perhaps
others- are "rather necessary" or "mostly necessary . " The
equivocation is essential. A cartoon may indicate an attribute, contra-indicate it (i.e., indicate something incompatible with it) or give no information about it. If each of the
four features is necessary in any ser,se, the sense is not that
each must necessarily be present. Rather, no feature must be
contra-indicated.
Of course, even this is too strong. Contra-indication of
one or two attributes may leave a substantial resemblance
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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- Caricature 8a with modified features
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and permit recognition. The mechanisms of recognition
operate with a certain tolerance for and awareness of
contra-indication. The four attributes are "rather necessary"
in the sense that contra-indication of any one of them
degrades resemblance (and presumably recognition) much
more than simple absence, and contra-indication of many of
them destroys resemblance and recognition.
The tracings that yielded conclusions about "rather
necessary" conditions also point to a definitely unnecessary
condition: the exact shape of the caricature. The tracing
process inevitably introduces minor metric deviations from
the proportions of the original caricature. But the traced
caricature remains recognizable, as Figure 11 a illustrates. Yet
such minor distortion can be significant; the effect on
photographs is quite different. Figure 12 displays tracings of

f

photographs 9c and 9d. The resemblance to the President is
slight indeed. Two more considerations complete the point:
tracings of large photographs are readily recognizable, and
even a freehand copy of a caricature is generally quite
recognizable. Then as far as recognition is concerned, the
caricature is much less sensitive to minor random metric
distortion than the true photograph or presumably the true
face. Exact metric proportion is not a critical aspect of a
caricature.
This finding should not be surprising. Exaggeration is the
central technical device of caricature. The caricaturist pushes
the distinguishing trends of a subject's proportions toward
extremes. If recognition depends on or is enhanced by these
overstated trends, then minor metric variations should not
alter the overstatement nor therefore reduce recognition.

Figure 72
- Tracings of Figures 9c and 9d
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THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY
The exploration of necessary conditions leaves unsettled
the matter of sufficient conditions. Are the four attributes
stressed above sufficient for a caricature to be recognizable as
the President? The point of course would be to list attributes
at once necessary and sufficient. For sufficiency alone, all
one need do is select a recognizable carica ture and to
announce that duplicates of this are sufficient. This tells us
nothing. Strictly speaking, the bid for both necessity and
sufficiency is already lost, since the attributes under discussion are only "rather necessary" in t he e la bo rate se nse
discussed earlier. However, perh aps at least there is a concept
of "rather sufficient" to match.
But the game really is lost. Neither the four key
properties, no r these together with various ancillary features
mentioned ea rlier, are sufficient or even approach sufficiency. A convincing demonstration of this is an effort to
caricature according to the recipe of these properties. Failure
is remarkably easy. In the course of this study, I have learned
to make recognizable caricatures of Nixon with fair reliability (Figure 13) but also have learned how easy it is to
miss. Figure 14 exhibits a deliberate miss. The evidence is
there: jowls, hairline, nose, box chin, and more. But the
visage remains unrecognizable. In this case, reasons are not at
all elusive. The line of the profile is too concave and the
entire head too squat. Thus there are properties "rather
necessary" to a caricature of the President not among those
already discussed.
Such failures are not the exclusive province of the
amateur. There are a number of quite inadequate professional attempts. This emerged in a striking way after much of the
analysis reported here had been completed. Searches through
periodicals uncovered caricatures which formerly would not
have been collected. A deliberate check of their features
revealed that they were efforts at caricaturing the President,
efforts which had formerly prompted no recognition. A

careful look at the context (captions, White House in the
background, etc.) confirmed these judgments. This remarkable circumstance demonstrates once again that the four
attributes fall well short of sufficiency. On the positive side,
it stresses again how persistent these attributes are, occurring
as they do in both successful and unsuccessful professional
efforts.
Why do these properties fall so far short of sufficiency,
and what chances are there for improvement? An examination of less effective caricatures reveals on the one hand
definite directions for refinement, and on the other some
extreme difficulties. First, the descriptive predicates used are
after all rather vague; they allow too much room for
variation. For example, jowls which descend too far but
bulge · little seem to detract. One course therefore is to
narrow definitions of the present properties. Second, there
are further "rather necessary" conditions inviting specification, as illustrated above. Some caricatures suffer from a
head too squat, or a profile too concave or convex. In
general, it is often easy to point to a particular aspect of an
inadequate caricature and suggest a specific improvement. A
tracing of the caricature, with the aspect then appropriately
modified, is more effective. But just as often the failing is an
enigma. No approaches for improvement occur, or those that
do are ineffective when tried.
A more subtle barrier to refining this approach is that the
shape predicates used here are framed in words. Words are
singularly inadequate for conveying shape information. One
would prefer some sort of notation for shape, a notation in
terms of which such conditions as "long nose" or "jowls"
could be defined in a narrower and more precise sense. But
Goodman (1968) gives reason to doubt that such a notation
is possible. His analysis stresses that the infinitesimal variation possible in pictures is incompatible with certain formal
requirements for a notation. Perhaps for this purpose,
something short of a notation in his sense would do.
Certainly, a truly elegant theory of caricature recognition (or

)
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Figure 73

- Caricatures by the author
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Figure 75a

Figure 74

-by Zsep

-A deliberate miss

of recognition in general) would seem to require some
language more appropriate than English.
Although the properties discussed offer no certain
formula for recognizable caricatures, most professional caricaturists are persistently successful in their renderings of the
President. Each artist has developed his own recipe, his own
"sufficient" but not "necessary" approach to caricaturing
the President. There is a great variation from artist to artist,
but the cartoons by the same artist are very much alike;
Figure 15 illustrates. It is not difficult to learn to draw
caricatures of the President in the manner of the various
artists discussed here. Much harder, even with the help of a
list of important properties, is to invent a suitable technique
of one's own.
In the light of these remarks, the relevance of the four
properties to learning to caricature might be questioned. But
recall that these properties were found to be ''rather
necessary"; omitting them assures failure. Neither do beginners usually include them from the first. In a casual
experiment, about ten college students were invited to
caricature the President from photographs 9c and 9d . They
then heard a lecture and saw illustrations explaining many of
the points presented here. Finally, they were again called
upon to try a caricature, and were urged to use the several
properties that had been stressed in the course of the lecture.
The result was not, of course, a set of perfect caricatures. But
in almost every case the student included in the second
important properties he had formerly omitted. Almost all
initial efforts were quite unrecognizable, but in several cases
the second attempt began to bear distinct resemblance to the
President. Figures 16 (before and after) offer an example.

Figure 75b

Figure 75c

-by Zsep

Figure 75d

A MODEL OF RECOGNITION
The study of caricatures of the President suggests a
number of generalizations. The recognition of a caricature as
representing a particular subject appears to depend in large
part upon a few ' ' key" properties of the subject's physiognomy, properties presented in exaggerated form in the
caricature. Recognition as that subject is blocked if a few of
these key properties a re contra-indicated. Some properties
weigh more heavily than others in this respect. If not so
18
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Figure 76
-Caricatures by a student, before (left) and
after (right) a lecture on caricatures of the President

blocked, recognition can often take place in spite of the
pictured spatial form's divergence from the shape of the
subject's face, in spite of the omission of numerous details, in
spite of the inclusion of false detail, in spite of concealment
of several key properties (as opposed to contra-indication of
themL and in spite of the inclusion of properties inconsistent
with the viewpoint.
These considerations are reminiscent of identifying an
item through a logical conjunction of conditions. Several
positive findings may suffice to discriminate that item from
other items. But one negative finding suffices to disprove
that identification. The same logic appears to underlie the
caricature recognition process, a process however which is
cautious enough of circumstantial evidence or counterevidence not to reject an hypothesis on the basis of just one
negative finding.

This leaves two questions: whether the same general
model of pattern recognition applies to face, as well
as to caricature, identification; and further whether the
properties caricature and face recognition depend upon
are the same. Most broadly, face recognition like caricature recognition can be viewed as a process of checking
for certain "key" attributes. To put flesh on that skeleton
requires saying something about what kind of attributes. The
situation with caricature suggests that in normal face
recognition also: (1) precise metric information and fine
detail about the face is irrelevant; (2) the key attributes are
relatively few; (3) the disposition of non-key attributes,
whether presented, concealed, or contra-indicated, is irrelevant to recognition; (4) recognition may take place on
the basis of very partial evidence; (5) recognition will be
blocked by contra-indication of key attributes.

Figure 7 7
-The effect of blurring on
recognition; pictures blurred as on the
right were recognized 85% of the time
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Metric Precision and Fine Detail

Irrelevant Attributes

Recent experiments of Harmon {1973) establish clearly
that metric precision and fine detail are unnecessary for face
recognition. Harmon tested subjects' recognition of images of
faces treated in ways that destroyed fine detail and exact
contour to varying degrees. He found that recognition could
survive substantial mistreatment of the image, as in Figure
17 for instance.
Superficially, this finding appears contrary to the discovery mentioned earlier that tracings of small photographs
of the President did not yield good resemblances. The
resolution lies in recognizing two points. First of all, the
amount of blurring a given face can stand and still remain
recognizable will certainly vary with the particular attributes
that are distinctive of that face, as Harmon has noted. But
second and more important, this paper argues that recognition of real faces, like caricatures, depends on the trend,
rather than the exact measure, of features- whether noses are
long or short as noses go, chins are weak or strong as chins
go. On this interpretation, for face and caricature recognition
alike, accuracy per se would have no value; but inaccuracy to
the degree of changing trends would block recognition.
Indeed the traced features of the President in Figure 12 do
not deliver particularly well three of the four properties
isolated: jowls, box chin, and elongated nose.

This category asks whether in recognition of true faces as
in caricature recognition, large numbers of non-key attributes
are simply irrelevant to recognition, which will succeed
whether those attributes are represented or misrepresented. I
know of no literature addressing this issue. If one accepts the
thesis that caricature recognition simply borrows the normal
face recognition process, caricature itself is the best example
of this happening.

Few Key Attributes
This issue presupposes that recogn1t1on depends on
various measures, accurate or crude, of the face, measures
such as nose length, nose angle, eye placement, eyebrow
thickness. Obviously one could list an enormous number of
dimensions which varied across individuals and logically
could be used to differentiate them. But the analysis of
caricatures suggests that, there at least, relatively few dimensions suffice. The four attributes identified earlier might
break down into ten or so dimensions- the nose might
involve length, thickness, and upward curl, for instance.
Although the attributes proved insufficient for recognition,
their obviously important role suggests they reflect ten or so
out of 20 or 30 crucial dimensions, not ten buried among
100. Does the same principle apply to recognition of real
faces; are key dimensions for a particular face relatively few
in number, say 20 or 30?
The question has not been directly studied, but indirect
evidence suggests an affirmative answer. Harmon {1973) in
another study found that 21 dimensions sufficed to sort very
effectively a population of 256 portraits of white unbearded
males without glasses from 20 to 50 years old. Some
examples of the dimensions are hair from full to bald,
forehead receding- vertical - bulging, nose short-mediumlong. Indeed subjects' estimates of the ten measures most
prominent or differentiating for a particular photograph
served quite reliably to single it out from the population,
despite the contamination of frequent errors in estimating.
Without speaking directly to the process of reflexive recognition of individuals, the findings demonstrate that relatively
few attributes suffice to single an individual out of a large
population, and also that such attributes can be perceptually
judged.
20

Partial Evidence
A study by Goldstein and Mackenberg {1966) established
that normal face recognition can succeed on the basis of
partial evidence. Goldstein and Mackenberg employed a
variety of masks obscuring parts of the face and studied face
recognition in kindergarten, first, and fifth grade children.
The task was to recognize masked photographs of classmates,
photographs which, unmasked, were all recognized two
weeks prior to testing. Exposure from the middle of the nose
up permitted 95% recognition by the fifth graders. Even
exposure from the eyebrows up allowed fifth graders to
recognize 70% of the photographs. The stress laid earlier on
the hair and the hairline as a cue for recognition receives
some support here. Exposure below the center of the nose
yielded only about 45% recognition, as did exposure of a
horizontal bar-shaped region including the eyes and the
bridge of the nose. In summary, it would appear that the face
from the eyebrows up offers a great deal of information for
recognition; both the muzzle area and the face from the
eyebrows to the bridge of nose offer markedly less information and about the same amount, in isolation. Recognition
evidence from the nose is difficult to assess here, as almost all
the masks partly obscured it.

Counter-Evidence
Some encouragement for the role of counter-evidence in
perception of faces comes from a study by Bradshaw and
Wallace {1971). They utilized stimulus materials assembled
with an lndentikit-a collection of transparent overlays
providing a variety of noses, eyes, and other facial features
for the compilation of complete faces; the kit is normally
used in criminal identification work. Subjects were presented
with pairs of faces, the two of each pair sometimes being
identical, or sometimes differing by varying numbers of
features. Subjects were to report as quickly as possible
whether the faces were identical or not. Bradshaw and
Wallace found that responses were more rapid the greater the
number of differing features. This supports a serial featurechecking analysis of the matching task at the expense of a
parallel "gestalt" analysis, where processing time would not
decrease with an increase in differing features. In particular,
the data best fit the hypothesis that the process was
"sequential, self-terminating, without replacement"meaning that the process was one of sequentially testing for
matching features, that it terminated upon finding a discrepancy, and that features once tested were never tested
again for that example.
These results are compatible with the view of face
recognition proposed here; the serial finding underscores the
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importance of individual attributes and the self-termination
is equivalent to the heavy weight accorded counter-evidence.
However, this matching task involved pairs of strange faces
whereas the paradigm task of the present study is the
recognition of extremely familiar faces. Bradshaw and
Wallace recognize this difference themselves. Their study,
nevertheless, demonstrates that the human pe rceptual system
is highly sensitive to, and accords considerable weight to,
mismatches in comparing faces. This sensitivity and weight
plausibly carries over to face recognition, where the stimulus
must in some sense be compared to stored information about
familiar faces.

A GESTALT ALTERNATIVE?
T he argumen t for an attribute-checking model of face
recognition seems to stand in opposition to a gestalt view of
recognition, where the perceptual mechanisms respond not
to a collection of attributes, but to the holistic pattern of
their interrelations. In fact, the two perspectives do not
compete nearly as much as they seem to. A little thought
reveals that the attribute-checking model allows perfectly
well for a gestalt interpretation.
First of all, no specific restrictions have been placed on
what may count as a key attribute. True, the four properties
stressed in t he example, jowls, nose, hairline, and box chin,
are spatially localized in certain parts of the head and might
be called individual features. But this accident of the present
analysis does not disallow properties with ~ mQ_re gestalt
flavor, properties such as the ratios of distances between the
eyes and from eye to mouth, or approximate positions of
features in the oval of the head, or the general shape of the
head dimensionalized in some manner. Indeed, the contour
of the whole seemed to be part of the problem with the
"deliberate miss" in Figure 14.
On this interpretation, the attributes, however gestalt-like,
still describe the physical shape of the face. But perhaps faces
might be encoded in memory and recognized in holistic
terms not directly descriptive of shape, in terms of personality for instance. One person might have a spiteful but lazy
face, another a visage cloyingly .friendly, and so forth. That
faces can be encoded reliably in such terms has been
demonstrated (Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955;
Shoemaker, South, and Lowe 1973). Observers are generally
asked to classify the faces presented in terms of a given
vocabulary or along dimensions such as sincere-insincere. The
classifications are often "objective" within the culture, that
is, much the same from judge to judge. However, there is no
evidence of correlation between attributed personality and a
depicted
person's
actual
personality
(Hochberg
1964:105-11 0).
Such a means of encoding faces may not be especially
effective. Yin (1970), in a study where observers tried to
describe faces in writing and later match faces to. descriptions, found that description of personality did not work
well. In any case, far from being contrary to an attribute
checking process, readings of personality appear to depend
on just the sorts of facial attributes under discussion. For
example, Secord and Muthard, in a study of judgments of
women's faces, found a frequent clustering of three personality attributions, "conceited," "likes men's attention," and

"demanding," which they termed the "gold-digger syndrome." The making of these judgments proved to be highly
correlated positively with a photograph displaying high
eyebrows, bowed lips, visible eyelids, tilted head, and narrow
eyes, and correlated negatively with square face, widened
eyes, untilted head, and straight lips.
A more serious challenge comes from E. H. Gombrich
(1972:26-28) who points out that the particular measures a
face appears to have depend on the whole shape of the face.
For instance, how close together the eyes seem-and therefore how lively or dull the face appears-turns not only on
their objective distance but on how widely the whole face
and hair extends. This stance really presents a synthesis of
the gestalt and attribute-detecting spirits. Acknowledging the
relevance of measures of the face, Gombrich's account points
out that such measures are influenced by the shape of the
whole. Such an interpretation sits comfortably with the
attribute-checking process explained here because that
attribute-checking is done by the human eye. Recognition
research depending on objective measures of human features
would not allow for the gestalt influence. But in research
such as Harmon's or Secord's, or for instance in the use of an
ldentikit, the human eye judges the relevant dimensions and
gestalt influences come into play automatically.
In summary, no genuine conflict obtains between the
gestalt viewpoint and the present description of recognition
as a process of checking certain physical attributes of the
face. Indeed, the gestalt perspective enriches the concept of
how such attributes checking works. This is not to say that
differences never emerge between attribute-checking and
gestalt theories of recognition, but at least such differences
ma ke little trouble for the present argument.

RESEMBLANCE AND RECOGNITION
The available evidence enc ourages the position that face
and caricature recognition are similar processes, depending
on the presence of some among a few key attributes, and on
the absence of contra-indications of key attributes. The
natural step is to conclude that face recognition employs just
those same properties that the caricaturist chooses to
emphasize; he selects these in order to borrow the normal
recognition process.
An alternative interpretation is that caricatures are conventionalized symbols established by the practice of caricaturists within the culture. Indeed, this occasionally
happens. Gombrich (1972: 12-13) has cited a case where
Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's financial wizard, gradually became
represented solely by a high stiff collar. In general, though, a
convention for every person does not allow for recognition
in-caricature of individuals one has never before seen
caricatured, a common event.
A weaker but more plausible version of the convention
theory is that observers have learned - at -a reflexive automatic level-what information caricatures generally provide
and what they leave out. Normal face recognition would use
many more properties than caricatures are careful about. For
a naive viewer, those "extra" properties not captured in
caricatures would act as counter-evidence, blocking recognition. This suggests an experiment. Would naive viewers,
familiar with picturing in general but unfamiliar with
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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caricatures, fail or succeed in identifying familiar faces from
caricatures? Such an experiment has not been done. Even so,
my bet is that extended adaptation would not be required.
Economy of means in psychological functioning argues that
the extra information provided by accurate depictions over
caricatures is simply extraneous to the recognition process.
The trouble with this tack is that it seems to imply a
discrete, categorical perception of the world. Can it be true
that out of the richness of visual information offered the eye
we draw only a few trends- long noses versus short, weak
chins versus strong. Do we see simply by pigeon-holing?
Surely any such stand contradicts our everyday experience
with the fineness and subtlety of visual discrimination.
Indeed, we know a good deal more about a face than a
caricature would offer. For one thing, we do not mistake
caricatures for accurate conventional portraits; we can
readily point out the exaggerations. Even given a conventional portrait, if we are asked (without the model present)
"what do you think of this resemblance," we can sometimes
point out subtle divergences- the hair too curly, the forehead
a little high, and so forth. From this standpoint, a trendoriented categorical recognition process seems implausible.
The solution lies in realizing that recognition is one thing
and resemblance something else again. Nuances of resemblance are at issue when one already knows the identity of
the depicted face, by being told or by recognizing it.
Recognition involves a rapid reflexive "look-up" system for
identifying faces. Streamlined for function, the system
operates with relatively few categorizations which taken
together differentiate one person from another quickly and
effectively, and without requiring extremely precise scanning
of the stimulus. When recognition is achieved, one may then
find one has available considerable further information about
the face, even information contrary to the stimulus.
Accordingly, we may reflexively recognize a caricature of
the President with straight hair, no bags under the eyes, and
curved eyebrows, even though we know his hair curls a
bit, his eyebrows peak, and his eyes have bags. This is part of
our knowledge, but not part of that knowledge used by the
look-up system. Likewise, we may discover an old friend on
the street, only to realize on second glance that it is someone
else; the results of the reflexive look-up are checked against
the further knowledge made available by the look-up.
In this context, the paradox of caricature recognition
disappears. Though relative to our full perceptual capacities,
caricatures are grossly inaccurate in depicting the shapes of
their subjects, the look-up subsystem exercises much more
generous standards. The caricaturist chooses his exaggeration
not to achieve a convincing resemblance, but to trigger the
look-up system, perhaps to trigger it even more effectively
than the real face. He has the freedom to do this, and to
pursue aims such as humor and interpretation of the
personality at the same time, exactly because there is so little
the look-up system really cares about.

On August 24 Associate Editor Larry Gross brought the following
news story from the Philadelphia Bulletin (8/23/74) to my attention.
Because of its obvious relation to the preceding paper on caricature,
I am taking the liberty of adding it as an extra illustration to the paper
by Perkins. - SW
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Ford Gives Nightmares
To Political CartC)onists"
_,. fl'he writer is .a political car•
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NOTE
1 This research was conducted at Project Zero, of the Harvard
Graduate School of Education, operating under National Science
Foundation Grant GB-31064 and National Institute of Education
Grant G-003-0169. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily
reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education,
and no official endorsement should be inferred.
I thank Howard Gardner and Nelson Goodman for their perceptive
comments on an earlier version; Paul Szep, political cartoonist for the
Boston Glob e , for an enlightening interview on the ins and outs of his
art; Graham Roupas for several useful conversations; and John
Kennedy, who first drew my attention to the problems of caricature.
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Figure 76 - "before and after" drawings by a member of lecture
audience.

Figure 7 7- from "The Recognition of Faces," Leon D. Harmon,
Scientific American (Nov. 1973, pp. 70-82).
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Includes computer programs, illustrations about the placement
of cameras and observers, and an extensive bibliography. It is
available to members at $3.00 per copy and to non-members
and institutions at $5.00 per copy. Bookstores, teachers and
others wishing to place bulk orders should write to Sol Worth,
editor of Studies, for special instructions. All others wishing to
obtain copies should write directly to SAVICOM.
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TOWARD A RESEARCHABLE FILM LANGUAGE 1
STEVE FELD
CARROll WilliAMS

In the course of reading and tal king about the numerous
publications concerning anthropology film, a constant problem has been apparent to us. This is the tendency to confuse
various filmic styles and techniques with an anthropological
methodology of research film. In order to shift gears
considerably and move away from this "cookbook" level of
discussion, we have written a paper whose character is
principally epistemological and conceptual, rather than
methodological and stylistic. The concern of this paper is to
facilitate a system of thinking by positing a particular
interrelationship of ideas. It is not a radical or visionary
exegesis, but a discussion which proceeds from the point at
which we now find our~elves, utilizing what "knowns"
already exist.
With this in mind, a few short caveats are offered: This is
a position paper, an exposition of thinking in progress. It is
neither a scholarly review of particular accomplishments nor
an attempt to define or delimit a field of work. Hence we
have excluded the usual scholarly references. Further, because we are synthesizing considerably and writing to a broad
readership, sections of the paper will appear suggestive but
substantially lacking to readers of certain orientations. Much
background material and detail has been omitted; we
encourage correspondence in the pages of this journal
regarding such issues that our readers think invite fuller
discussion.

* * *
This paper is essentially a discussion of three filmic
paradigms: the locked-off camera (LOC), conventional film
language {CFL), and researchable film observation (RFO). By
three filmic paradigms we mean three distinct process-toproduct systems which take in conceptual organization
(before filming and editing), image collecting and ordering
(editing), and filmic interpretation. The starting point of the
paper is the LOC paradigm, currently fashionable as a social
science research film methodology.

Steve Feld and Carroll Williams are currently researching the
epistemology of generating and analyzing social science film,
and preparing to shoot extended samples of interaction for a
sociolinguistics multiple analysis project. Steve is writing a
thesis on filming naturally occurring speech and social
interaction; Carroll is director of the Anthropology Film
Center in Santa Fe, where he regularly teaches courses in
social science film.

Our first argument is that a positive association between
LOC filming and the generation of reliable research footage is
unprincipled. We will show that the LOC paradigm, conceived as a set of working instructions for research filming, is
founded on dubious assumptions about the film perceptiontranslation-communication2 system, human observational
process and observable realities, and scientific process
generally. In addition, we are concerned that questionable
ethics are involved.
In arguing the weaknesses of the LOC paradigm we do not
propose that it be substituted by conventional film language.
We believe that CFL is artificial and has little to offer the
researching filmer.
An alternate paradigm, beyond the event-chopping
artificiality of CFL and the naivete of LOC, is discussed. The
RFO approach is evaluated as it relates to the other two in
terms of the central criterion raised in this paper, that of
"maximized researchability."
The thrust of our thesis is that generating researchable
film depends on a sophisticated research problem, on
maximizing the seeing/hearing potentials of the film technology observation system, and on the translationcommunication skills of the researching filmer. Therefore,
RFO is not a static process but a creative one, relying on
intuitive as well as improvisational skills.
lOCKED-OFF CAMERA
AND CONVENTIONAl FILM lANGUAGE

The concern of this section is a description and a
comparison of the LOC and the CFL paradigms. For
purposes of graphic comparison, we will use a typical social
science filming situation, the psychological interview.
Physically, the LOC apparatus consists of an immobile
camera or cameras, fastened in one position to a tripod so
that it/they will not tilt or pan (i.e., move vertically or
horizontally). The lens is set at a single focal length for a
single angle and makes no optical movements ("zooms").
The two essential aspects of this methodology are: (a) the
camera is hidden, be it behind a curtain, one-way mirror, or
special shooting booth with a peep-hole for the lens. While
the subjects may or may not be informed of their being
filmed, the camera is obscured from their view; much like the
TV "candid camera," it is invisible by its location. And (b)
the camera does not have an operator who is introducing
human choice or selection into the filming situation beyond
selecting the angle, focal length, camera height, f-stop, and
sound taking positions. In other words, no new qualifiers are
being introduced by the filmer; in fact, the start/stop
function of the camera may even be programmed by an
intervalometer. The LOC product is an essentially secret
record made through time with a constant frame being held
by a hidden, non-humanly operated camera.
Human choice is, of course, minimally involved. Frame,
angle, and focal length are consciously selected by the
researcher in coordination with his needs for a specific data
level for his after-the-event film examination. In some
scientific work this means an extremely microscopic frame
area. In social science filming (and particularly the case of
the psychological interview), we are, however, generally
speaking of extreme wide angle coverage, showing full figures
TOWARD A RESEARCHABLE FILM LANGUAGE
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and contexts for all of the partiCipants. See Figure 1 for
some typical angles of inclusiveness in such framing.
At this point we shall turn to the assumptions that
underly the usage of the locked-off camera. (1) First, it is
assumed that the human observational system is inadequate
for some chosen observational tasks; that it can't get "all the
data all the time." Human memory and sensory inputs are
thought to be overloaded by the amount of significant data
that exists in a situation; thus, another recording system is
imperative. (2} In order to create laboratory-like objective
recording, film must be used. Film is thought to be a
non-biased recording device capable of adequately imaging
"reality" when, and only when, it is conceived and produced
not as an "art form" but as a research tool that can perform
para-human tasks. (3} Film is also thought in this paradigm
to be essential because research requires total data across a
total time base. All behavior is assumed to be signal - there is
no noise. Therefore, the only way to get the total signal,
while at the same time eliminating all human filtering is to
film with no compression or expansion of the time base: a
one-to-one record.
To further clarify the nature of the LOC paradigm, a
comparison with conventional film language will be helpful.
First, what do we mean by "conventional film language"? By
"conventional" we are referring to the theatrical mode of
filmic translation that is definable in terms of the filmmaker's ability to "shoot to cut" (edit} and the audience's
26

Figure 7

competence to "read" (interpret} the sequence of images. In
other words, the acceptable mode of temporal and spatial
condensation and ordering of an event, or message about an
event, such that, when projected, it will be comprehended
easily. By "film language" we will make a limited analogy.
Essentially, we are referring to the fact that the formal
structuring of filmed units can be described roughly in a way
similar to that of the syntactic component of a language.
Film images are collected in order to be concatenated in a
meaningful way. Two processes are involved: the conjoining
of units and the embedding of lower order units within
higher order units. The interplay of these factors is what
creates recursivity in the structure of film. For instance, a
sequence opens with an establishing shot (ES}, moves to a
medium shot (MS), then to a closeup (CU}, to a reverse point
of view closeup (CU-R}, then back to a medium shot (MS),
returning to a fuller establishing shot (ES}. Within a skeletal
ES to MS to CU to MS to ES format there are infinite
possibilities of lower order insertions. Within the segment
MS-CU-MS there is a smaller set of possibilities, using
extreme closeups (ECU}, reverse point of view closeups
(CU-R}, and cutaways or reaction shots (CW}. The point is
that there is an already established "film language" which
allows the filmmaker, through translation, to break down
and reconstruct aspects of an event to construct a communication about the whole event.
With the use of synchronous sound, the time component
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------of the event may be kept intact while the spatial orientation
and point of view is changed or alternated by intercutting
two or more camera angles. The collecting of the images and
the editing process are governed by rules and conventions of
acceptability within genres and codes. Only so much variation in the concatenating of shots can take place before the
viewer decides that he is watching some sort of avant-garde
film where the filmmaker is "saying something" in an
unconventional manner. Such judgments make up a viewer's

. -~·

film interpretation competence. Similarly, the filmmaker's
competence involves knowing how to "shoot to cut," i.e., to
collect the images so that their montage will "read" to the
viewer as he intends it to and that his idea will be
communicated.
To compare this paradigm to the LOC approach described
earlier, here is a storyboard illustrating how CFL would
"cover" the same psychological interview that the LOC
records with the single angle frame (see Figure 2) .
TOWARD A RESEARCHABLE FILM LANGUAGE
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In the storyboard we have an eight-shot pattern which
gives an idea of how CFL breaks down and then reconstructs
the natural flow of the action using various focal lengths)
angles) points of view) and spatial orientations. The sequence
begins with a wide establishing shot (ESL moves in for a side
angle medium frame (MSL to a close up (CUL switches
angles and "mirrors" the closeup with its reverse (CU-RL
pulls back and reverses angle for another medium frame
(MSL goes to the reaction shot cutaway (CWL then to
another type of medium shot (MSL and finally back to the
establishing shot orientation marker (ES).
A typical CFL approach to interview material is found
here in the embedded MS to CU to CU-R to MS-R pattern
(numbers 2) 3) 4) and 5 of Figure 2). This is the "ping-pong"
effect where camera A gives a medium shot from the side
angle) combining profile and full faces. Camera B then intercuts a cross shot CU of the profiled speaker. The reverse
angle CU is then ping-ponged using either composition. Then
camera B pulls back for the reverse medium shot. The pingpong closeups within the MS angles can be repeated ad
infinitum) although in long sequences reaction shots are
usually added for various purposes.
It is important to note that we are not only describing a
system for shooting to cut hard-matched action shots) i.e.) a
sequence filmed by two cameras for intercutting the angles.
In fact) the MS to CU to CU-R to MS-R sequence and all of
its variants can be filmed in a single continuous take) with
the moves being made totally by the walking) panning) and
zooming of one cameraman. In other words) we are not
equating CFL with cameras on tripods. In fact) much of what
nowadays is inappropriately labelled as "cinema-verite" is no
more than theatrical CFL without the hard cuts. Many socalled "non-conventional" cameramen are obeying the same
"shoot to cut" rules as the two camera storyboard team)
even when shooting long uninterrupted takes and moving
about freely with lightweight crystal sync handheld equipment.
While many have come to label any piece of grainy)
poorly exposed) handheld) shaky-frame) first-take piece of
"live" news footage as cinema-verite) one can see that we are
talking of the same filmic structuring that governs daily TV
soap operas. The moves) the angles) and the rhythms are
equally predictable in either case and) upon close notice)
show Iittle deviation from the rules cited above.
Finally) we should note that we have made very general
characterizations. Although we have approached film's
syntactic structure using linguistic jargon) this is not the
place to expound a theory of cine-semiotics) if such a thing
exists. The fact that we are anthropology filmmakers forces
us to say that we have deliberately not dealt with cultural
differences in film structuring. While we believe this to be an
essential question) it is beyond the scope of this preliminary
statement. What we have described as CFLJ then) is no more
than European-American CFL; we do not suggest that there
is a pan-human predisposition to structure and organize film
sequencing in the same way.
Before continuing with a discussion of film paradigms)
other factors regarding the relation of film to research needs
and potentials must be pointed out. It is only after these
factors have been discussed that we can critically evaluate the
uti! ity of the LOC and CFL approaches to film research.
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RESEARCH AND RESEARCHABILITY
IN HUMAN AND FILM OBSERVATIONS

The aim of this section is to discuss research using film)
and the researchability of film footage. Basically we will
argue that the filming observer must be the human observer
who knows and understands the differences and similarities
of the filmic and human perception systems. Moreover)
maximizing the researchability of footage is dependent upon
imagining an event in a way that you look at it) so that you
can look at it on film (over and over) and hence do research
with it.
First) what do we mean by "research with film"? V/e mean
using film in some way to solve a problem. In this process
film is neither a research method nor a technique- but an
epistemology; it is a design for how to think about and hence
create the working conditions for exploring the particular
problem involved.
Anything that one collects on film can be researched. In
large measure) however) recent examples of social science
"research film" appear to be attempts to mimic hard science
through linear cause-effect thinking. The researcher/scientist
thinks he knows what the film will show because he doesn't
believe that the filming process has anything to do with
creating the conditions through which he will deal with a
chosen problem. Research then becomes a planned closed
circuit) oblivious to the levels of information the filmer and
filming situation are or are not adding) and much less aware
of what film's potential role might be. Film is thus seen as a
research recording tool which makes a record of something
you already know) and already know how to study. It is no
more than a black box whose product is available for research.
This is far different from our conception of researchable
film. For us) researchable film means maximizing the research potentials of a problem) in terms of both its
"knowns" and "unknowns" by using the film observation/
translation process as a creative input related to the research
design. For a film to be researchable one must be able to
look at it; being able to look at it means being able to see in
it what was seen in the event itself by the researcher. By
researchability) we mean observation as seen through the
camera) primed by how the skilled observer would see the
event without the camera.
The first set of skills in this process involve indepth training in the research area. The ability to generate sophisticated
research is the result of a long period of orientation) awareness) sensitivity) and sharpened intuitions in the chosen
discipline.
The second set of skills requires the acquisition of justified self-confidence in handling motion picture technology.
Only at this point can one integrate the capabilities of film
with the needs of research design. Learning film translation
skills explicitly means learning CFL as a baseline competence
system) and LOC as an alternative to it. In order tci film the
way you want) you must know what kind of film you don't
want.
The skill family that links these first two involves perception) specifically) the different workings of the eye-seeing
and the camera-seeing systems. What pulls it all together for
maximizing researchability is the filmer's understanding of
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how to use film-seeing to translate what the human seeing
system is responding to in the observation process.
The eye sees with one focal length, optically similar
to a 25mm lens on a 16mm cine camera. The camera lens, on
the other hand, can exist in a variety of focal lengths, either
fixed ("prime" lenses) or variable ("zoom" lenses). The eye
resolves data at a higher level than any camera lens system
and has a single point of sharp focus. Simultaneously the eye
is always receiving soft focus inputs. The camera lens images
an entire frame in sharp focus, whatever the lens system. The
area of peripheral data that can be taken in by the camera is
always less than the peripheral input of the eye, although the
camera's resolution of the area is much higher.
The eye's ratio of sharp to soft focus is a product of the
shifting signal-to-noise sorting process in the brain. The eye is
coupled to a variable focal length brain, while the camera has
no autonomous brain attachment. Four examples can clarify
the differences: (1) The brain allows the eye to shift to wide
angle viewing, lowering sharp focus, so that an increased level
of coding of all input can occur. (2) Conversely, the brain
allows the eyes to shift to sharp focus on another (possibly
high level) signal, reducing the level of every other input.
Two other possibilities are illustrated by an interaction triad:
(3) When person A shifts from sharp focus in the area of
person B to sharp focus in the area of person C and then
back to sharp focus in the area of person B, often (depending
on the spatial situation of the triad) person A still has input
from the peripheral soft focus vision of person B. Or (4),
persons A and B are interacting and conducting appropriate
eye contact, but person A is really perceiving and interpreting person C. All four of these situations (and obviously
many more) are beyond the capabilities of any lens system
hooked into a brainless camera.
In actual experience, there are choices of point of focus,
intensity of focus, rate of focus shifts, and attention paid to
soft focus. On the screen, choice is far more limited. Soft
focus peripheral vision cannot be produced by an optical
camera system; screen focus is all sharp, usually the result of
the cameraman preadjusting for hyperfocal distance. In film,
the frame is present, the movements you see are not your
own, and the lack of frame movement is also uncontrollable.
The lens system must adjust for framing; the eye adjusts only
to create a sensing system pathway.
The eye has an incredible ability to move in and out of
space very rapidly. Initially, the eye's search pattern establishes context, marking the parameters of the space it is in.
Further search clarifies this immediate instant marking
system. Then a more semi-randomized pattern sets in, with
the eye triggering on the signal to noise flow in the event. As
a result of this process, the search settles into rhythmic patterns. This does not amount to a stringing together of the
different "holds" and "moves" the eyes make; rather, it is a
rapid sorting process.
The camera lens system cannot replicate the search pattern of the eye or reproduce in extenso the exact signal-tonoise ratio the eyes triggered on. And the camera lens cannot
search at the rate the eye searches, shifting soft to sharp
focus ratios instantly. This is why it is possible to sit in a
chair and observe an action from one place, but impossible to
shoot a film of the same observation from the same single
sitting position. The camera must move flexibly in order to

maintain the framing that includes the information that the
eye is triggering on.
Up to this point we have spoken as if the image were the
entire film. It should be clear that everything said about
collecting visual information applies equally to auditory information. Microphones and our ears exhibit differences of
the same order as camera lenses and our eyes. This is why it
is imperative that the soundman understand the relation
between acoustic energy and space. Otherwise, it is impossible to record sound with both the spatial and the psychological dimensionality that matches the image.
A final aspect of these sensing systems remarks concerns
scale and the process of after-the-fact viewing. Viewing a
piece of 16mm film on the screen is different than viewing it
on a Moviola picture head. (Think of the experience of seeing
the same film in a theatre and then on TV; the difference is
not just one of resolution.) Both the relation of the size of
the filmer to the size of the subjects, and the height of the
angle to the size of the shots, involves framing the image so
that the distance of the film watcher to the viewing surface
can be interpreted appropriately.
We have shown that the differences between the human
eye and the camera lens system critically affect the way one
can see an event with and without the camera. Moreover, the
experience of watching the event on the screen is different
from either that of observing the event with the naked eye or
observing it through the viewfinder. We have obviously left
out numerous often-made trait Iist differences between film
and the eye; e.g., the latitude of film's sensitivity to light,
shadow, and color as compared with the eye, and the inability of film to handle high contrast ratios, low light levels,
and so forth . We conclude that an awareness of the limitations and pote ntials of film in relation to the naked eye are
crucial skills for the research filmer.
We know that film cannot replicate what we see with our
eyes; film is not real. Yet it is capable of recording what
some of our sensory systems trigger on in the observational
process. Researchability, then, means thorough usage of the
existing human sensing-measuring systems, conscious awareness of the ongoing sensing process, and the ability to translate this in the way film is able to see. The researchable film,
as an image of what was seen in the event, is not a collection
of a priori knowns, but is deliberately instrumental in the
discovery process of revealing significant unknowns.
At this point we will turn to a third film paradigm, what
we call researchable film observation. We believe that RFO is
a non-black box way to use film in the research process, a
way to use film to see. In the next section we will outline
why RFO is a more principled research paradigm than CFL
or LOC.
TOWARD RESEARCHABLE FILM OBSERVATION

In order to explicate RFO, we will first turn to an evaluation of the LOC and CFL approaches. Our discussion is
framed in terms of the notion of researchability previously
presented. Our principal remarks are directed to the comparison of the LOC and RFO paradigms, in that LOC is explicitly
conceptualized as the research alternative to CFL.
The first level for reviewing LOC filming concerns the
fallacies of its underlying assumptions. One assumption is the
TOWARD A RESEARCHABLE FILM LANGUAGE
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inadequacy of the human observational apparatus. This is
methodologically hopeless. Despite the degree to which one
considers our sensing systems as limited, they are the best
and only measuring tools we have. One can use film in a way
that allows the footage to reflect our own measuring systems,
rather than operate on the pretense, as LOC does, that film is
independent of them.
The human perception system, with its selectivities and
biases, is far superior to any attempt to eliminate it through
brainless instruments. What and how we see is more important than what and how we don't see. When you opt for
LOC, you opt for a way that you cannot possibly see. Hence,
the LOC reduces rather than enhances the importance of
human observational skills. Starting with the inadequacy of
the sensing systems, rather than with their potentials, is
givrng up before you begin.
A second assumption is the idea that film is a non-biased
recording device, capable of adequately imaging reality for
research purposes. This is equally ludicrous. By its very lightopt i ca 1-c hem i cal-mechanical-acoustical-electrical-electronic
nature, film has its own peculiar limitations of selectivities
and biases. But again, it is the human process that is crucial.
Bias (stripped of its usual negative connotations) results from
what the filmmaker does with the technology.
Cameras do not "tell the truth." With a lens system that
makes an image optically reduced in size and that projects it
onto a material with a limited sensitivity to light, shadow,
and color at a chosen and fixed frame rate per second, the
reality of film is only a function of the physiology of the
eye. Remembering that film transport systems (both camera
and projector) are collecting/displaying still image samples of
the event, there is thus no data collected/displayed during
transport (holes).
A third assumption is that the full frame is necessary in
order to get total data on the film; all events are signal and
there is no noise, and the full frame eliminates human filters.
Again, these notions are unfounded. Total data is not definable by a framing system or pattern in any a priori sense; it is
only a function of the research problem at hand. The idea
that the widest frame equals the most data is based on the
idea that the wide frame is the closest approximation of
human peripheral vision. This, too, is naive. There may be
instances where a wide frame is the right one for the data
being filmed, yet in terms of significance, the unquestioned
assumption of the utility of locking-off the wide frame tends
to minimize rather than maximize data. This is because of
the optical resolution in the frame, the inability of the eye to
resolve both the central and peripheral in sharp focus simultaneously, and the fact that we do not have single freezeframe brains. Blocking out the actual experiential quality of
event perception is not a way to maximize the data level of
film for research.
The approach to behavior as "all signal, no noise" is an
oversimplification. All behaviors may have significance imputed or attributed to them, and it is obviously important to
understand the patterns in which behaviors co-occur (X is
happening while Y is happening while Z is happening). But it
is untrue that everything that happens is always significant.
Significance is social; it does not derive from the a posteriori
categories of the researcher as he attempts to explain what is
in the film. Meaning is the result of cultural and social as30

sumptions, conventions, and strategies that human beings
bring with them into interactional settings.
Clearly, insignificant information may be imaged in the
film frame. In addition, information outside of the frame
may be contributing noise to the event itself. By their nature,
cameras image less noise and microphones collect more noise
than the interactants themselves actually experience. Film
cannot show where people's heads are at when they enter a
situation. But it can respond to the immediate signal-to-noise
stream that the interactants create. A filmic approach that
seeks to be researchable starts from the human observational
base, understanding the signal-to-noise flow in the event, and
translating this to a high signal, low noise film.
Whatever the signal-to-noise ratio of the actual event, LOC
filming cannot give an "all signal, no noise" picture of what
is happening. A non-moving, non-responding camera cannot
shift with the constantly shifting signal-to-noise ratio of the
event being filmed. Only the flexible camera, operated by the
observer whose intuitions and response patterns are lockingin to the signal-to-noise ratio of the event itself can produce a
researchable film.
A final aspect of this last assumption involves the desirability (assuming the possibility) of eliminating human
filters. This appears absurd. All experience is filtered in some
way; the idea of filtering as a negative bias is naive here. The
camera itself is a filter; it interacts with the human observational filtering of the event. Filters can be used to advantage
in research. This is why it is essential that the researcher, who
has been trained in the observation of his subject, is also the
filmer. The idea that filters- cognitive or technological - can
be eliminated is the idea that it is desirable to generate
footage with no point of view. To the contrary, we believe
that research using any footage is a function of filtering
through the observational training and sophistication of the
filmer.
We have indicated that the underlying assumptions of the
LOC approach are unjustified. In addition, we wish to point
out that the issue of "objectivity" has been falsely construed
here. When compared to the arbitrariness of CFL, LOC may
appear a more realistic and more objective approach to film
for research. Yet, when one considers that the baseline of the
LOC paradigm is the attempt to eliminate human perception,
human creativity, human understanding, and human filtering
from the data gathering process, we are left with the fact that
LOC shooting hardly heightens objectivity. Rather, LOC is a
reflection of the idea that the camera can be a robot and
perform independently of human volition.
Moreover, LOC is less objective, in that it actually increases the possibility of lost data. In the realm of knowns,
this includes fine-grain motion level cues and the general
resolution of micro-data. In the realm of unknowns, numerous meta-communicational information can be lost.
Although LOC fashions itself as scientific filming, its
mechanical working instruction approach to methodology
has little in common with science. Science is not an accumulation of meter readings and formulae, for methodology
depends heavily upon chance, creativity, and guesswork, as
well as the sharpened intuitions of the researcher. Thus, in
reducing the potential of film to a non-seeing, non-translation black box approach, the only scientific reliability of
LOC might be in filming a wax museum!
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We believe, moreover, that there are ethical as well as
epistemological objections to LOC filming. Invoking science
as a justification for stealing footage is antithetical to a
humane approach to research. Attempts to justify LOC
filming based on the idea that the camera's presence is disruptive are also untenable. Whatever the methodology, every
researcher must deal with rapport problems that arise;
cameras are not a special exception. We do not believe that
the camera's presence ruins data; on the contrary, the skilled
film researcher should be able to catalyze the event as it is
being filmed. Filming involves human contact and human
sensitivities in the process of interaction. Part of the researc h
filmer's skills involve his ability to maintain rapport while the
camera is in his hands. Hiding the camera is a deniai of the
need for an appropriate relationship between those who film
and those who are filmed. If the "live" filming process alters
behavior significantly- and we don't believe it does- we
would prefer to deal directly with possible behavior alteration as a film research problem, rather than to resort to
hidden cameras.
One might object that the preceding discussion is loaded;
that there are instances where those being filmed are informed that they will be secretly observed and recorded. We do
not see this as a more successful way to get unbiased or
unacted footage. Peep-holes inspire no kind of confidence at
all, whether or not the subjects are informed that they are on
camera.
It is clear that LOC is neither a seeing film language nor a
principled methodology (much less epistemology) for doing
research with film. Hence we do not see it as a viable alternative to CFL. At the same time, we would not argue that CFL
presents an alternative to LOC.
As noted, CFL is based on principles of artificial spatial
and temporal condensation which inhibit researchability. The
selectivity of CFL is derived only minimally from the structure of the event itself; for the most part, its structure comes
from the traditional "shoot to cut" or narrative and causal
rules of our culture which insure angular, temporal, and
matched action continuity.
Even when CFL is framed within a cinema-verite shooting
style involving first takes of non-staged actions, the constant
zooming, emphasis on the verbal, and restructuring of the
event for storyline reportage and statement-making mitigates
against the research use of the footage. What is absent in
cinema-verite filming is an explicit comprehension and translation of the event as internally structured, and the presence
of the researcher-cameraman, whose unique skills result in a
unique imaging of the event. Thus we propose that beyond
the naivete of LOC and the arbitrary restructuring of CFL
lies another approach - researchable film observation.
Researchable film observation is the generation of footage
that shows the filmer's through-the-camera experience of the
event. RFO shows how a researcher within a specific research
context chose to see an event as it happened. The crucial
argument here is that what we do see, not what we never see,
is what should be on the film in order to maximize its researchability.
For us, RFO is a new film "language." It begins with two
axioms: the structured integrity of entire events and the
epistemological bases of the human observational process.
Hence, RFO has no need to artificially present images either

through the non-seeing of LOC or the reconstructed rhythms
of CFL. Filmically, this may result in long uninterrupted
takes of the ongoing flow of interaction, angle and focal
length changes justified by the triggering pattern of human
response and intuition in relation to the structure of the
event, and handheld crystal sync shooting for optimum flexibility and optimum interaction between the filmer and his
subjects. This simplification of technological procedures
likens RFO to cinema-direct. It differs in that the person
behind the camera is not making a film-statement but is a
researcher with a specific research problem 3 in mind.
The new film language of RFO means reducing the distinction between footage and finished film. The product of
RFO shooting is a record of human experience and interaction in a particular cultural and research context. Some
might insist that this is "mere" footage because it lacks titles,
credits, background music, storyline, and so forth. Our thinking is that such criteria have nothing to do with whether the
product is a presentable film communication about how
someone chooses to see something. When filmmakers and
filmviewers become competent in looking at how film - and
filmmakers- can see the structured integrity of events, there
will be no difference between footage and films; a nontheatrical film language will then emerge, bringing the acts of
filming, observing, and participating together into a unified
activity.
RFO has nothing to do with "pretty pictures" (even when
one is filming a beautiful event) or "making movies" to illustrate verbal concepts. It has nothing to do with making visual
books or teaching devices, although the latter may be a
secondary usage. It has to do with research. Research means
questions, problems, thinking designs, discovery patterns,
creative and intuitive probing. With film, research means exploring the seeing process, sharpening filmic observation
through sharpened human observation.
Researchable film observation is a reduction of the eventto-film translation process such that the film moves closer to
(cognitively) the actual event itself. In doing so, it is the
integrity of the event, its wholeness, and its own structure
(not the film's restructuring) that is communicated. It is such
a perception of the event that makes it researchable.
Much of the potential of RFO is based on comprehending
film as a translation process; only then can one appreciate
the importance of a reduction of translation steps from the
initially perceived world of events (without the camera) to
the recoded world organized on film. RFO is not an explication of an event or the event itself, but a translation of the
event. This goes back to the distinction that must be made
between phenomena and the units of pattern that are used in
both their description and explication. An explicit assumption of RFO is thus that human sensing is the only justifiable
starting point for film translation. The premises are: there is
no such thing as "raw data"; all retrievable data are nonneutral translations, descriptions, or memories of what once
happened in time and space. Meaning in the event is first
experienced and understood as direct feeling. As a directly
experienced event is filmed, the filmer is continually adding
and re-combining impressions so that in the next instant, new
aspects of further experiencing can be collected in the
process of filming.
Thus, RFO makes three distinct contributions to the reTOWARD A RESEARCHABLE FILM LANGUAGE
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duction of the translation process: (1) More of the initial
intuitive meaning of the event observation is present in the
film. (2) The human/film observation process opens itself up
to more possible clues, intuitions, and circumstances- a flexibility based on what is alive in the world of directly experienced meaning in action. (3) Biases can now be seen more
clearly, as more of the epistemic bases of the selection and
collection process can be directly grasped. In sum, RFO is
expressive of the fundamentally adaptive and self-correcting
nature of human processing.
We emphasize that we are not talking about a film
shooting style that exists independently of the events to be
filmed. It is relatively easy to copy a shooting style without
knowing the motivation for the choices made. Yet, this does
not make the product researchable. The camera and cameraman can be moving extensively or little at all. The takes may
be short or long shot sequences. In some cases, the frame
may remain constant for a long time; in others, it may shift
frequently. The filmer must know how to see the event in
order to show, with film, how the event can be seen. The
exact nature of the shooting strategy is in large part a function of the context- both social and scientific- and the content flow of the event.
There is no one way to do it and there are no rigid discovery procedures. The skills include improvisation, luck,
intuition, excellent reflexes, and an acute understanding of
researchability, methodology, and epistemology. Researchable film observation is a new film language, but its purpose
is not to create new film language cliches. Rather, it aims to
expand the research potential of film through a new understanding of the relation of human observational sensing to
film observational sensing.
We see RFO as a humanistic and creative endeavor which
explicitly recognizes that human filtering is essenti al. RFO is
a record of human contacts. Its purpose is to maximize researchabil ity so that there is in no way an attempt to
condemn the product to archives or to a limited audience of
specialists.
CONCLUSION

As filmmakers and audience participants we have generated and watched competent and successful CFL, and have
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observed several vanet1es of CFL produced by colleagues.
Both our personal work and our observations lead us to believe that neither current CFL nor trends in stylistic refinement will lead to researchable film.
In addition, we think, more firmly than ever, that LOC is
not a researchable alternative. The epistemological grounds
upon which we have criticized LOC are essentially those
upon which the critique of all behavioral scientism rest; both
derive from an ideology desirous of separating scientific
activity from human experience. The aim is objective detachment. A basic feature of the RFO paradigm, by opposition, is
the desire to re-center analysis in experience, promoting a
continuity of the existential and objective. The scientistic
LOC indifference to the conditions of knowing are thus
transcended in RFO.
We see RFO as an alternative because it is not a program
of "how to do it" but a way of thinking about the variables
to be dealt with in order to do research with film. The most
crucial input to this new language system is the kind of
seeing that the multi-disciplined trained observer can do. He
knows how to collect images on film to make it researchable,
and is trained to do it. RFO is a way of looking with film
that does not conform to conventions imposed from without
the research context but responds to structure and experience from within it. As such, it is both an essential input to
research thinking, and a truly exciting new kind of observation-partiCipation, embracing the communicational and
meta-communicational potentials of human interaction.

NOTES
1

We wish to thank John Collier, Jr., Ardis Gaither, Jim McDonald,
Buck Schieffelin, and Marge Zabor for detailed critiques of an earlier
draft.
2

By "translation " we mean the putting-into-code of messages;
when we speak of film as a translation medium we are referring to the
use of culturally organi zed sets of methods for structuring images.
3

0ur emphasis on the importance of a research problem is not an
insistence that filming be programmed. We recognize the value of
digressive filming within the general framework of a specific research
problem.
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ART AS A STRUCTURAL SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF HOPI POTTERY DESIGNS 1
LAURAJ.GREENBERG
WORKING HYPOTHESES: THE RESEARCHER

It is Arnheim's (1966) working hypothesis that art reflects
not one but two processes of abstraction, namely: (1) the
abstraction entailed in visual perception which requires that
one order and classify in order to perceive, and (2) the
abstraction entailed in devising any visual representations
("realistic" or otherwise). Thus:
There is no direct transfo rmation of experience into form, but
rather a search for equivalents [Arnheim 1966:266].

Also, perhaps, in the realm of "working hypothesis" is the
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, which speculates on the nature of
the relationship between language and thought. Although the
specific formulations of this hypothesis vary (Whorf 1940,
1941; Sapir 1929: 209), there is a general connection posited
between a language's lexation and grammatical structure, and
the content of thought. In other words, one's linguistic
categories and discriminations presumably influence what
one will in fact think, and vice verse.
This paper ultimately derives from my interest in the
relationship between these two working hypotheses. Although one evolved in the discipline of linguistics and the
other in the context of the psychology of art, they seemed to
contain possible congruences. In particular, I was interested
in the possible implications of each for the other. It seemed
that if Whorf were correct about language affecting the way
people classify and order reality, and if Arnheim were right
about perception necessarily entailing classification and
ordering of "visual" reality, then there ought to be the
equivalent of a visual Whorf hypothesis. That is, if perception
entails active classification and ordering, and if classifications
(lexicon) and rules of ordering (as evidenced in grammatical
structure) vary from culture to culture, then one would
expect visual perceptions to vary cross-culturally in some
patterned way as well. Further, it would be logical to expect
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University of British Columbia. She is, at the moment, engaged in writing a doctoral dissertation on the structural analysis of the art of the Northern Northwest Coast of America,
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intersection as they are used to generate the art, and on the
specific and prolific use of visual punning for social and symbolic ends.

that visual discriminations and categories would influence
(and be influenced by) art and other "expressive" visual
systems (e.g., architectural systems) or systems of spatial
terminology, and by language. Secondly, the methodology
of linguistics, which so elegantly arrives at system by the
ordered and "scientific" study of variation, seemed to have
the potential for elucidating these visual systems.
I devised a specific project which attemped to examine
and/or verify the above hypothesized connections, choosing
the Hopi as a case study, and basing my methodology on
linguistic methodology (with some necessary modifications).
My choice of the Hopi, specifically Hopi pottery designs, had
been motivated by two considerations: (1) that the art
system or corpus be relatively abstract or non-representative
(thus minimizing semantic meaning as a consideration and
maximizing "visual" considerations), and (2) that the people
have a relatively well-integrated, coherent, and self-contained
philosophy and social structure. As a logical first step in
constructing the total design system, I proposed isolating
what I called "visual phonemes" in Hopi pottery designs (a
term derived from the "new archeologists").
Art is, no doubt, a "language"; however, I realized that
the linguistic analogy is a difficult one to translate into visual
terms. For one thing, language is, by necessity, a more
conventionalized system than art. And for another, whereas
the given in linguistics is that humans are physiologically
capable of producing only a finite number of mono-sy11abic
sounds which can be taken as the basic components of any
language, such obvious and discrete units are not inherent in
the visual realm. And yet, I thought that these and other
obstacles could be circumvented by the careful construction
of a series of test drawings (based on patterned variations of
actual Hopi designs), which could then be used to determine
"significant variation" and thus to isolate visual phonemes.
Aside from certain pragmatic considerations, such as
having no Hopi contacts when I arrived in Arizona, two
factors ultimately caused me to abandon my search for visual
phonemes and to reconsider my theoretical model. The first
was that it became disconcertingly and progressively more
apparent, the more I read and the more I saw of Hopi
designs, that my model (which was based on the primacy of
units or elements) was antithetical to the nature of Hopi art
and to Hopi culture as well (which stresses the primacy of
the total). This is, incidentally, an important point, and one
which will be further developed in the body of this paper.
The second mitigating factor evolved as I abandoned my
quest for visual phonemes, and set about examining the pots
in the Museum of Northern Arizona in an effort to study
actual variation in pottery designs. As I studied the designs I
photographed them as a way of recording them, and in
addition, I often drew them. In drawing them, a certain logic
or conceptual order began to emerge in what had previously
appeared to be fairly chaotic designs. In order to reproduce a
design, it is necessary to actively perceive it, i.e., to ei~her
discern or create spatial relationships and order in the des1gn,
such that it can be recreated. (Reproducing from memory
alone would require an even more exacting perception).
Thus it was not surprising that the designs became clearer as
I dre~ them. What was more surprising was that the order in
most cases was actually quite simple; it had eluded me so
entirely before I was forced to search it out, only because it
A STUDY OF HOPI POTTERY DESIGNS
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followed different tendencies than those I was used to. For
example, although I would have been aware of the symmetry
of a bilaterally symmetric design at first glance, I was at first
totally oblivious of designs which possessed other sorts of
symmetries, such as rotational symmetry. What was most
important was that as I drew I began to discern certain
structural similarities between designs which had previously
seemed to have not a single thing in common. The fact that
these previously confusing designs could all be made comprehensible by the same ordering principles suggested that these
principles were not totally arbitrary, but perhaps represented
a valid structure. All of which suggested the use of a
structural model.
Structural analysis seemed an appropriate solution to my
problems if for no other reason than because structural
linguistics, which Levi -Strauss (1967:32) credits as the inspiration for his own structuralist approach, entailed a similar
shift from analysis of terms to analysis of relationships
between terms. This shift, plus the shift in emphasis from
conscious phenomena to unconscious infrastructure, the
discovery of general laws, and the search for system
(Levi-Strauss 1967:31) seemed relevant to the patterns I was
discovering in Hopi designs.
In addition, that aspect of Levi-Strauss' thinking which
surfaced in The Savage Mind (1966) seemed potentially
compatible with part (and only part) 2 of Arnheim's visual
model; there is no direct transformation of experience into
form, but rather a search for equivalents. Taken together,
they suggest an interesting framework.
It would seem that the tendency to order and structure
would be a basic cognitive process which is used by man to
apprehend his universe, and that art could be thought of as
an external form of this internal process. As such, it would
seem useful to analyze an art system in terms of structure. In
particular, "the search for equivalents" might be structural,
i.e., there might be structural symbolism. This seemed
especially likely given the susceptibility of structural relationships to visual or "schematic" representation.
In The Savage Mind (1966), Levi-Strauss examines the
organization of totemic systems, and classifications of the
biological world. These are significant, not in what each
category includes, but rather in terms of the total system
(and the types of discriminations which are thereby made
visible). And similarly, in The Elementary Structures of
Kinship (1969), he again expresses interest not so much in
the individual kinship categories per se, but rather in the
total systems which are thereby elucidated, and (most
importantly) in the implied structure of those systems.
In analyzing Hopi designs, I have attempted a structural
analysis- the visual corollary of a structural linguistic analysis. How are a specific set of Hopi designs organized, what is
their visual structure, what organizing principles are evident,
and what sorts of discriminations do these organizing
principles imply? Secondly, how do these organizing
principles correlate with those of other Hopi sub-systems,
e.g., the Hopi cosmological system or the Hopi linguistic
system? And lastly, how valid is this approach: i.e., what
questions (anthropological or otherwise) does it address,
what kind of answers does it provide, and what further
questions are in turn generated by those answers?
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HISTORICAL AND MATERIAL CONTEXTS:
THE HOPI 3

Brief History of Pottery-Making in the Area 4

The Hopi are a Pueblo group living in what is now
Arizona. Pottery-making has been practiced in the area for
the past 15 centuries, and as early as A.D. 600 pottery was
being produced in a variety of colors by people alleged to· be
ancestors of the Hopi (Bartlett 1936:1 ). However, although
occupation of the sites seems to have been nearly continuous, the history of the area (like the history of any area)
seems to have been somewhat erratic. One result has been a
series of distinct pottery types of varying color, shape, and
design, which archeologists have been able to distinguish and
to sequence. In its most basic form, the historical sequence
of pottery types has been summarized by Bunzel (1929: 81)
as follows:
I. Black on white period. Entirely geometric ornament.
II. Late prehistoric period. A gradual development of
colored wares and animal ornament, reaching its highest
development at Sityatki village.
Ill. Historic period. A gradual return to white wares and
geometric ornament.
IV. Contemporary. A recent revival of II.
The pottery that I have analyzed comes exclusively
from the last of these periods. Much of the pottery was
produced after the above classification was in print, some as
late as 1970. However, many of the designs have been
adapted from earlier designs. This is in part inherent in the
nature of Hopi pottery design, which reflects a series of
historical intrusions, interruptions, and fortuitous influences.
For example: The advent of the Spanish in the seventeenth century is thought to have resulted in a degeneration
of Hopi pottery; the founding of the First Mesa town of
Hano by a group of migrating Tewa in the eighteenth century
is thought to have revived the industry; and Zuni patterns are
thought to have been i·ncorporated into Hopi pottery as a
result of the nineteenth century drought which caused the
Hopi to seek refuge in Zuni territory.
Even archeol~gy has not been without its effect. In the
late nineteenth century, the archeologist J. Walter Fewkes
started excavating a site named Sityatki, and unearthed some
spectacular pottery. The wife of one of the archeological
fieldworkers, Nampeyo, became interested in the pottery
sherds; she first began copying the patterns, and later
adapted them to create her own designs. She has been
followed by later generations of Nampeyos who have
followed the tradition. (The pot shown in Figure 10 is,
incidentally, a Nampeyo pot).
Nor does Nampeyo's "Sityatki Revival" represent the last
of the fortuitous influences. The tourist trade in the
twentieth century affected the kinds of pottery produced,
and no doubt the present resurgence of interest in Native
American cultures is currently having a similar effect. All of
which is described in this section in order to show that,
although the Hopi and their ancestors have been producing
painted pottery for the last several centuries, the design
system has not by any means remained constant nor has it
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developed smoothly. But for all that the influences were
fortuitous, the important point in this context is that their
effects do not seem to have been totally random. Rather,
they all seem to have been incorporated in selectively Hopi
ways.

Pottery Technology
Despite the complexity of the pottery patterns, the
technology which the Hopi employ to produce pottery is
relatively simple (which is not to say easy). Traditional
pottery is still made by women, using neither wheel nor kiln.
Using the coil method, the potters progressively add rounds
of clay to a base, smoothing each piece into the preceding
layer. The walls of the vessel are later thinned and evened
with a gourd scraper. After drying, undecorated utility wares
are fired directly, while decorated wares may first be slipped
with several thin layers of one of the other clays. Finally, the
designs are applied with brushes. (It is only this last process
with which this paper will be concerned.)

Pottery Shapes and Designs:
A Broad Typology
Hopi pottery is made in a variety of forms: low, shallow,
corn-meal bowls; slightly higher, broad-lipped stew bowls;
narrow-necked water jugs; and such additional items as
ladles, tiles, and canteens. Further, the shapes of the vessels
are relevant to a discussion of the designs which are found on
them. As one would expect, certain types of designs are more
frequently associated with one type of vessel than another,
since the design fields vary with the shape of the pot.
There have been many attempts at classification of Pueblo
pots by shape and design. Most of these typologies are
archeological typologies whose avowed purpose is to differentiate pots, usually by approximate date and area. By
contrast, my intention here is to show what Hopi pots, or
rather their designs, have in common. The purpose of this
typology is to give the reader a general idea of the design
solutions which the Hopi have employed.
I am following Bunzel 's general prescription that designs
are essentially organized around the "roadline" (1929: 13),
and am basing my categories on the placement of designs in
relation to the "roadline" of the pot or of an equivalent line.
The "roadline," which Bunzel translated from the Zuni word
omane (road), is simply the line that encircles the neck of
those pots which have necks and circumscribes the interior of
those pots which are too shallow to have necks (e.g., bowls).
Although Bunzel systematized possible design arrangements,
these were too limited for my purposes as she dealt with only
two types of pots: the water jug, and the shallow bowl. I did,
however, try to follow her general parameters of variation in
the formation of the typology which follows, i.e., amount
and part of the field filled, number and type of band
groupings, and number and type of repetitions.
General Design Typology:

I. Pottery with bounded panel designs. Bounded in this
case means that the design field is specifically defined by,

and generally contained within, encircling lines. These lines
are the "roadline" and secondary lines.

A. Pottery with basically one main circumferential
band. The circumferential band is a common feature of
Hopi pottery. It either occurs on the exterior circumference of a vessel or along the interior rim (and around
the border in the case of tiles). I refer to further
divisions of this band either as reflecting "vertical,"
"horizontal," or "oblique" divisions panels, following
Bunzel (1929:13-48). In some pots, there is an additional and smaller horizontal band around the neck.
1. Designs with one main horizontal band which is
vertically sub-divided. The vertical divisions produce
individual design panels. These vary from two to
eight in number (and perhaps even more). They are
of various arrangements:
(a) One panel repeated several times. This is
one of the simplest and most common arrangements. The panels are often further sub-divided
along a diagonal.
(b) Alternating panels (two or more). Rather
than merely repeating the same design pattern,
two or more design patterns are alternated.
Thus reading around the pot or tile one would
have one panel with design A, then one with
design B, then design A, then B, etc. Or one
could have ABCABC, etc. And once again, the
panels are often sub-divided along a diagonal.
(c) More complex alternating panels. These
pots are basically of the same type as the ones
above, but the panels which repeat are more
elaborately sub-divided into horizontal, vertical,
and oblique sub-panels.
(d) Alternating fixed and progressive panels. A
fixed panel refers to one which is repeated
exactly, and a progressive panel is one which
varies slightly each time it appears. The variation can result from color being used differently. This is fairly uncommon.
(e) Non-repeating or irregularly-repeating
panels. With only one or two possible exceptions, I have not seen pots of this type, but I
included this as a residual category.
2. Designs with one horizon tal band with no
explicit divisions.
(a) Continuous patterns. These are patterns
which are composed of a repeating pattern
which forms a single connected unit. A scroll or
meander would be a good example.
(b) Dis-continuous patterns. These are patterns which are composed of discrete elements
but which are so arranged that each pattern
leads into the next.
B. Pottery with circular interior areas which are panelled.
1. Designs with two or more main panels, which
may or may not be sub-divided. The major division
is generally made with a line which is not a
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diameter, and so the panels defined are almost never
equal. The panels can either be treated as bounded
fields (i.e., sub-divided), or treated as semi-bounded
fields.
2. Designs with more than two main panels,
arranged rotationally. In designs with more than
two main panels, the arrangement is often rotational..
In such designs panels are created by the intersection
of several lines, none of which is a diameter of the
circular area. The panels produced are equal in area,
and generally identical as well.
3. Designs with center or near-center radically
divided panels. I came across only one pot of this
type, which was a canteen, executed in such a way
as to suggest an animal face.
II. Pottery with semi-bounded, non-panel designs. These are
designs which are bounded only by one line, the "roadline,"
and no bottom restricting line. Or, in the case of interior
designs, these are non-panel designs emerging from the
"roadline." By the term "semi-bounded," I definitely mean
to imply that it is the encircling line which is the basis of the
design's organization. Designs of this type vary considerably,
however:
A. Pottery with regular, repetitive designs originating
from the roadline. These are generally exterior circumferential designs, and are often quite similar to the
designs in I.A.2., except that they are bounded on only
one side.
B. Pottery with irregular, non-repetitive designs
originating from the "roadline." These can be either
exterior or interior designs, and are practically all fairly
birdlike, with obvious wings and body forms which are
themselves composed of smaller panel sections. In such
cases too, there is often at least part of the "roadline"
which has no protruding design. Many Sityatki derived
pots are of this form.
Ill. Pottery with unbounded, central designs. This category
applies to designs which, though they may be on a pot which
is circumscribed by a "roadline," are not attached to it and
do not emanate from it. If there is a "roadline," it is
somewhat extraneous to the rest of the design.
A. Pottery with one central, free-floating design figure,
generally a conventionalized representational figure.
These designs are usually standard bird or· kachina
figures, and occupy the central area of an interior design
space. In the case of an exterior design these are usually
repeated twice, although only one figure can be seen
from any viewpoint.
B. Pottery with repetitive or periodic design patterns,
generally organized from the center. Occasionally interior designs are created by organizing periodic band
designs around the center of the vessel (as opposed to
organizing them from the circumference). Designs of this
type can be quite elaborate. In the few cases where
non-bounded designs are exterior designs, they generally
consist of small isolated design groups occurring two or
more times around the exterior of a shallow bowl for
which most of the design interest is in the interior
pattern.
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Symbolism: Dominant or Incidental
One of the premises of a structural study is that the
relationships between elements are ultimately more revealing
than the elements themselves. Since I had proposed to study
Hopi pottery designs as an independent, or at least -autonomous, system (not dependent on other systems for meaning),
I felt compelled to consider the extent to which Hopi designs
employ conventional symbolism or symbolic elements (such
that the semantic meaning of elements could be a mitigating
factor in the relationship between elements). By the term
conventional symbolism, I mean nothing more than what
Bunzel calls "the [fixed] association between designs
and ... ideas" (1929:70), or what could be called a conventionalized and conscious association between a visual form
and meaning; i.e., a symbol's iconic content, or agreed-upon
semantic meaning.
Whereas the literature reflected nearly universal agreement
as to the beauty of Hopi pottery, and only minor discrepancies as to the nature of its manufacture; on the matter
of whether the designs carry meaning there seemed to be
bitter disagreement, verging on ideological warfare. The views
ranged from those who implied that Hopi art is totally
governed by symbolism to the extent that aesthetics or
"sensuous pleasure in beauty of form and color" is quite
secondary (Hough 1919: 268), to those who intimated that
the very idea that Hopi pottery designs are symbolic was
foisted upon the buying public by unscrupulous traders
(Sikorski 1968:20). In the middle were those who suggested
that truly symbolic design elements are used only ·on
ceremonial objects, but that the forms (and not the meaning)
may also be carried over into a purely decorative context as
an alternative to creating new elements (Hubert 1937: 2).
One of the earliest contributors to this controversy was
the aforementioned Fewkes (1898, 191 0), who traced Hopi
bird, butterfly, and feather symbolism from ancient to recent
times, in the art and in a ceremonial and religious context,
and imputed a connection between the two. As it happens,
many contemporary pots do seem to carry designs which are
easily recognizable as conventionalized bird forms. In addition, many pots which do not have avian figures do seem to
have avian forms. These might not be recognizable as such
but for their clear resemblances to earlier and more explicit
avian forms. One can find such derived forms in contemporary pots (see, for example, Figures 2 and 18).
For the sake of argument, I accepted as fact that certain
avian and feather symbolism did exist, at least at one time in
the past, and further that these avian or feather elements
have been carried over into modern designs, in form if not in
content. And so the question of whether pottery designs
were originally symbolic became non-problematic. What
became more problematic was whether designs and design
elements still carry symbolic meaning (primarily of a
religious or sacred nature) and, if so, to what extent it
dictates the placement of elements in any design.
To answer this last set of questions, I turned to Ruth
Bunzel's (1929) study of Pueblo pottery. In reference to the
Zuni, and with the two exceptions of the "road" or
"roadline" and a specific "prayer-stick" design (1929:69-70),
she discusses the matter of symbolism as follows:
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[the names which refer to designs] are not pattern names, since
they are so loosely applied that there is no definite association
between any name and a particular form. The same name is
applied- to elements having nothing in common from a stylistic
point of view, and conversely, the same element may be
differently designated in different contexts. Nor are the designs
symbols in any sense of the word. We are justified in using the
word symbol only where the associations between the design and
the object or idea suggested is fixed and recognized [1929:69;
italics my own).

The above was written in reference to the Zuni; as for the
Hopi, she suggests that "the associations between designs and
objects or ideas is even more tenuous than at Zuni"
(1929: 70). On another occasion she states outright that
"[religious] symbolism plays no role in decoration" among
the Hopi (1929: 52). In addition, she offers the following
comment with specific reference to Fewkes:
There is no reason to assume that the meanings now attached to
Sityatki designs are those originally associated with them, nor is
any such claim made by the persons who use them .... The
modern Hopi sees rainbows and mountains where the archeologist
sees birds and serpents. One can take one's choice [Bunzel
1929:71).

Thus, not only does it seem that symbolism was not a
factor in Hopi pottery designs at the time Bunzel did her
fieldwork; there is even some doubt as to whether it ever was
a factor (cf. Bunzel 1929:69-71 ). This conclusion justified
discounting the possibility that Hopi pottery designs are
regulated by what would be primarily "non-visual" constraints, i.e., constraints dictated by religious or other
meanings. Such constraints would have either diminished the
value of a "visual" structural analysis of the corpus (since
non-visual constraints would have been operative), or have
made it considerably more complicated.
In fact, not only did the literature not diminish the case
for a visual structural analysis of Hopi art; it seemed, if
anything, to strengthen the case for pursuing a line of
analysis which would concentrate on relationships between
elements rather than on elements themselves. For while
certain forms had been taken over or adapted from other
pueblo groups (e.g., the Zuni) and from at least one defunct
site (Sityatki), and possibly even from a ceremonial context
as suggested by Hubert (1937: 2), the linguistic terms which
refer to these elements or configurations remained
ambiguous and non-specific. It was reported, for example,
that a form could be given one name in one context, and a
different name in a different context, and still a third name
in the first context after a lapse of time (cf. Bunzel
1929:53-54). This inexactitude in naming elements, as well
as the fact that they seem to be taken over rather than
invented, could be thought to indicate that the elements are
not themselves important as entities. Rather, spatial relationships between elements and generating placement of elements may be more important.
This seems quite possible given the precise terminology
for describing spatial concepts:
There is a notable paucity of terms of a purely descriptive
character, such as square, circle, triangle, and the like, although
the language is not lacking in precise terminology for spatial
concepts [Bunzel1929:54).

It seems still more possible in light of the fact that the
Hopi language has a preference for verbs as opposed to our

favoring nouns, and thus seems to turn our propositions
about things into propos1t10ns about events (Whorf
1950: 70). Interestingly enough (and perhaps as a fitting
allegory for anthropology), Bunzel drew entirely different
conclusions from the inconsistent design terminology but
precise spatial terminology. She suggested that the lack of a
consistent linguistic terminology for design elements indicates that art is not the object of rational thought among
the Pueblo Indians (Bunzel 1929: 54); whereas, on the basis
of the same information, I suggest the possibility that it is
rational, but that the rationale used is based more on process
and relationships than on elements or things. It was with that
possibility in mind that I started my structural analysis.
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
OF HOPI POTTERY DESIGNS

Operationalizing Levi-Strauss
It may be the general consensus that Levi-Strauss'
ultimate insights are more inspiring than his specific methodology (cf. Hayes and Hayes 1970). Whereas the former are
almost indiscriminately applicable, the latter is often exceedingly difficult to apply to any given situation, in part
because it is so disturbingly elusive (particularly in his earlier
work), and in part because it is so specific. Thus in an effort
to operationalize structuralism, I turned to the most concrete
and the most relevant strictures I could find-the four basic
operations of structural linguistics, as reported by LeviStrauss in Structural Anthropology (1967):
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious
linguistic phenomena to study of their unconscious infrastructure;
second it does not treat terms as independent entities, taking
instead' as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, it
introduces the concept of system ... ; finally, structural linguistics
aims at discovering genera/laws, either by induction [or by logical
deduction) [Levi-Strauss 1967:31).

Although the translation of structural linguistic principles
into a visual equivalent was not as automatic as one might
have hoped, it did at least represent a general strategy.
However there were certain basic problems. Clearly a
prerequi;ite for a decent "structural analysis" of a given
design corpus is a general (etic) descriptive system. Just as
clearly, such a descriptive system can ultimately be constructed only on the basis of several individual design systems
(such as Hopi pottery designs). Further, the existing
terminology which I had at my disposal consisted mainly of
design terms, e.g., symmetry, balance, rhythm, etc., as well as
a few Gestalt relationships like figure-and-ground which had
been incorporated into the standard design framework. With
the terms one inherits (unsolicited) an implicit design
framework- an entire visual context which is often inapplicable to Hopi designs and sometimes deceptive as well.
At times design qualities or characteristics are individually
relevant to the Hopi material, but do not relate to each other
in the ways that the traditional context imp Iies. Other design
concepts are relevant to the Hopi material only because of
their conspicuous inapplicability.
And so I was left with essentially two options. I could
(theoretically) invent an entirely new system of design ter.ms
with which to analyze Hopi art, or I could use the old des1gn
terms with the advance warning that I would be abandoning
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their traditional contexts. I chose the latter alternative, thus
taking the bricoleur's way out rather than the scientist's (as
that analogy is used in the first chapter of The Savage Mind
[1966] to distinguish alternative ways of creating order).
What I have done then is to delineate a series of principles
which seem to have generated the designs, or according to
which elaboration occurs. When taken together, they create
some idea of a design system. The principles are neither
linear nor typologically equivalent; rather, they all interrelate. In that sense, they are arbitrarily ordered; and for that
reason, I have not numbered them. In that sense also, what
follows is a and not the structural an alysis of Hopi pottery
designs.

design solution in this respect; for although it is composed of
two central bird figures, the unpainted area is far from being
background in the conventional sense. The two inner shapes,
the heart shape and the concave triangular shape, emerge as
figures in their own right.
And for those central, figural designs which do not
employ the unusual design solution described above, the
figure/ground equality is generally maintained on a lower
level. That is, the central "figures" are usually composed of
smaller panels which embody ambiguous figure and ground
relations. This is also often the case for those designs which
are not composed of a central figure (e.g., the two pots
referred to earlier, Figures 1 and 2).

Structural Principles

SUB-PRINCIPLE: The smallest panels are often divided in
such a way as to yield elements susceptible to a yin-yang
spatial organization. What I will reluctantly call a generalized
yin-yang model, for lack of a better term, is a more specific
and literal form of equal figure and ground than that detailed
in the previous principle. In the original Chinese T'ai-chi-tu
symbol (popularly known as the yin-yang symbol or still
more colloquially as the "yin-yang"), the field is divided into
two identical shapes, one dark and the other ~ight, such that
visually both are simultaneously figure and ground. (See
Arnheim 1966:222-244 for a complete design analysis of the
T'ai-chi-tu symbol.)
Generally there seem to be certain forms and certain
ways of dividing space which are susceptible to this type of
duality, since the reversal quality is inherent in the form
itself. Many Hopi pottery designs use such forms and spatial
divisions to produce near yin-yang or generalized yin-yang
effects. Among these forms are the feather or wing motif, a
stepped design, a scroll or spiral design, continuous triangle
designs, and the oblique division of the field (see Figure 5 for
examples).

PRINCIPLE: Designs are formed in such a way that there is
equality of figure and ground (to the point of there being no
figure and ground).
In our standard design framework, the term figure
normally connotes a dominant image or shape applied to a
background. And background (or simply ground) normally
connotes that area or space remaining after the main figure
or fit;ures have been applied. Occasionally in this framework
one hears of "negative elements," in which case one normally
assumes that the unpainted areas are the figures in that they
are the simpler, more dominant shapes, or the shapes which
convey meaning. But this implies the same relationship; it is
merely the roles which are reversed. Thus the framework
seems inevitably to imply a design situation in which there is
dominant shape and residual (or subservient) area.
In Hopi designs, however, the painted areas often seem
no more simple or dominant in shape than the unpainted
areas. In that sense, the figure and ground often seem of
equivalent importance, almost to the point of there being no
distinct figure and ground. The interior design in Figure 1
illustrates this quite nicely, and represents a fairly typical
treatment of interior space. In terms of both the total
composition and the individual panels, the painted and
unpainted areas are of equal visual importance.
Another treatment of design space, as suggested earlier, is
the exterior semi-bounded design (i.e., bounded only by the
"roadline," from which the design emanates). The semibounded design shown in Figure 2 could certainly be thought
of as three discrete "avian" figures, one of which is shown in
the diagram below (Figure 3). However, in terms of the total
composition, the unpainted areas assume a shape which is
very similar to some of the painted shapes (for example, the
scroll, as well as the enclosed areas at the rim), and the
figural areas merge into a repeating pattern which assumes
prominence.
All of which is not to imply that there are no central
"figures" on Hopi pottery. Although not the most common
design form, there are designs which are composed of
centralized figures (in the sense of figural representations
applied to the center of a design field). These are generally
avian figures or kachina figures (the latter probably being a
recent innovation for the tourist market). However, the existence of centralized figures or figurai representations does not
negate the figure/ground relations described above. The
modern Hopi pot shown in Figure 4 represents an interesting

PRINCIPLE: Designs are often generated by rotation.
The yin-yang relationship described above can be thought
of as having a particular figure/ground relationship. But it has
other defining characteristics as well. In particular, the
original T'ai-chi-tu symbol is rotationally symmetric or is at
least a variant of a rotationally symmetric design.
As the name would imply, rotational symmetry is a form
of symmetry in which parts of the design recur as a result of
being rotated around a central axis. (For an excellent
explanation of rotational and other symmetries, all of which
are described and analyzed in terms of the type of operations
according to which repetitions occur, see Shepard
1956:267-276.) 5
The pattern on the canteen shown in Figure 6 is an
example of a pattern which appears deceptively complex
until one looks at it as a relatively simple rotational design
with two equivalent parts in rotational opposition to each
other along a central axis. Such bifold rotational designs are
fairly common in Hopi pottery. Any line cutting through the
center of the field would result in two identical design halves,
although clearly the explicit line provides the most obvious
division.
Conceptually similar, although more complex than the
canteen design, is the design shown on the pot in Figure 7.
The same rotational operation is used or implied, only in this
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case there is a fourfold field, with explicit divisions. In
addition, the four quadrants have each been further subdivided, such that diagonal quadrants are identical {see
schematic drawing, Figure 8). Again, once one perceives the
order, the design appears simpler. The rotational symmetry is
evidenced in the fact that any line cutting through the center
of the field would result in two identical halves.
A common design organization in Hopi pottery is a
bounded panel design (with one "horizontal" band which
often is sub-divided into repeating "vertical" panels). This
format is used both along exterior sides and interior rims.
Although the exact number of panels seems to vary
considerably, the repetitions seem invariably to occur by
rotation or to result in a rotational design. This is evidenced
in the relative orientation of the panels, and in their order;
i.e., the panels repeat sequentially in a 360° path. The bowl
shown in Figure 9 has a six panel design of this type
(consisting of three panels, each of which repeats).
Another common design treatment is exemplified by the
pot shown in Figure 10. This is a fairly characteristic
Nampeyo pot (cf. pp. 00-00). In this case, there is no explicit
division into parts which are rotationally symmetric, but the
total is, nevertheless implicitly generated by rotation. In
fact, it seems to be generated by two separate series of
rotations; i.e., one could think of this design as consisting of
one rotational opposition Pd which is itself rotated around
the center of the pot, thus producing a PdP d Pd pattern (see
Figure 11 ).
The reason I earlier detached the rotational principle from
the term rotational symmetry is that the phenomenon of
rotation can occur without necessarily producing a design
which is rotationally symmetric. That is, parts of a design
may be in rotational relationship to each other, but those
parts may not be identical to each other. Thus, while a given
design may not be rotationally symmetric, it may appear less
chaotic and more comprehensible when looked at with
rotation in mind. The design on the pot shown in Figure 12
represents a case in point. The design consists of two distinct
"horizontal" or circumferential bands. The upper band
consists of two similar panels (although only part of one
panel is shown in the photograph) , while the lower band is
filled by a series of panels which, taken together, form a
continuous design similar to the PdP d design in the previous
pot. While not rotationally symmetric (because the two
oblique halves are not identical), the panel (drawn in Figure
13) makes more sense if seen as largely influenced by
rotation, as the spiral patterns are in a 180° rotational
relationship along the axis indicated. Similarly each of the
sub-panels filling the lower band exhibits bifold rotational
symmetry along the axis indicated (or, for that matter, along
any axis going through the center of the sub-panel).
I could give several other examples of this kind; I will
limit myself to just two. The design panel drawn below
(Figure 14) is one of many versions of a Zuni-derived panel
which is used on both interior and exterior band designs.
This design, incidentally, is the "prayer-stick" design mentioned earlier. Although it may appear less obvious (because
we are probably not accustomed to considering painted and
unpainted areas as equivalent), rotation can be seen to be
operative in this case as well. That is, the light {unpainted)
"step" figure and the dark (painted) "step" figure are in
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rotational oppos1t1on along an oblique dividing axis. The
analysis of this design in this way is made more plausible by
the fact that the explicit oblique division of panels into two
identical parts is common.
Another version of this same phenomenon can be seen in
the drawing below {Figure 15) which represents a central
avian figure copied from the interior of a shallow bowl. If
looked at solely in terms of the painted areas, the design does
not seem to be even marginally rotational. However, the
unpainted swirls which are "negatively" defined by the
darkened areas can be seen to be in rotational opposition.
(While I would not maintain that this was consciously
rendered in this way, I would suggest that this is at least an
unconscious factor in the aesthetic appeal of this design.)
This design, incidentally, is probably derived from a Zuni
design as there are similar designs to which it bears some
resemblance (cf. Sides 1966, Pl. 17).
Rotation is also sometimes operative in the smallest
details and sub-panels. Thus, for example, although the
design on the modern pot shown in Figure 1 is not (on the
total level) a rotational design, at least one of the panels ca·n
be seen to be rotationally generated. I am referring to the
crescent panel at the top, which seems to have been treated
rotationally even though the shape of the field mitigated
against a strict rotational design.
PRINCIPLE: Designs are generated by repetition of elements or by formation of identical elements, and are
periodic.
In all of the previously mentioned rotational designs,
rotation is the cognitive operation by which repetition
occurs. By contrast, bilateral symmetry entails reflection as a
way of achieving repetition, and is also used (e.g., Figure 4),
but not to the same extent.
The periodicity of the design results from the order and
type of repetition. For example, circumferential bands
(either exterior or interior to the pot) are composed of
panels which repeat in a variety of ways. The panels of these
bands can be arranged in a simple repeating pattern
(AAA ... ) or in an alternating pattern of some sort
ABABAB ... , or ABCABC ... ), or in some cases in an
alternating fixed and variable pattern (AB' AB" AB"'). Nonbounded designs such as the one shown in Figure 10 also
exhibit varying types of periodicity, depending on the
number and type of rotations.
PRINCIPLE: Designs are generated relative to the conceptual center of the field, although this center is not
generally made explicit.
In part this is a necessary result of rotation, and in part
rotation is itself subsumed by this quality of conceptual
center. Any rotational design is produced by rotating certain
forms or elements around a center, or by dividing the field in
such a way as to produce rotationally related areas. In either
case, rotational designs are generated relative to the center of
the field.
In previous sections I have made reference to "horizontal"
bands, often with "vertical" divisions, although these terms
have not always been gravitationally correct; in this respect I
have been following Bunzel's interpretive terminology
(1929: 16, 18). If such bands were simply horizontal (concep-
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tually), they would be generated by sheer repetition of
elements or panels along a straight line; that particular design
operation has been termed translation by Shepard
{1956: 269). On a cylindrical surface, such as the outside of a
water jug or bowl, such an operation would result in a
circular or circumferential pattern {in the same way that
maintaining a straight linear path on earth would eventually
define a circular path). However, if the band designs were not
so much "horizontal" as conceptually circular or circumferential, then they would be conceptually governed by
rotation around a central point. Thus the same concrete
designs could have been conceptually produced in two
distinctly different ways. I suggest that the central point or
circumferential interpretation is the more probable one,
although I do not think that the two are necessarily mutually
exclusive. That is, thinking of the designs as being conceptually generated relative to the center of the field does not
necessarily eliminate the possibility of the bands being
conceptually "horizontal" as well. My reasons for suggesting
a central orientation follow.
First, in many cases there is a similarity between interior
designs which are clearly circular in conception, and exterior,
"horizontal" or circumferential patterns. For example, the
Nampeyo pot shown in Figure 10 has an exterior design
which is very similar to an interior design on another
Nampeyo pot. I do not have a photograph of this second pot,
but the design, which exhibits a definite circular orientation,
is shown in schematic form in the diagram below {Figure 16).
Thus both would seem to be circular in conception. {Note,
incidentally, that the painted spiralling feather patterns are
almost identical to the unpainted spiral forms surrounding
them, although having an opposite directional orientation.)
Similarly, exterior designs of the type shown on the pot in
the foreground in Figure 17 are conceptually similar to
interior designs of the type shown in Figure 18. Both are
semi-bounded avian designs, emanating from the "roadline."
Only in one case the design is an exterior design and in the
other an interior design. The conceptual equivalences in
other respects suggest that both are conceptually contained
in a circular field defined by the "roadline."
Placement of the "roadline" is the most constant and the
first operation in Pueblo pottery design {Bunzel 1929:13,
28), and as such seems to represent an initial circumferential
definition of the field. Most "roadlines" have a small gap or
token non-enclosure, a Zuni practice which the Hopi have
adopted. Although the meaning of this conventionalized gap
has occasioned considerable dispute {cf. Chapman 1951), the
explanation given by Bunzel is that the "roadline" is
identified with the life of the potter, and should therefore
not be finished. Finishing the "roadline" is symbolically
equated with ending the potter's life {Bunzel 1929:69), and
thus entails completing a circle or a full cycle.
Many designs can be seen to emanate from the "roadline,"
often spiralling in toward the center of the design {see, for
example, the design just mentioned, viz., Figure 18). This
central orientation is somewhat apparent in the design
product. In addition, the indication of movement inward
toward the center has at least been mentioned, if not fully
and elaborately documented, in the literature. Thompson
{1945:550) reports that designs move in a circle and toward
the center in a circular and centripetal movement. Ortiz

{1972: 143) reports that in sand painting, one of the most
sacred acts performed in the society, the outer boundaries
are first set, and then the painter works inward toward the
center of the field.
Lastly, evidence for the central orientation of designs is
suggested by the common use of bifold, fourfold, and other
rotational symmetries, as well as rotationally-derived panel
designs. All of these are either a result of, or imply, rotation
around a center or central point.
Thus the center of the field is vital as an organizational or
implied force or locus, rather than as an objective or explicit
form or point. In Western art, by contrast, the center of the
composition is generally filled, although it may not exert any
particular force on the rest of the composition.
PRINCIPLE: The elements in Hopi pottery designs often
seem to be generated by division of the field,· i.e., elaboration
of design occurs through division into elements, rather than
by the cumulative addition of elements.
Although my first inclination in studying Hopi pottery
had been to (1) isolate elements, and {2) then determine how
they were combined, this procedure was discarded because
following it seemed to make the designs more rather than less
confusing. It seemed that the elements were often derived
from the designs rather than vice versa; that is, the elements
seemed, in many cases, "emergent" rather than basic.
For example, the design on the modern pot shown in
Figure 19 (which is a four-panel design) appears to be
a rather chaotic design, which maintains its chaotic appearance so long as one tries to conceptualize it by pulling
out elements one by one {particularly since one runs into
immediate figure/ground problems in even trying to decide
what the elements are). However, if one conceives of the
design as generated by progressive divisions . or setting of
boundaries with the filling in of details {thus creating
elements as the last step), it becomes more visually comprehensible. The schematic diagram below {Figure 20) represents one possible reconstruction of one of the panels.
Unfortunately I did not witness the actual painting of the
design diagrammed in Figure 20, nor was I able to interview
the potter, so my reconstruction is admittedly speculative.
More important than the specific sequence of the divisions,
however, is the idea of progressive divisions and emergent
elements. And for this general idea there is additional
evidence, both material and textual.
First the visible intersections and overlappings of lines on
the po~ themselves can provide some information as to
sequence by which the designs were created; and secondly,
what descriptions there were of the decorating process
seemed supportive. For example:
The area to be decorated is usually bordered or circumscribed
by several parallel lines or bands. Then the area is divided into :wo
or more units and next the larger design elements are applied.
Areas which are to become solid masses of color are first outlined
and then filled in. Thus the design progresses from the larger,
simpler masses and lines to the more intricate details. One unit of
the design is not completed until the next unit is started. The units
are considered in their relation to each other and are developed
alternately [Hubert 1937:9].

I do not mean to imply, by any of the above, that
elements do not exist in Hopi pottery designs. Nor do I mean
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to denigrate attempts to isolate and name motifs, although
Bunzel did meet with somewhat limited success in that
particular endeavor (1929: 53-54, 70, 118-119). Rather, I am
suggesting that the procedure of isolating and classifying
design "elements" per se without considering how these were
themselves derived, is of dubious utility in the context of
Hopi pottery.
As it happens, that very procedure has been followed in at
least one case of which I am aware. In a study of Hopi
pottery exhibited at a 1959 Museum of Northern Arizona
craft show, Sikorski (1968) has isolated, and classified Hopi
elements. The study includes a page of over one hundred
diagrammed "design elements" arranged in six categories,
e.g., "triangle," "curved elements," and "irregular elements"
(1968: 18). Not only do several of the elements seem to have
been arbitrarily assigned to one category as opposed to
another; the rationale for isolating and defining certain
configurations (many of which are irregular) as entities or
elements is neither self-evident nor explained. In total, this
classification and isolation of "elements" does not seem to
clarify anything. However, this very lack of clarification may
be, itself, revealing.
PRINCIPLE: Lines are more nearly devices for defining
boundaries, areas or movement, than themselves elements or
entities.
The phenomenon of generation of elements by division
and later filling in of areas is apparent on other than totally
bounded panel designs of the type shown earlier (Figure 19).
In part, this is the case because so many of the unbounded
designs are composed of panels at the lowest levels (e.g., the
pots shown in Figures 2 and 4). However, it is also often
evident on those pots whose desi gns are not composed of
panels or sub-panels at the lowest level. The Nampeyo pot
(Figure 1 0) is such a pot; rather than being produced by the
cumulative addition of given elements, the design seems more
nearly to have been generated by lines which reflect paths of
motion (thus creating areas which are filled in or elaborated
with hatchure). All of which could be stated in the form of
the above principle.
PRINCIPLE: The design field is not uniformly elaborated,
nor is balance literal.
This is a negatively significant principle. It is probably
related to equality of figure and ground, and is in that sense
stating the antithesis of the principle or phenomenon which
has been termed horror vacui or aversion to unfilled space in
reference to art styles such as that of the Northwest Coast or
Maori art. Since non-painted space seems to have value (cf.
pages 00-00), there would seem to be no need to achieve
balance through uniform filling of the field.
PRINCIPLE: Color does not seem to be employed to
distinguish between dominant and subsidiary elements or
areas, although it is used differentially for lines versus areas.
Again, this is a negative principle, and again it is stated to
contrast Hopi designs with other two- or three-color design
systems (such as the Northwest Coast system which uses
what have been designated primary, secondary, and tertiary
color systems [Holm 1965:29-32] ). Unfortunately, none of
my photographs or drawings are in color, so it is difficult if
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not impossible for the reader to determine the colors in the
pots illustrated here. All of the pots shown here are painted
in dark brown or black, and most use in addition, a dark red
or reddish brown pigment. (Also common, though not shown
here, are pots with a red slip with dark applied designs, or
with a more yellowed slip.) With one or two exceptions,
none of which are shown here, the lines seem always to be
applied in the dark black-brown pigment, with the reddish
pigment applied only to fill in areas. The largest painted
areas, in particular, seemed to have been filled in with red, so
as to avoid too black a design.

Structural System
Having delineated several inter-related structural principles
in what I have called "bricoleur's terms," I would like to pull
these together into a more integrated and explicitly defined
system especially since many of the principles, when taken
together, suggest additional or emergent aspects of the Hopi
pottery design system.
Rotation versus bilaterality, as used here, are not merely
terms for describing relationships between elements once a
design is produced; rather they describe the forces or
operations by which the designs are produced. Moreover, the
use of each seems to imply certain concomitant relationships.
In particular, the general tendency to favor rotational over
bilateral symmetry has the following implications: (1) it
tends to produce a dynamic rather than a static design; (2) it
implies a design situation in which only one element is
repeated, whereas bilateral symmetry often requires two
different forms of the same element (equivalent to a
right-hand and a left-hand form) ; and (3) it suggests the
importance of a conceptual center (often non-ex pi icit) which
is the one constant point in the 360° rotation of a central
axis, or is alternatively the intersection point of all central
axes. Further, all of the above implications are reinforced by
other individual design principles or characteristics, as these
have been delineated earlier.
Thus, for example, the dynamic rather than static quality
of the design system is reinforced by figure/ground reversals
and equivalences (particularly those which follow a generalized yin-yang model), by the oblique division of panels
(which suggests rotation), by the use of obliquely placed
lines to define areas which are in rotational opposition to
each other, by the use of tapering shapes and areas (which
suggest transition), and by the use of spirals and other
directional elements rather than more static and stable
rectangular elements. All of the above tend to imply
transition or movement and are in that sense dynamic visual
devices or arrangements. In addition, the general dynamic
aspect of the design system is specifically cyclical and
periodic. This cyclicity and periodicity are emergent both
from rotations (as are imp Iied in the Nampeyo design shown
in Figure 10 and diagrammed in Figure 11 ), and from
sequential repetitions of the type which occur in the
ABABAB or ABCABC type of bounded panel designs (cf.
Figure 9).
The single rotated form versus the mirror-image forms
(i.e., left-hand and right-hand forms) similarly relate back to
the total system, particularly to figure/ground reversals. Both
bilateral and rotational symmetry could be considered as
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visual representations of duality; yet the types of duality
represented would differ. In the rotational case, since the
forms are identical (at least in terms of shape), the
opposition is totally based on position or relative location. In
the bilateral case, by contrast, which uses mirror-image
forms, the opposition is based on opposite forms or entities.
One might think of rotational symmetry as x and complement of x (at least in a yin-yang model), and of bilateral
symmetry as x and anti-x. The yin-yang form, as described
earlier, is that specific form of bifold rotational symmetry
which uses forms of identical shape but different color. As
employed in Hopi pottery designs, th e yin-y ang model
produces a situation in which one form is explicit (i.e.,
painted), whereas the other is implicit (i.e., itself unpainted
but defined by the surrounding painted areas) (cf. Figure 5).
The resulting duality exhibits complementary opposition.
The interior Nampeyo design drawn in Figure 16 is interesting in this respect in that, at the total level, the pattern
exhibits a duality of the complementary, imp Iicit versus
explicit variety. The painted and unpainted areas are each
other's complements in terms of shape, although the orientation and implied directional movement are diametrically
opposed. Complementary duality of this sort is related both
to figure/ground equivalences and to the use of rotational
symmetry.
Another characteristic of the total design system which is
emergent from the several individual design principles, when
these are considered together, is the importance of the total
design as a total design. That is, the designs seem to be
generated from the highest level downward, rather than being
built up from a series of discrete elements. The distinction
which I am trying to make here is analogous to the difference
between a logical system which is based on deduction and
one which is based on induction. In part, the importance of
the total is evidenced in (or resultant from) the generation of
designs relative to the conceptual center of the field. But
more importantly, it is evidenced in the progressive divisions
of the field such that elements are seemingly the conceptually last phase in the generation of the pattern rather than the
reverse, i.e., the generation of pattern by the cumulative
addition of elements.
The above point is important, if for no other reason than
that it runs counter to the "natural" assumption that
elements are of prime importance, with operations being
defined in terms of elements, and being significant only as
they specify the ways in which elements are to be combined.
Such an assumption could follow quite automatically from
an attempt to translate or adapt linguistic methodology
directly to the visual realm. In the Hopi case, it would seem
that operations have primacy. Moreover, operations seem to
be performed relative to the total. Thus, for example, in the
course of this structural analysis, it often seemed more
accurate to suggest that a field was divided in order to
produce x number of panels rather than to say that a
particular panel was repeated x number of times (e .g., Figure
9), or to suggest that a field was divided in such a way as to
produce four quadrants in rotational opposition to each
other, rather than to say that a section was repeated four
times (e.g., Figures 7 and 8).
Finally, the Hopi design system seems to be composed of
different levels of design, all working in similar ways, rather

than being based on dominant and subservient (or filler) elements. This is due to the importance of the total design and
its central orientation, the emergent aspect of elements, and
the primacy of operations over elements. Thus, for example,
the total design may be composed of several panels, which
are in turn composed of sub-panels, which are further divided
and filled, etc.
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITIES IN OTHER SYSTEMS:
WORLD VIEW

The premises of this study, it should be recalled, are
twofold: (1) that designs can be analyzed as a structural
system, i.e., that certain generating or structuring principles
can be inferred by induction, and (2) that the structure of
designs should logically be related to the structure or
structuring of other Hopi cultural systems. Thus, having
attempted a "structural analysis" of Hopi pottery designs
and having arrived at a particular visual structural system, an
obvious second step would be to see if, or rather how, these
visual structures correlate with the structure of other
systems. For example, does the way in which the designs are
organized have anything in common with the way the Hopi
cosmos is conceptually organized (or structured)? Or, more
realistically, what do the two systems have in common?
Although any number of Hopi systems and sub-systems
could have been analyzed for purposes of comparison, the
"world view" or structuring of world seemed the most basic,
and therefore the most obvious system to present in the brief
space allotted here.

"Linguistic" Structuring of Reality
The choice of world view was a particularly obvious one
since it was largely on the basis of Whorf's studies of Hopi
linguistics (1936, 1938, 1940, 1941) that he formulated his
noted hypothesis, and since I am considering "world view"
or cosmological organization broadly enough to incorporate
Whorf's lexical and grammatical structuring of reality, i.e.:
A world view provides a people with a structure of reality; it
defines, classifies, and orders the "really real" in the universe, in
their world, and in their society. In Clifford Geertz's phrase
(1957), a world view "embodies man's most general conceptions
of order" [Ortiz 1 972:1 36].

According to Whorf (1950:68), the metaphysics underlying our own language entails the imposition on the universe
of two grand cosmic forms: time and space. The former is
kinetic, one-dimensional, and subject to a threefold division,
i.e., past, present, and future; the latter is static, threedimensional, and consists of infinite space.
By contrast, time and space, as such, are simply not Hopi
concepts. That is, time as an objectified concept is not
translatable into Hopi, either in terms of specific words,
expressions, grammatical forms or constructions; nor do the
tenses past, present, and future have Hopi equivalents (Whorf
1950:67). And yet, as Whorf points out, without these
distinctions "the Hopi postulates equally account for all
phenomena and their interrelations" (1950:67). The
question is, how? The answer is that the Hopi also impose
upon the universe two grand cosmic forms: these are not
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time and space, but rather manifested and unmanifested (or
manifesting). These could also be thought of as objective and
subjective:
The objective or manifested comprises all that is or has been
accessible to the senses, the historical physical universe, in fact,
with no attempt to distinguish between present and past, but
excluding everything that we call future, BUT NOT MERELY
THIS; it includes indistinguishably all that we call mental everything that appears or exists in the mind ... and by an implication and extension ... in the very heart of the Cosmos itself
[Whorf 1950:68-69].

Whorf makes the observation that we 6 carry spatial
concepts (almost obsessively) into our speech and thought
through the use of spatial metaphors of all sorts, and by
"objectifying-imaginatively spatializing qualities and potentials that are quite non-spatial (so far as any spatiallyperceptive senses can tell us)" (1941:83). By contrast, the
Hopi language evidences a total avoidance of such metaphors
and extensions of spatial concepts to non-spatial matters
(1941 :83). Whorf's explanation for this phenomenon is that
major Hopi grammatical patterns do not provide analogies
for imaginary space, and that the Hopi have other linguistic
devices, in particular verb forms, which serve the same
expressive purpose (Whorf 1941: 83).
Rather than suggest that the Hopi do not carry spatial
concepts into their language and thought, as Whorf does
(1941 :83), I suggest that or.e could as validly say that the
Hopi carry "non-spatial" concepts into their spatial thought.
That is, that the same structuring principles come through in
verbal and visual thought and expression.
For example, it seems that sequence, repetition, duration,
and intensity in the Hopi language are all relevant considerations in Hopi designs and express characteristics which were
seen to generate the designs.
The more one learns about Hopi linguistic forms, the
more apparent the parallels between linguistic forms (particularly verb forms) and the structure of the design system
become. For example, in a quite detailed paper, Whorf
(1936) deals specifically with two of the nine aspects of
Hopi verbs; the segmentative and the punctual. In that paper
he presents the following series of concrete examples to
demonstrate the change from a punctual aspect (manifested
about a point) to a segmentative aspect (a series of repeated
interconnected segments of one large phenomenon), by the
consistent reduplication of the root and addition of a suffix
(Whorf 1936:52):
ha'd it is bent in a rounded angle

ho"ci it forms a sharp
acute angle
pa"ci it is notched
pi'va it is gullied out

ca'mi it is slashed inward
from the edge

hari'rita it lies in a meandering line, making successive rounded angles
(applied for instance to
meander
patterns in
decoration)
hoci'cita it is zigzag
paci'cita, it is serrated
piva'vata it extends in successive
gu II ies and
gulches (said of ground)
cami'mita it is fringed, it
is slashed into a fringe
along the edge

What is significant in terms of this paper is neither the
specific linguistic mechanism used (although it relies on a
reduplication which is interesting), nor the specific Hopi
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words, but rather both that the specific connotations of the
above words (punctual and segmentative) seem eminently
suited to describing many Hopi designs, and that the implied
cognitive distinctions which are apparently necessary in
choosing the proper aspect of a verb also seem relevant to
Hopi designs. Moreover, the particular set of words cited
above is not unusual in terms of the particular discriminations which it requires.
The Hopi language is equipped to deal with (and
requires discriminations dealing with) vibratory phenomena,
forces, repetitions, type of sequences, duration, etc. Similarly, the design system seems to be based on repetition, to be
generated by central forces and by rotational forces and
movements, and to vary according to number and type of
sequences. In addition, the Hopi language exhibits marked
tendencies to use verbs rather than nouns (Whorf 1950), to
transform our propositions about things into propositions
about events, and not to "objectify" or think in terms of
entities (Whorf 1941: 79). I cannot over-emphasize that
processual descriptions based on operational distinctions of
the above type seem more readily applicable to a description
of Hopi pottery designs than a terminological system based
on classifications of elements or "entities." It is relatively
easy to determine sequence, repetition, and intensity of
designs (which areas are highly developed and which are not);
it is not always possible to determine which parts of a design
are object (figure) and which are ground. It is also interesting
to note that, as a specific alternative to "objectifying" things
(thus creating "entities" of such "things" as days and hours)
and creating imaginary plurals on these "entities," the Hopi
language relies instead on cyclicity and patterns of repetition
(Whorf 1941: 78). Their designs also seem to be based on
cyclicity, and patterns of repetition, to the point of
reflecting patterns of change without having discrete "elements" (e.g., Figure 1 0). As for the two grand cosmic forms
which Whorf (1950:68) has delineated- manifested and
unmanifested- it seems more than coincidental that there is
not a figure (object) on a (residual) ground in Hopi pottery
designs, so much as an explicit or painted form and an
implicit or unpainted form, each of which seems significant
(cf., in particular, Figure 16). Could this not be seen as a
visual representation or rather a structural reduplication of
"the Hopi philosophy of the universe in respect to its grand
dualism of objective and subjective" (Whorf 1950: 70)? I
suggest that, if not created with this similarity in mind, the
designs which employ this device are unconsciously appealing, or correct, or "aesthetic" because of this structural
similarity.

Cosmological Structuring and Reality
While the preceding Whorfian analysis presented a way of
"structuring reality," and could in that sense be considered a
"world view," it was so abstracted as to be more of a
meta-world view. I would therefore like to use this section to
briefly present a more specific, or at least more concrete
version of the Hopi world view, particularly the Hopi
cosmology, which could perhaps be thought of as a created
rather than a mediated reality. Toward this end, I will rely
heavily on overview articles by Ortiz (1972) and by
Thompson (1945).
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Ortiz (1972} concedes that it is both possible and
productive to talk of a general Pueblo world view, i.e., those
aspects of world view which are universal to all the Pueblo
people (1972: 142}. The first generalization which he proposes for all the pueblos is that:
they all set careful limits to the boundaries of their world and
order everything within it. These boundaries are not the same, but,
more important, the principles of setting boundaries are ... [Ortiz
1972:142].

The idea of setting boundaries at all, and further, the idea of
setting them as an initial operation in the process of ordering,
is once again paralleled in the Hopi design system. Their
pottery designs seem, in many cases, both processually (cf.
Bunzel 1929 and Hubert 1937:9} and conceptually (cf. the
Structural Analysis section of this paper} to be generated by
the successive setting of boundaries. I might add, as an aside,
that Hopi architectural terminology also deals with
boundaries of spaces rather than with spaces as entities (e.g.,
rooms, hallways, etc.}; thus hollow spaces are not named as
objects but are rather located or described by relative locat.ion (cf. Whorf 1953}.
The boundaries of the cosmos are specifically set by the
Hopis according to four cardinal directions and three cosmic
levels. In addition:
All the Pueblos also have a well-elaborated conception and
symbolization of the middle or center of the cosmos, represented
by a sipapu, an earth navel, or the entire village. Usually there are
many different centers because sacred space can be recreated again
and again without ever exhausting its reality .... Among the
Pueblos, the center is the point of intersection of the six
directions, with a seventh being the center itself. If only four
directions are given symbolic elaboration, the center will be the
fifth direction [Ortiz 1972:142].

The importance of a conceptual center as a generating
force, and indeed as the intersection point of several
directions, again seems structurally congruent with the
conceptual importance of the center as a generating force in
the design system. In that system, the center is the
intersection of all central axes, or the constant point in the
rotation of any one axis. Similarly, the relative definition of
sacred space seems to be structurally duplicated in the
individual design panels and sub-panels which are organized
(rotationally or otherwise} relative to their own respective
centers.
Much of what I have discussed previously is corroborated
by Thompson (1944, 1945}, such as: the tendency to
conceptualize phenomena in terms of growth cycles, repetitive and vibratory movement patterns and serial metamorphoses, the tendency to conceptualize Hopi history as an
unfolding of sequences or phases, and the dynamic view of
the cosmos (1945:542}. The nature of Hopi duality, particularly as that duality differs from our own, is also discussed:
the Hopi concept of the balanced, correlative interdependence of
the manifold aspects of reality excludes an arbitrary over-all dual
division, such as that which structures our own thinking and forms
the basis for our traditional ethical concept of the competing
forces of good and evil. Duality in the Hopi world view exists only
insofar as it represents two correlates in a reciprocally balanced
universal scheme, and each correlate is conceived as an indispensable part of the whole, neither one being essentially subordinate to
the other [Thompson and joseph 1944:44].

At the risk of belaboring a point, I suggest that the type of
duality described above is structurally duplicated in the
yin-yang type of (complementary} duality which is based on
equal figure and ground and on rotational symmetry, rather
than in the (antithetical} duality of bilateral symmetry.
Once again, the importance of the total, and of periodicities and cycles, suggests apparent structural parallels with
the design system. In particular I suggest that such designs as
the pottery design shown in Figure 10 (and schematically
diagrammed in Figure 11) represent a visual structural
replication of the way reality is conceived, again probably
unconsciously. I further suggest that structural parallels are
to be found and are significant in other systems, e.g., Hopi
ethics or Hopi religion, but shall not deal with these at this
time. The world view has already been discussed in sufficient
detail to at least indicate the plausibility of the structural
analysis of pottery designs given earlier in the Structural
Analysis section and to suggest that that structural system
relates to other "non-visual" structures and structurings.
CONCLUSIONS

In an effort to elucidate the elusive nature of structure,
Levi-Strauss (1960: 52} made reference to a hypothetical
jig-saw puzzle generated by a hypothetical mechanical saw,
the movements of which were regularly modified by a
hypothetical cam shaft. The structure of the puzzle does not
exist, he suggests, "at the empirical level" (which would, I
presume, be essentially a description of the proxemic
relationships between parts of the assembled puzzle}; rather,
it lies in the mathematical formula which expresses the shape
of the cams and their speed of rotation.
With the frank acknowledgment that I will in the process
probably be subverting the intended meaning of Levi-Strauss'
analogy, I would like to extend it. I suggest that the above
formulation "of the empirical level" could be thought of as
structure (noun form}, whereas the mathematical formula
would, by contrast, represent structure (verb form). The
former refers to product; the latter refers to process.
Similarly, I suggest that designs could be thought of in terms
of design (noun form) or in terms of design (verb form}.
This paper represents an attempt to deal with design (verb
form}, with design as process, with design as a created system
which follows certain principles of elaboration which may
well conform to the principles followed in other cultural
systems. In that context, my main conclusion is that I have
begun, and that that beginning is worth continuing. In that
sense,- the questions I have answered, however tentatively or
speculatively, are less interesting than the further questions
which those tentative answers suggest. Accordingly, my
conclusions will deal both with what has actually been done
in this study, and with what further studies or approaches
could or should, as a result, be attempted.

What Has Been Done in This Study
Very simply, I have attempted both to delineate the
structure of a particular design system, and to compare that
structure with the structuring principles followed in other
systems in that culture. In particular, I have dealt with
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linguistic structuring of reality, since much of Wharf's work
was with the Hopi language, and since I was initially
interested in a visual equivalent of the Whorf Hypothesis.
The tentative conclusion on this particular relationship is
that the same structuring principles do seem to be operative
in both systems, and in other systems as well (cf. Thompson
1945; Ortiz 1972). A further conclusion, which will be
elaborated below, is that such structural similarities are
revealing.
In terms of the specific structural analysis of Hopi pottery
designs, certain tentative conclusions are more intrinsically
interesting than others. In particular, I am thinking of my
tentative conclusions as to: (1) the importance of operations
rather than entities as a conceptual clue to the organization
of the designs, and (2) the likelihood of designs being
generated "downward" by successive divisions rather than
"upward" by the cumulative addition of elements. Both of
these are interesting if for no other reason than that it often
seems to be assumed that the reverse is the case, i.e., that
elements are of prime importance, and that designs are
formed by the progressive addition of elements. The point
here is that the reverse may be the case in some art systems,
but that it needn't necessarily be the case. The seeming lack
of figure and ground in the traditional sense is also an
interesting principle in this respect; i.e., it is possible not to
have traditional (dominant) figures and (residual) ground, as
such.
In that sense, my specific analysis of Hopi pottery designs
as a structural system serves to expand and explore the realm
of logical possibilities of design, so that actual ways of
organizing designs can be placed in the context of possible
ways of organizing designs. Such an examination of logical
possibilities (particularly as these are phrased· in terms of
structural possibilities) is essential if one is ever to be able to
discuss the logical probabilities of designs or design motifs
occurring in disparate cultural groups, or if one is to draw
cross-cultural comparisons. I suggest that if a cross-cultural
grid or etic scale is at all possible, it will ultimately be a
structural grid. To the extent that this paper deals with a
process approach to art, and attempts to examine structural
possibilities and cognitive implications of possibilities, it
contributes towards the eventual establishment of such a
grid. To the extent that it also seems to make Hopi pottery
designs more visually and conceptually comprehensible, it
also makes a contribution.
In addition to feeding back into the art context from
which it derived, I think this study has a minor, though real,
potential for being recycled into the structural framework
from which it derived. That is, I think that any information
on "visual" cognition and structuring is of obvious relevance
to structural theory in general. For example, the distinction
between the dualities entailed in rotational versus bilateral
symmetry seems to suggest that "binary oppositions" may be
of more than one type (e.g., antithetical oppositions and
complementary oppositions) and would probably be worth
investigating further.
The above are what I consider to be the strengths of this
study. However, the study itself suffers from a certain
symmetry and balance: every strength is matched by a
weakness. Generally the weaknesses seem to follow from the
tentativeness of the study. In particular, I see three weak48

nesses, none of which are irremediable. (The remedies will be
discussed in the next section.)
First, this study would have been infinitely stronger if I
had been able to interview potters, and to observe the designs
being painted. Instead, I had to rely on written material, and
answers to other people's queries (e.g., Bunzel 1929), whicfi
did not always correspond to what I would have liked to ask.
Second, the structural analysis of the design system was
phrased in such a way as to be more subjective than
objective. The analysis was certainly made more plausible by
the existence of numerous structural similarities in other
systems. However, these similarities present a compelling
rather than a conclusive case for the analysis. Thus, although
one could argue that the analysis was to some degree
confirmed by the structural similarities in other systems,
such an argument would be undeniably circular, i.e., preliminary research on the Hopi no doubt influenced the analysis of
their pottery. (However, if the argument is circular, it is no
more circular than the relationship which is being investigated.) All of which is not to say that an analysis such as
was given in the Structural Analysis section must necessarily
remain either tentative or unverifiable. Rather, it can be used
to generate predictions which would themselves be testable.
At least one such set of predictions will be discussed in the
next section.
Third, this study suffered from the lack of an adequate
terminology with which to describe a design system concretely and precisely, and with which to state empiricaHy
verifiable propositions. Having chosen the "bricoleur's out" to
describe the structural system, I made no progress in the
specific invention of a genuinely "scientific" terminological
system. However, the general parameters which such . a
terminology should follow did become clearer.

What's Being Done as a Result of This Study
i am currently following two quite distinct lines of
investigation, each of which follows from the framework and
conclusions of this paper. The first entails making specific
experimental predictions on the basis of the Hopi study, and
devising a feasible way of testing them. The second entails
studying an entirely different art system occurring in a
structurally dissimilar though equally cohesive society, in an
effort to broaden my framework and test its general
applicability and explanatory value. Both will be briefly
described below.
Although the specific structural analysis presented in this
study is of unverified psychological validity, it can be used to
generate predictions which are directly verifiable. Toward
this end, I returned to and modified my original idea of test
drawings. As conceived of originally, the test drawings would
have entailed taking a standard design motif, varying it
randomly, and using those variations to determine which
types of variation are significant and which are not. Whereas
this seems to work well for linguists, and is methodologically
flawless, it is quite unwieldy when operationalized for
designs because the variation is hard to control. The test
drawing technique was eventually modified such that it was
not to be used to elicit information randomly, but rather to
test specific predictions.
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The experimental procedure is as follows: The subject is
given a drawing of a simple design and asked to examine it so
that he can subsequently reproduce it from memory. He
would then attempt to draw it himself, and would be given
the opportunity to make verbal corrections and to indicate
possible deficiencies and vagueness in his drawing (thus
allowing him to compensate for lack of drawing ability and
providing a measure of his certainty as to what was correct
and what was hazy in his visual memory). Lastly, he would be
asked to describe the original design verbally. The drawing
process would be filmed, thus providing a permanent record
of the sequence in which the design was reproduced. 7
The theory behind such a procedure is as follows: First, it
is assumed that in order to reproduce the design, the subject
would be forced to actively organize it and classify it in a
systematic way. The correctly rendered aspects of the design
would provide some indication as to which aspects of the
design were actively classified and in what ways, just as the
mistakes would presumably indicate which aspects of the
design were not particularly relevant to the viewer's ordering
system. Similarly, it is thought that the sequence in which
the design is reproduced is indicative of the relative importance of the various ordering principles. The use of verbal
description would provide a way of testing the relationship
between linguistic categories and visual discriminations:
presumably those aspects of the design which are noted
verbally would be correctly rendered in the subject's drawing.
In order to obtain significant results in the above
experiment, the test drawings would have to be created with
specific ordering principles and variables in mind. For
example, see the test drawing below (Figure 21 ). It is a
relatively simple and highly regular design if perceived as a
rotational design composed of an inner and outer line
arranged in directional opposition to each other. If one were
more accustomed to bilateral symmetry, and tended to
classify in terms of entities rather than lines, it would
probably be considerably more difficult to perceive correctly.
Using such a test drawing, and on the basis of both the
structural analysis of Hopi pottery designs and Whorf's work
on linguistics, I would make several predictions. Specifically, ·
I would predict that if the above test drawing were given to a
large group of Hopis and a large group of Anglo-Americans,
the following patterns would emerge statistically: that the
Hopis would be more consistently accurate in rendering the
rotational repetitions and the specific directions would be
more often correctly reproduced, that the Hopis would be
more likely to notice that all of the swirls (including the
inner ones) are virtually identical in size, and that they would
be more likely to reproduce the design by first drawing a
continuous outer and then a continuous inner line (rather
than by several choppy lines used to block out a shape). I
would also predict that the Hopis would be more likely to
verbally describe the design in terms of lines and motion, and
that the Anglos would be more likely to describe it in terms
of entities.
The second line of investigation which follows indirectly
from the structural analysis of Hopi pottery designs is an
analogous though greatly modified structural study of
Northwest Coast Indian art. In part, that particular system
interested me because it is structurally opposed to the Hopi

system in so many ways: Northwest Coast designs are predominantly bilateral (to the point of split representation), balance is quite literal (e.g., literally an eye for an eye
and a tooth for a tooth), the field is almost entirely filled in
many cases, and "elements" seem to be extremely important.
The organization of Northwest Coast societies seems correspondingly opposed to the Hopi organization as well, but it
does not seem worthwhile to develop those comparisons at
this time.
In the particular study of Northwest Coast art which I am
working on at present, 8 I have changed my approach in the
following ways. First, I am considering operations which are
more directly Levi-Straussian, i.e., (1) the operation of visual
intersections, and (2) the operation of inversion. The former
operation is visually equivalent to mediation as that is used in
myth, and seems to be a reverse and complementary
operation to visual opposition. It is used as a way of
combining both elements (to produce a formline system) and
total figures, and is the specific mechanism by which
numerous visual puns are formed. The operation of inversion
is used on the meaning level such that humans and crest
animals are shown in symbolically inverted circumstances
(e.g., a crest animal which occurs on a headdress worn by a
chief might itself be wearing a similar headdress consisting of
a human figure). Again, the operation is similar to one which
occurs in myth. Secondly, I am working on the meaning level
more directly, since much of Northwest Coast art is crest art,
or is at least directly representational. (The premise in this
case is that such an art system is used as much to indicate
relationships between crest groups as to merely differentiate
them.) What follows directly from the Hopi study, in this
case, is the use of a process model which is directed at
operations rather than at configurations.
Thus the final conclusion to this paper is a premise: that
design can be studied in terms of process, and in terms of
system, and that such studies both answer and generate
structural, "visual," and cognitive questions.
NOTES
1

This study is a revised version of a senior honors thesis submitted
to Harvard University in 1971. The original study was financed by a
National Science Foundation research grant obtained through the
Harvard Anthropology Department, and was largely carried out using
the resources of the Museum of Northern Arizona's Research Center.
This manuscript was prepared while I was on a fellowship program at
the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. I would therefore
like to acknowledge the support of all of the above institutions. In
addition, I would like to thank those people who assisted me at the
Museum of Northern Arizona for their help, Dr. jeremy Sabloff who
was my thesis advisor at Harvard for his encouragement, and Professor
Sol Worth of the Annenberg School of Communications for his
generous assistance and constructive comments both on this manuscript and on a related verification project conducted at the Summer
Institute of Visual Communications in Sante Fe, New Mexico, during
the summer of 1972.
2
1 am admittedly interpreting both Arnheim's and Levi-Strauss'
work selectively, and in that sense make no pretense of accurately
representing either of their frameworks . In addition, having discussed
the work of Whorf with Arnheim on one occasion, I know for a fact
that despite all the possible congruences which I see, he is aware of
irreconcilable differences (personal communication 1971 ). For a
discussion of some of these differences (cf. Worth 1974:276-279).
3
1 am using Hopi (in reference both to pottery and its makers) to
indicate both the Hopi and the Hopi-Tewa, and descendents of the
group of Tewas who migrated to the First Mesa town of Hano some
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300 years ago. Although they still maintain a certain cultural
autonomy, the pottery tradition is, for the purpose of this analysis,
essentially the same as the Hopi. Some of the pots illustrated in this
article, are Hopi-Tewa.
4
I have generally not cited specific sources for this and the
preceding two technical sections, because the information is such a
conglomeration of so many sources, most of which are listed in the
bibliography.
5
In particular, Shepard (1956:269) defines band patterns in terms
of operations by which the repetition occurs, e.g.: translation
(foreward movement without change in orientation), reflection
(folding along an axis so as to produce a mirror-image), bifold
rotation (a 180° rotation of a single axis), as well as various
combinations of the above. These seem to be predominantly
conceptual or cognitive operations, rather than actual physical
operations. Symmetries of total patterns could thus conceivably be
classified in more than one way, depending upon what one defined as
the 'element' which is subjected to the operation. In this study, I have
concentrated both on the operation of rotation (180° or otherwise)
and on the division or creation of fields which imply rotation,
although the resulting symmetry (if there is one) could often be
classified as 'radial' just as eas ily as 'rotational.'
6

The terms we and our, as used to refer to citations of Whorf
(1941 ), specifically refer to the group which Whorf has labeled
"Standard Average European." This category includes English,
French, German, and other European languages, the assumption being
that all such languages use the same basic distinctions (Whorf
1941 :78) in the grammatical constructions and categories discussed,
and differentiated from the Hopi language. In other citations from
Whorf, the same referent is probably applicable, but it is not specified
explicitly.
7

Th is experimental procedure, including the use of film to record
the drawing process, was devised and tested in preliminary fashion
during the summer of 1972, at the Summer Institute in Visual
Anthropology, held in Sante Fe, New Mexico.
8
This study forms the basis of a doctoral dissertation for the University of British Columbia.
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FIGURE CREDITS
Most of the pottery shown in the illustrations is from the
collection of the Museum of Northern Arizona in Flagstaff. These
pots are labeled by the abbreviation MNA in the following list and are
followed by their catalogue numbers. All other pottery , listed as
"modern (1970)" in the following list, appeared at the Craft Exhibit
at the Museum of Northern Arizona during the summer of 1970. All
photographs and drawings are by the author. Figures 5 and 21 are
schemadc drawings .

Figure 7 - modern bowl, MNA Craft Exhibit (1970).
Figures 2, 3 - MNA cat. #2208/E1503.
Figure 4- modern bowl, MNA Craft Exhibit (1970).
Figure 5 - schematic drawing by the author.
Figure 6 - MNA cat. #225/1 015.
Figures 7, 8 - MNA cat. # 1 015/E556.
Figure 9 - MNA cat. #1 014/E515.
Figures 70, 7 7 - MNA cat. # 774/E2630.
Figures 72, 73 - MNA cat. # 918/E458.
Figure 74- exterior panel from MNA cat. # 255/1 013.
Figure 75 - interior design from MNA cat. # 1015/E521.
Figure 76 - interior design from MNA cat. #1026/E615.
Figure 7 7 - modern bowl , MNA Craft Exhibit (1970).
Figure 78 - MNA cat. #782/E157.
Figure 79, 20 - modern bowls, MNA Craft Exhibit (1970).
Figure 27 - schematic drawing by the author.
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THE SITUATION AND TENDENCIES
OF THE CINEMA IN AFRICA
PART I*
JEAN ROUCH

translated by STEVE FELD
The cinema began to take hold in Africa from the first
years that followed its invention. In South Africa, for
example, as early as 1896, cinema was introduced by a
vaudeville magician who had stolen a "theatregraph" from
the Alhambra Palace in London. And today, the word
"bioscope," used from the turn of the century by "Warwick
bioscope" projectors, is still the usual word for cinema in
South Africa.
In West Africa, the first attempts at cinema projections
date from 1905, the year that travelling cinemas projected
the first animation strips in Dakar and surrounding areas. At
the same time pioneers and explorers began to use the
camera, and the French cinematheque has several catalogs of
George Melies referring to the first films made in Africa.
Since this pioneering period, the cinema has developed
considerably, but one must nevertheless note, along with
Georges Sadoul, that Sub-Saharan Africa not only remains
one of the most under-developed areas of the world in terms
of films shown, 1 but moreover the most backward continent
in the area of film production. While Asia, South America,
and Indonesia have long been making films, Sub-Saharan
Africa has not yet produced a single feature length film.
In the words of Georges Sadoul, "Sixty-five years after
the invention of the cinema, in 1960, there is not to my
knowledge a single true feature length African film production - acted, photographed, written, conceived, edited, etc.,
by Africans and in an African language. Thus two hundred
million people are shut out from the most evolved form of
the most modern of the arts. I am convinced that before the
close of the 1960s this scandal will be but a bad souvenir of
the past. " 2
It thus appears particularly opportune today, at a time
when African cinema is being born, to take account of
current productions in Africa, the possibilities of new
productions and distribution, and to analyze the current
tendencies in the new African cinema.
The plan of our study will be the following: (1) an
account of commercial, educational, and documentary films
made in Africa up to today; (2) an analysis of the importance
of these types of film from filmic, cultural, and social

This is the second in a series of translations of the major
writings of jean Rouch, translated by Steve Feld, which will
appear in the first five issues of Studies. An introduction by
Feld to the entire series of articles appears in Vol. 7 No. 7.

viewpoints; (3) an analysis of new tendencies and the
conditions for the development of a true African cinema.
As to reference documents: It is important to note here
the considerable difficulties of documentation in the field of
African cinema. I apologize for many errors and omissions
that are inevitable in this type of study; but I think that
above all this report is a foundation, which after the
necessary corrections and rectifications will give researchers
access to information for their studies.
I have gathered these data by using: the classic literature- unfortunately very slight- on African cinema (Georges
Sadoul, Leprophon, Thevenot); a review of the first and only
international conference on "Cinema in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
organized in Brussels during the World Fair in July 1958;
different UNESCO reports (in particular the report of
January 1961, concerning the development of information
media in under-developed countries), different articles on
African cinema published in the journal Presence Africaine,
and the special issue of La Vie Africaine on African cinema
(June 1961 ). I have also made as much use as possible of
reports of information services prepared by African republics
in response to a questionnaire circulated by the Comite du
Film Ethhographique of the Musee de I'Homme in Paris.
Finally, I will make much reference to my own experience as
a filmmaker and observer during the course of several trips to
West Africa since 1941.
ACCOUNT OF AFRICAN FILMS TO PRESENT

In this rapid survey we will only distinguish two categories
of film: (a) commercial and documentary films, and (b)
educational films. In fact, it is not possible to establish very
neat boundaries between commercial, documentary, scripted,
and ethnographic films; these genres have frequently been
mixed since the beginning of African film. On the other
hand, educational films can be neatly placed to the side, as
their appearance has been recent, and their aim and manner
of technical production has been completely different.

Commercial and Documentary Films
The first films shot in Africa by foreign directors (and
with rare exceptions, all of the films analyzed in this account
are, unfortunately, of this type) were boldly exotic. One sees
here a logical continuation from colonialist literature, which
also, until the last few years, was aimed toward this sense of
removal and bewilderment.
We know very little about the first Melies documentaries
or the films made by Pathe before 1925, but what their
catalog titles indicate is the capricious foreignness of savagery
and cannibalism; showing the African as a peculiar animal
whose behavior is rather laughable, when not classed at the
very limits of pathology.
The first World War allowed Europeans to discover
another aspect of the African: the courage and good humor
of the Senegalese sharpshooter favored the creation of the
stereotype of the complacent childish Black, the "Uncle
Tom."**
It is peculiar to note parallel images of the Black
stereotype: In the United States, until the second World War
the Black American was reserved for film roles of the smiling
CINEMA IN AFRICA: SITUATION AND TENDENCIES
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domestic, just as at the same time in African cinema the
Black African was either the incomprehensible savage or the
devoted servant, never lacking in a sense of humor.
The first noteworthy film about Black Africa is undoubtedly Leon Poirier's La Croissiere Noire, made during
the first automobile crossing of Africa, from north to south,
by Citroen tractors (October 1924-June 1925). The basic
subject of this film is auto adventure, but parallel to this real
epic some representative aspects of populations encountered
during the trip are shown. The travellers were undoubtedly in
a hurry, but it is obvious that they took some time to choose
and look at their subjects. The documents have aged, but
remain as inestimable archival data, both in terms of the
discovery of Africa and the evolution of African cultures.
Without doubting the sincerity and good will of the
filmmakers, two orientations are clearly apparent; the incomprehension of a world just glimpsed, and having stopped to
look closer, the barbary of what is discovered there (platterlipped women, circumcision rites, aspects of the daily life of
pygmies, etc.). Although they are rendered as objectively as
possible, these images remain frozen, if not ironic documents, quite far from the human warmth of the films made
previously or at the same time by Robert Flaherty (Nanook
of the North, Moana).

The same feeling· was present in all of the written or
filmed reports of expeditions of the period; the West
discovered the rest of the world with a lens little different in
viewpoint from the pen of Marco Polo.
Unfortunately, the situation degenerated, and in succeeding films Africa was but a continent of barbarism and
inhumanity. Clearly, Africa was not the only continent
subjected to this treatment: Asia, South America, Greenland,
and generally all colonized countries were recalled on the
screen from meager images of wild dances, guitar players, or
primitive hunts. Titles like Among the Cannibals, Among the
People Eaters, and Bali, Island of Naked Breasts sufficiently
evoke the spirit, or rather the lack of spirit, of the period.
Raymond Barkan, in a particularly well documented
study- "Vers un cinema universe!" (Cinema 67 )- describes
several typical scenarios:
An ivory hunter (frequently accompanied by the widow of an
explorer) abandoned by his porters, captured by a ferocious and
vociferous tribe, is saved at the last minute by the bullets of an
emergency squad. Or: In the debilitating climate of the tropics, a
white man (generally a plantation owner) and a white woman, in
the midst of dreadful lovelife complications, are aggravated by an
indigenous rebellion, or occasionally by an earthquake or floods.
Or: In India, the polo addicted officers of His Majesty's Britain,
gain fame at the head of their Sepoys against revolting bands. Or:
In the Sahara, foreign legionnaires or Arab troopers (their captain
joined the Army in a fit of the blues) victoriously battle against a
group of pillagers. These explorers universally dream of civilization
penetrating the Dark Continent, vehemently attacking the powers
of sorcerers, and blazing the trail for missionaries who would
convert the natives to Christianity and doctors who would
immunize them against sleeping sickness.

"We are writing with a minimum of humor and dramatization" observes Barkan justly.
As a completely new means of expression, the cinema neither had
the spare time nor the desire to read the works of Levy-Bruhl and
Frazier. Working at the level of newstand adventure novels, the
racism of these films was more stupid than deliberate. If cinema
sacrificed itself to all of the commonplace colonialist ideas, it was
equally for purposes of commercial conformism as for political
52

conformism .... In truth, the Hindus, Africans, Indians, and
Arabs were of little more consequence than the lions, tigers,
orangutans, cobras, and scorpions among whom they accomplished their missions in the jungle, the tropical forest, or the
desert.

And Barkan concludes: "Whatever antipathy comes from this
cavalier treatment inflicted on our colored brothers, there is
no proof that it added to the racialism upheaving mankind."
From this period, dominated in France by the colonial
exposition of 1931, we are reminded of Trader Horn, where
one of the chief attractions was an African being devoured
alive by a crocodile (and from the statement of the
filmmakers it was never really clear whether the sequence
was faked or accidental) and above all of Bozambo (also
known as Sanders of the River), a sound film with music,
starring the Black American singer, Paul Robeson. I will
dwell upon this latter film at length for two reasons:
Bozambo was one of the first quality sound films made in
Africa, and, chiefly, Bozambo was quite an appreciable
success in France and is still a considerable success in Africa.
On the musical level it is interesting to note that thanks to
Paul Robeson's extraordinary voice, a low quality pseudoAfrican music was successfully imposed on both European
and African listeners. For example, I've heard young Africans
sing the canoer's tune, ayoko; this is a very rare example of
musical falsification simultaneously abused by foreigners and
natives alike.
The African success of this film is even more peculiar,
because there has never been a film which so elevates the
glories of colonialism. Based on a novel by Edgar Wallace, the
film is the story of a British colonial administrator, Sanders
(nicknamed "Sandy the strong") who with his African
servant, Bozambo, arrives at a river area in his administrative
district to put down traditional authority and maintain
colonial order. For the most part, the film takes place in
Nigeria; for the needs of certain action some exteriors were
also shot in the Congo among Wagenia fishermen, and in
animal reserves in Kenya. These authentic settings served as
the basis for the studio sets in Hollywood, where the rest of
the film was shot.
One can see, equally on the visual, auditory, and
ideological levels, that this is one of the most faked films that
has ever been made, and yet, the film continues to enjoy
quite a success in Africa. Some African friends with whom
I've discussed this problem have perhaps given me the key to
understanding this success: for the .first time in film, a Black
plays a leading role, and even if it is as a puppet of a British
colonial administrator, it is nevertheless sufficient to create
considerable sympathy among African audiences.
Bozambo opened the way for an African fantasy cinema,
and the hero that followed was not Black but the white
Tarzan of the familiar unending film series. The raceless
ape-man and his fantastic adventures against men and beasts
became a pastime whose prodigious success touched upon
the entire world.
In order to finish with films of this tradition made
between the two wars, we will just note two very interesting
films by Leon Poirier: Cain, made in Madagascar, and
L 'Homme du Niger, made with Henry Baur in the interior
Segou region of the Niger delta. Despite the defects of these
two films, the directors deserve credit for not faking
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anything. For the first time, cameras were set in place and
shot natural surroundings and real people. In reviewing these
films today it is strange to discover, because of the time since
an earlier viewing, a sort of inversion in the pictures: the
environment being the principal object of interest, to the
detriment of the actors, who are transformed into secondary
accessories.
On the other hand, the first true documentary films began
to appear at this time. Previously, Marc Allegret, accompanying Andre Gide in the Congo, brought back the naive but
pretty pictures of Voyage au Congo (1928), where most
frequently aesthetics took precedence over ethn og raphic and
social documentation. If th e film had bee n th e cin ematic
mirror of Gide's classic book bearing the same title- a violent
testim ony against the excesses of colonialism - it would
certainly have oriented those to follow in the 1930s, thus
pl aying for Africa a comparable role to that played for Asia
by Pudovkin's Storm over Asia (1928) or, above all, for
America by Eisenstein's Thunder over Mexico.
But it would be necessary to await the images of the Ivory
Coast rescued by Vautier (Afrique 50) in order for the
number one problem of Africa in the twentieth century - its
relation with the White world- to be evoked with sincerity, if
not impartiality.
In the area of documentary film, the experience of the
period between the two wars was already very conclusive.
Marcel Mauss, uncontested master of the French school of
ethnology, had already professed in his lectures an interest in
adding still photography, cinema, and sound recording to
traditional ethnographic research. And it is interesting to
note that it was infinitely easier then to depart on an
exploration with a 35mm camera and Edison cylinder
recorder than it is today to pull together a simple expedition
to the Sahara. But in fact, if for most present day leaders in
French ethnology - Leroi-Gourhan, Levi-Strauss, Bastide- this
teaching of Marcel Mauss remains theoretical, a few pioneers
made the first African ethnographic films during the DakarDjibouti expedition, which went from the Atlantic to the
Indian Ocean, under the leadership of Griaule, Schaeffner,
and Leiris. The first attempts were made particularly among
the Dogon of the Bandiagara cliffs, and in 1938, Marcel
Griaule, during a second mission, made two model 35mm
sound ethnographic films.
Au Pays Dagon is a short fifteen-minute film illustrating
aspects of the daily life, material culture, and religion of the
Dogon. And Sous les Masques Noirs shows funeral ceremonies of a village in the cliffs, and documents the
construction, role, and use of large masks, which through
ritual dances permit the soul of the deceased to be returned
to the dwelling of its ancestors in the next world.
At about the same time, in 1936, Jean d'Esme shot La
Grande Caravane (35mm, sound) in Eastern Niger; it retraces
the voyage of a salt caravan from Agades to Bilma, where the
salt mines are found. Unfortunately, despite the passionate
images, the author could not escape the manner of the early
sound documentaries, namely, the use of a gossipy and
exasperating narration, and tedious music in the style of the
Persian March.
It is the same defect which marred a short and completely
forgotten film, Coulibaly
I'Aventure, made in 1936, in
Guinea, by G. H. Blanchon. This was the first African
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sociological film, and its subject is one of the most important
phenomena found in West Africa- the migration of young
people from the savannah to the cities of the coast. The
adventures of Coulibaly, leaving upper Guinea in order to
earn the dowry for his fiancee working as a docker in
Conakry, and then as a miner in Sigiri, could have been an
extremely valuable document, if it wasn't spoiled by the
propagandist narration (in the "benefits of our civilization"
style).
Outside of the scene in French Colonial Africa, and some
spectacular type pseudo-documentaries which I have already
said too much about, I would only mention a single valuable
ethnographic film, Pecheurs Wagenia, shot by Surbeck, at
Stanley Pool, upstream from Stanleyville in Belgian Congo.
One had to wait until after the war to finally see the
development of the African cinema, both in the realm of
fiction film as well as that of documentary film. 3
Finally, one other aspect of filming between the wars
should be noted. It is probable that Africa was the subject
for several German filmmakers who were travelling all over
the world in the 1930s, making the large series of U FA and
Tobias films that included Walter Ruttman's Melody of the
World (1929). Unfortunately, all of our research in this area
has been in vain, and only documents dealing with South
America and the Far East are in the cinematheque of the
Musee de !'Homme.
The second World War indirectly favored the development
of "cinema on the move" ("cinema au long cours," following
the excellent phrase of Jean Thevenot) , because during this
period Army film units used portable materials rather than
the more perfected 35mm cameras, which were heavy,
cumbersome, and could not leave the studio. It was at this
time that 16mm, previously only an amateur format, gained
its first stronghold.
Most professional filmm akers, at that time, were reticent
about 16mm (and many still are today) . Yet the first color
35mm enlargements made from 16mm films about aircraft
carriers and flying fortresses in operation had drawn the
attention of some filmmakers, as well as some young
researchers (like myself) impassioned with the cinema and
the wonderful possibilities of the 16mm medium.
These divergent options created in France two opposing
currents, which have a tendency to unite today- 35mm
professional film, and 16mm exploration and research film. 4
It was in France chiefly, just after the war, that the new
movement had its birth. French youth, leaving the occupation, the liberation movement, the armed forces, or the
underground, were desirous of a means of escapism, a feeling
that has been accurately portrayed, though through a
romantic veil, in Jacques Becker's Rendez-vous de juillet.
The Musee de I'Homme effectively became a magnet of
attraction for all youth seeking adventure and discovery.
Around ethnologists like Marcel Griaule, Andre LeroiGourhan, Reverend Leenhardt, and Theodore Monod, and
great travellers like Paul-Emile Victor or Bertrand Flornoy,
there developed a spontaneous grouping of young, well
disposed people ready to go off to Greenland, the Antarctic,
Borneo, Tierra del Fuego, New Guinea, or Africa. Noel Ball if,
a young organizer out of the underground , put together a
short Musee de I'Homme mission, the 1946 Ogooue-Congo
expedition, which was the first collaboration of ethnologists
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and filmmakers and which remains a model of this genre.
During this mission the first quality sound recordings in
Africa were made; in addition, they allowed for making film
sound tracks that would not have to fake exotic music. The
three 35mm black-and-white films made during this trip Danses Congolaises, Au Pays des Pygmees, and Pirogues sur
I'Ogooue- remain the first high quality images and sounds of
Sub-Saharan Africa, and they constitute first rate documents
on traditional Congo dances, the daily life of the Ba-Binga
pygmies, and canoe transportation from the Lastourville falls
to Lambarene, on the Ogooue river. 5
Concurrently, a young French filmmaker, Franc;;ois
Villiers, shot two very different films in Equatorial Africa:
Autour de Brazzaville and Amitie Noire. The first told the
story of how the Middle Congo rallied behind Free France
during the war, and the second, narrated by Jean Cocteau,
was a poetic essay on the cultures of Chad. It is necessary to
say that these films are not of great interest, but nevertheless
constitute one element of the renewal of African cinema.
The films of Villiers and the Ogooue-Congo mission were
shot in 35mm, in the same way that conventional commercial productions were made; they required the use of
heavy equipment and reliance on a camera crew. This was
due to the influence of the Institute des Hautes Etudes
Cinematographiques (IDHEC), which advocated the use of
35mm materials and technical crews for the production of all
films, even those shot in the most remote areas. Yet at the
same time this institute was also interested in the experiments by young groups of travellers and researchers who
were voluntarily oriented toward 16mm.
For example, at the same time as the Ogooue-Congo
mission, the author of this report, with two comrades, Ponty
and Sauvy, descended the Niger river by canoe, and made
16mm black-and-white films during the trip. I must note that
we had chosen 16mm as a last resort, because commercial
cinema producers were not interested in our project. If the
results were disappointing (in particular, we used a very fast
negative film, and we didn't have the money to deal with
problems of heat and humidity) , a document on hippopotamus hunting by harpoon on the Niger river was
nevertheless completed. From these pieces, Actualites
Franc;;aises made a 35mm blowup (the first black-and-white
blowup to be made in France) and edited a ten-minute film
entitled Au Pays des Mages Noirs.
From this point on there was a split in African cinema
between two options : 35mm films with commercial and
technical guarantees, and 16mm films for eventual blowup or
use in lectures. 6
Here we must note a single exception to the general rule
of 16mm's evolution (i.e., shooting in 16mm and then
enlarging to 35mm). This is the case of Albert Mahuzier, who
began by making 35mm films on hunting in Chad for
Actualites Franc;;aises, and later created a sort of family
enterprise of world travel (including a trip across Africa with
his wife and nine children) and directed 16mm films for
lectures. These films have been an enormous popular success
in France and Belgium, but concern Africa only in a
secondary manner, as the principal subject was the life of the
Mahuzier family in the course of their expeditions.
After 1948 films made in Africa multiplied; it is not
54

possible to mention them all; I will nevertheless try to group
them by types, illustrated by a few titles.
The first post-war African fiction film seems to be Paysans
No irs (titled Famoro, le Tyran in Africa) by Georges Regnier;
the film was shot and produced by the same crew that made
the Ogooue-Congo films. Despite the na·J·vete of the scenario
(Voltaic countrymen are terrorized by a Black despot and it
is only the intervention of the colonial administration that
brings them happiness and prosperity) this film represents an
important stage in the development of African cinema. For
here, alongside the story, a real Africa- its countrysides, its
peoples, and above all its dialogues- appeared for the first
time. After Paysans Noirs, all African films shot on studio
sets appeared singularly null. For example, Le Char des
Dieux, a film made at about the same time in Cameroon by
Alfred Chaumel, and then edited using footage from all over
Africa, was outdated before it reached the screen.
Another noteworthy pre-1950 effort was Thorold Dickenson's Le Sorcier Nair (The Black Witch Doctor). This film
was shot in a studio near London and was deliberately
non-documentary, both in terms of framework and characters. Nevertheless, it was the first treatment of the problem
of the confrontation of White and African civilization.
Also before 1950, 16mm developed further due to the
new possibilities of color film and printing 16mm sound
composite copies. Thus, I myself made three films in 1948:
Les Magiciens du Wanzerbe, Circoncision , and Initiation aIa
Danse des Possedes. These films, like those I made preceding
them, were attempts to illustrate systematic ethnographic
studies in the loop of Niger. However, in the course of
projections limited to professional film people, I realized that
with a portable 16mm camera an ethnographer-filmmaker
could bring back documents whose scope could reach
beyond Iimited specialist audiences. After 1948 it was thus
necessary to envision 16mm to 35mm color blowups, 7 but
this operation was not technically possible in Europe until
after 1951. In the United States this experiment had already
proved possible using the technicolor process. Unfortunately
this process necessitated printing a great number of copies in
order to be commercially feasible, and was not applicable to
films where the maximum demand to be hoped for would
not exceed ten copies.
The year 1950 is an important turning point in the
evolution of African film. The attempts of the preceding
years marked the end of the cheap exoticism so characteristic
of the pre-war films, and showed the necessity of discovering
and understanding African cultures if one wanted to communicate about them to members of other cultures. Moreover, 1950 historically marked the opening of the colonial
crisis and the first independence movements in African
countries. From this point until present one sees the
following trends in African films:

Exotic Africa. Outside of the Tarzan films, for which
Africa was but a backdrop, a certain number of filmmakers,
chiefly Americans, continued to exploit the "cannibal" and
"witch doctor's dance" film genre. Africa, as before the war,
was no more than scenery, and the Africans themselves
functioned only as the unfortunate extras that one never
hesitated to dress up in costumes of materials from the far
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Atlantic, and paint with dreadful tatoos in order to take
advantage of "local color."
As an example one can cite King Solomon's Mines (which
started the Tutsi dancers of Ruanda-Urundi on their film
career), whose very first images- a wounded elephant supported by its cows- are the only ones worth the trouble of
keeping. Other examples are Nagana, a ghastly gangster film
made among the Peul of Cameroon, but which could just
as well have taken place in Marseilles or Chicago, and finally,
a film made in Gabon by the production crew that made
Lost Continent, for which a plastic skeleton was brought
from Rome for the witchcraft scenes. This genre of film is far
from exhausted, and today, in Kenya or Chad, someone is
still shooting some new production in which Africa will serve
as a country of beasts and savages, precisely fitting the White.
man's standard of adventure. 8
Ethnographic Africa. Here we find filmmakers and ethnographers trying, sometimes rather clumsily, to show the
most authentic aspects of African cultures. The influence of
ethnographic film has not been limited to scientific research,
and has already modified quite a few commercial films made ·
in Africa.
In the purely ethnographic field, we must first note the
films of Luc de Heusch, one illustrating an ethnographic
thesis on Tutsi kinship (Ruanda), another concerning the
lineage system of the Hamba of the Kasa·,- (Fete Chez les
Hamba). Here the ethnographer turned filmmaker, and tried
to use film as a contribution to the techniques of ethnographic research. These two unpretentious but very carefully made films remain the only authentic documents on
cultures of the Congo before the troubles of independence.
And in comparison, the numerous high-budget Belgian films
made in the Congo, such as Congo, Sp/endeur Sauvage, or
most of the short films by Gerard de Boe, seem less faithful.
The case of Henri Brandt is different: he was a filmmaker
who came to ethnography in order to make a film in Africa.
After a preparatory mission among the Peul bororo nomads
of Niger, Professor Gabus, director of the ethnographic
museum at Neuchatel, sent Brandt out to the field for a year
alone with these savannah pastoralists. Working in 16mm,
Brandt brought back an extremely valuable document,
accompanied by remarkably well recorded location sound.
Brandt's Les Nomades du Solei/ remains a classic film, even
though it has never been distributed commercially.
From the beginning, all of these efforts were not
particularly well greeted in scientific circles, and when the
Comite du Film Ethnographique was created at the Musee de
!'Homme, and charged with the responsibility of initiating
students of ethnography to the techniques of cinema, a
certain number of ethnographers reproached us for placing
the research of an image before ethnographic research itself. 9
Despite this slight resistance, a true school of Africanistfilmmakers has developed, some working alone, others
working with the aid of film technicians. We should mention
the following.
Among the ethnographers: Capron, who with filmmaker
Serge Ricci made Noces d'Eau (fertility rites of the Bobo and
Bambara in the San region of Mali) and Bobo-Oute (daily life
of the Bobo-Oule on the border of Upper Volta and Mali;

Igor de Garine, who alone shot Gourouna, Bergers Sacres and
Les Hommes du Logone (both concerning daily life and
religion of peoples in Chad); Claude Millet, who despite
problems with a bad camera made one of the most disturbing
films on rites of passage in Equatorial Africa, Rites de Ia
Circoncision Chez les Mongom; Monique and Robert Gessain,
who illustrated their work on large initiation ceremonies of
the Coniagui (Guinea-Senegal border) with the color film Le
Temps du Came/eon; Guy le Moal, ethnographer and director
of the Research Institute in Upper Volta, who during the
many years of re~earch for his thesis on the Bobo-Fing made
a film on the role of children in religious masking traditions,
Les Masques des Feuil/es; and Dr. Zahan, anthropology
professor at the Univers ity of Strasbourg, thanks to whom I
was able to make a film on the funeral ceremonies of Mossi
chieftans in Upper Volta, Moro-Naba.
Among the filmmakers: Jacques Darribehaude, who made
two 16mm color films in Mali, Pays Mandingue and Saison
Seche (daily life in Malinke country in the go ldfields of the
Sigiri region); Georges Bourdelon, who made a 16mm
documentary on artisans of the Sahara, Forgerons du Desert;
Pierre lchac, who while out shooting a film on wild animals
brought back a 16-mm ·synthetic d_ocumentary on populations
-o f Chad, En Regardqnt P~sser /e Tchad. 10
_- · .Even ' professional filmmakers began trying to make truly
ethnographi-c films. Jacques Dupont, filmmaker of the 1946
Ogooue-Congo expedition, later made, in 1951, a remarkable
film, La Grande Case concerning Bamileke, Peul, and
Bamoun chieftainships in western Cameroon. PierreDominique Gaisseau (also a former member of the
Ogooue-Congo mission) made a series of films in Guinea on
the Toma, Bassari, and Nalou peoples; Foret Sacree (first
version in 1953), Pays Bassari, and Naloutai. Following these
first documents Gaisseau went back to Africa with two
European friends in order to be initiated into the secret
societies of the Toma. The long version of Foret Sacree is the
story of their attempt. Little by Iittle they are received by
members of Toma society, are tattooed, make a retreat into
the forest for purification rites, but then, at the last moment,
are not allowed to penetrate into the sacred forest. Sick and
demoralized, they abandon their attempt. This film, which
was contested by a number of ethnologists who felt that
being initiated into another society was the surest way to
lose the objectivity necessary for scientific study, nevertheless brought an entirely new aspect of ethnography to the
screen. For the first time one is an actual witness to the
research, which perhaps was hopeless, but nevertheless shows
an unbounded respect for African culture. For in the end,
this defeated attempt is a defense of the forest, which
refused to be violated by unknowns, despite the fact that
they had made relatively considerable accomplishments. 11
Evolving Africa. Here filmmakers tried to show the
problems posed by contact between traditional Africa and
the modern world. In this instance the cinema is up against
the same obstacles as African sociology. In both cases the
principal stumbling block appears to me to be an ignorance
of traditional cultures in the process of evolution. This fault
is particularly serious when manifest in films of a propagandistic tendency, where the filmmakers preferred to mock
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traditional African cultures, rather than attempt to understand them.
We have already mentioned the first film on acculturation - Cou/iba/y
I'Aventure, made in 1936. This topic was
not dealt with again until 1950, when a young student at
IDHEC (the French Film Institute), Vautier, clandestinely
made Afrique 50. This film shows the struggle of the young
RDA party in the Ivory Coast, which was then under attack
from the colonial administration. Shot in 16mm, black-andwhite, with a makeshift soundtrack added later, Afrique 50
was prohibited in Africa and France, and limited to
cinematheque showings.
Another banned film was Alain Resnais and Chris
Marker's Les Statues Meurent Aussi, made in European
African museums by means of a remarkable montage of
archive documents from Africa. The thesis was that the
statues of African art in Western museums are degraded
because they have lost the meaning of their representations,
and the new African art that has been influenced by the West
is already completely decadent. This violent and admirable
film was censured and has only been seen by a privileged
few. 12
At the same time, the first African students at IDHEC,
unable to obtain administrative permission to film in their
own countries, turned the situation around and began
making African films in Europe. If Mamani Toure's
Mouramani, a story based on Guinean folklore, is only of
slight interest, Afrique sur Seine, by Paulin Soumanou
Vieyra, Jacques Melokane, Mamadou Sarr, and cameraman
Caristan, is truly the first Black film. It is an interesting
attempt to show the lives of Africans in Paris; unfortunately
it only remained an experiment since the final editing and
the sound track were never carried to completion.
Besides these more or less ill-starred films of the 1950s, a
great number of films were shot in all countries throughout
Africa on the subject of acculturation. But as already noted,
they were made in ignorance- if not contempt- of traditional
cultures in the process of evolving. In these films, as before in
Paysans Noirs, L 'Homme du Niger, and even Bozambo,
African cultures were considered as archaic, and as unworthy
of surviving contact with Western culture. Their existence
was simply to be assimilated over time by "progress." In this
connection I should mention Men of Africa, made in East
Africa by Grierson and his group. This film treats the rivalry
of the educated Blacks of the savannah and the primitive
pygmies of the forest. Also, C'etait le Premier Chant, by
Carlos Vilardebo, a story of a young French civil servant who
tries to improve the situation of a Cameroon bush village that
is impoverished by both dryness and the lack of initiative of
its inhabitants. Other films are Bongo/a, made in Belgian
Congo by Andre Cauvin, a story that follows the misadventures of a young Bapende girl who runs away from her
village to be reunited with her fiance, a sanitary assistant,
because her parents want her to marry against her will. 1 3
Finally, The Boy Kumasenu, made by Sean Graham and the
Ghana Film Unit in 1952, a story of the difficulties of a
young fisherman who runs away from his village in the
lagoon and falls into the corrupt city, where he turns from
justice to delinquency.
Two films made by Claude Vermorel in Gabon and
Guinea, Les Conquerants Solitaires, and La Plus Belle des
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Vies, must be put in a somewhat different category. Here the
author has tried to treat the reverse aspect of acculturation:
the European who lets himself be taken in by the African
cultures which he first set out to discover.
The political struggles for independence have equally
inspired a certain number of films but, unfortunately, very
few seem satisfactory. It was singularly the Mau-Mau struggle
in Kenya that inspired the largest number of films. An
example is Peter Brooks' Something of Value (1953), which
tried to show the evolution of a friendship between two
young students, one White and one Black, who as a result of
circumstances find themselves in two opposing camps. This
tremendously narve and quite evidently prejudiced film is
one more example of the unconscious attack on African
dignity. Once again the African and his civilization are placed
on an inferior level. For example, the major scene in the film
shows the confession of an African nationalist leader who
betrays his compatriots because he was afraid of a calamity.
Simba, made by Brias Desmond Huerst in 1955, is an
incredibly violent expose about an African medical doctor
whose father is the chief of a Mau-Mau group named Simba;
the doctor can find no other solution to this drama than
death. Freedom, an extremely costly film made by Moral
Rearmament stresses the movement's customary theme of
redemption of sin by confession. Properly speaking, and
despite its title, this is not a film about political emanci_pation, but a propaganda film for the International Moral
Rearmament Organization.
A rather similar category includes films made by African
film units on the occasions of their countries ' independence.
A typical example is Freedom for Ghana, by Sean Graham,
concerning the independence of Ghana on March 6, 1957.
The historical interest of this film helps one forget its slightly
irritating propaganda angle.
It is too soon to discuss J oris Ivens' Demain Nanguila,
made in Mali during the summer of 1962. This film treats the
possible evolution of a peasant community supported by the
government party.

a

Outlines of a true African cinema. All of the films just
discussed were attempts by foreigners using film to convey
their impressions- or their knowledge- of certain African
problems. Here again the influence of ethnographic film,
despite its modesty, is really considerable. Very quickly we
have filmmakers wanting to reach below the surface, wanting
to transcend the stage of exoticism, wanting to make the
spectator enter easily into the African world, be it traditional
or modern. And these are the first efforts toward a true
African cinema of tomorrow.
The first example comes from South Africa, where in
1948 the Reverend Michael Scott made an extremely violent
black-and-white film, Civilization on Trial in South Africa,
which shows the reactions of Black South Africans to
problems of racial segregation. Also from South Africa came
the first film with a truly African story, even though it is told
by a White. The film is Englishman Donald Swanson's Magic
Garden, based on a ballad by a young Black man from
johannesburg (Ralph Trewhela, who plays the role of the
lame flutist). The film recounts the amazing adventures of a
thief who robs forty pounds from a church, loses it, then
recovers it, and so on, with someone helped at every turn
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along the way, until the money is finally returned to the
church. This little masterpiece has unfortunately passed
unnoticed in France owing to the fact that its French
adaptation was particularly difficult.
In Ghana, Sean Graham followed something of the same
idea in jaguar (High Life), a ballet based on the theme of a
popular song making fun of "been to" Africans who had
studied in Great Britain.
Other films were already in the works. In South Africa an
American director, Lionel Rogosin, made Come Back, Africa
(1959) which presented an even stronger message about the
victims of South African racism. Undoubtedly, one might
demand to know whether this film is not more the testimony
of Rogosin on apartheid, than it is a cry of revolt by the
victims of segregation themselves. But letting the role of the
filmmaker be what it may, at some moments it is Africa
which speaks, and the director is no longer the master of the
door he has unlocked.
It is in this same spirit that I, too, have worked over the
last several years. As far back as the making of my
conventional ethnographic film Les Fils de I'Eau I tried to
avoid the traps of exoticism. Flaherty had already shown me
a way of directing the documentary; by organizing and
ordering the authentic elements of a culture the filmmaker
takes them out of their alien framework and renders them
accessible to a world public. But no one could hope to rival
Flaherty's achievement of making Nanook the friend of men
who had never seen an Eskimo. I thus tried another path,
that of giving a voice to Africans themselves and asking them
to comment directly on their behavior, actions, and reactions. In 1955 I used this method in jaguar (not yet edited
with a final sound track),*** giving three young Nigerian
migrants the opportunity to tell of an imaginary- though
plausible- voyage to Ghana. In 1957 I had the same
experience in the Ivory Coast with Moi, un Nair. During the
shooting I projected the silent film footage tracing the life of
a poor dock worker from Abidjan to this same docker who
had acted his own part, and asked him to improvise a
narration. The result was remarkable: the docker, Robinson,
stimulated by the projection of his own image improvised an
astounding monologue in which he not only reconstructed
the dialogues for the action but explicated and even judged
his own actions and those of his fellow actors. 14
African cinema by Africans for Africans. The attempts
that I have just discussed have arrived at their own limits. For
when all is said and done, neither Rogosin, Graham, nor I
will ever be Africans, and the films that we make will always
be African films by Europeans. This shortcoming is not bad
in itself, nor does it prevent us from continuing to make
African films. But it is time that the statement is made, as it
has been by Georges Sadoul (Ibid.) "that Africans make
African films using African money." This is starting to
happen (I will discuss the technical training of African
filmmakers a bit later) and already Paulin Soumanou Vieyra,
the earliest of the African students trained at IDHEC,
teaching in Dakar for several years, has produced a film,
though perhaps still a bit awkward. Un Homme, Un Ideal,
Une Vie portrays the misadventures of a fisherman on the
Senegal shore who violates tradition by putting a motor on
his canoe. But despite the awkwardness, what ingenuity!

Here the African tradition is not judged; it is stated and
exhibited, and if the forest trees speak and join in with the
counsel of village elders, no one dreams of ridiculing it.
Owing to lack of funds this film has never been
completed. But Paulin Soumanou Vieyra has other projects,
and he is no longer alone. Just to mention French-speaking
Africa, it is from Vieyra and his comrades, Blaise Senghor,
Timite Bassari, Thomas Coulibaly, Jean-Paul N'Gassa, and
others, that we must wait for this film which we all hope
for- above all, we European directors of African films. 1 5
NOTES
1

Europeans go to films on an average of thirty or forty times per
year; Indians, Middle Easterners, and North Africans one time per
year; Africans one time every thirty or forty years, and in some
African countries once per century.
2
See Georges Sadoul, "Le Marche Africain," Afrique Action,
Tunis, May 1, 1961.
3
We should note a film shown in Paris in 1935: Soeurs Noires, a
religious propaganda film in which the actors spoke Zulu. It is
mentioned by Georges Sadoul in La Vie Africaine, June 15, 1961:
"Africa has remained, until now, a country of filmic poverty."
4
1n the United States, on the other hand, the problem was
previously studied by Walt Disney Studios. They decided to shoot in
16mm and then enlarge to 35mm; their celebrated series of films that
included The Living Desert was done in this fashion. Despite their
technical ingenuity, these films are of limited scientific interest.
5
These films were made by Jacques Dupont, assisted by an
exceptional ethnographic team {Raoul Harweg, Gilbert Rouget, Guy
de Beauchene) as well as an exceptional film crew {Edmond Sechan,
Pierre-Dominique Gaisseau, Andre Didier, Nef, Francis Mazieres). All
of them have continued in these paths since this first experience.
6
We cannot speak here about lecture "exploration" films as most
of them have disappeared owing to the absurd lecture circuit system
that required projecting the original. These lecture circuits began to
be extraordinarily popular in France in 1946 {the "Connaissance du
Monde" series held at Salle Pleyel, as well as series in the provinces)
and in Belgium in 1950 {the" Exploration du Monde" series). Here we
will simply report the format of these lectures: 16mm color films of
about one hour in length, with direct narration by the lecturerfilmmaker. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of these lecture
circuits Africa was one of the weakest attractions. So the loss of
African films here is not very serious. The only valuable documents
were edited elsewhere, had sound added, and were then marketed; we
will discuss these films shortly.
7
The instigator was filmmaker Rene Clement, who had made a
16mm color film of a trip to Yemen, around 1939. Titled L 'Arabie
lnterdite, the film was only shown at lectures.
8
we should also mention Denis' TV films of safaris in Kenya,
where one finds some remarkable sequences on wild animals {baboons
attacking an antelope who is giving birth), but where Africa and
Africans are merely scenery.
9
The Comite du Film Ethnographique was founded by the
permanent advisory committee of the International Congress of
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences during the Vienna meetings in 1952. Its creation followed the projection of films by the
author which were presented under the heading of an ethnographic
contribution. These films were made with the help of Roger Rosfelder
in Niger in 1951-52. They were all 16mm Kodachrome with original
sound tracks: Bataille sur /e Grand Fleuve {hippopotamus hunting),
Cimetiere dans Ia Falaise (funeral rites of the Dogan of the Bandiagara
cliffs), Yenendi: Les Hommes qui Font Ia Pluie {rainmaking rites
among the Sonrai and Zerma). These films were later joined together
and blown up to 35mm - one of the first made in Europe- and retitled
Les Fils de I'Eau.
10
we should also mention Fran~ois Balsan's L 'Expedition
Panhard-Capricorne on the Kalahari desert of South Africa, Fievet's
films on Nigeria, especially Kana, the films now being edited by
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Father Pairault on Northern Cameroon, and Civatte's films on Niger.
All of these films are 16mm Kodachrome, unfortunately reserved for
limited distribution.
11
Also deserving of mention is Omaru, a film made in 1954 in
35mm Agfacolor by Quendler, an Austrian filmmaker. Shot among
the Kirdi and Peul of the Mandara mountains, its subject is a sort of
African epic about the unhappy loves of a young Kipsiki shepherd.
Without any scientific pretensions whatsoever, this film offers some
interesting views of the life of the Kipsiki and the Peul chiefdom of
Rai Bouba.
12

The commercial release of Statues was an emasculated version
that has been publicly rejected by the authors.
13

Andre Cauvin has since made a film on the visit of King
Badouin to the Congo, and another on Congolese independence. The
editing of these two films together with a film on present day Congo
(1961) would make Cauvin's collected work into the most important
document on the evolution of a single African state.
14

Finally we should mention the American TV films made in
Kenya for Time-Life Inc. by Richard Leacock, formerly Flaherty's
assistant on Louisiana Story. For the first time in Africa, Leacock and
his crew used a portable camera synchronized to a portable tape
recorder. I will return to this subject in the third part of this report.
15
I have not cited the films made in South Africa by local
companies (particularly the films of Jack and Jamy Ulys) treating
typically South African subjects. Although the production of these
films is important and liable to increase given the favorable conditions
in South Africa, they cannot be considered as African films since they
are almost exclusively films made by Afrikanders, in Afrikaans, a nd
dealing only with subjects of interest to Afrikanders.

/'Afrique Nair, Paris, UNESCO, 1967. Rouch's paper was first written
and presented to a UNESCO symposium in 1961. A translation of the
1961 original was prepared by UNESCO for limited distribution.
Portions of the first third of the article, slightly edited and modified,
formed the basis of a short article, "The Awakening African Cinema"
published in the UNESCO Courier, March 1962. Otherwise, Rouch's
ex tensive knowledge of African cinema has not previously been
accessible to an English-reading public. The translation is by Steve
Feld, Anthropology Film Center, Santa Fe; special thanks are again
due Ms. Marielle Delorme of the Comite International des Films de
!'Homme in Paris for review and for locating a copy of the 1961
UNESCO translation. Due to the unusual length of the article it will
appear in two parts. Rouch's own footnotes are numbered through
the text; asterisks refer to translation notes.
**" ... le courage et Ia bonne humeur du tirailleur 'senegalais'
favoriserent Ia creation du stereotype du Nair bon enfant, style 'Y a
bon Banania.' " The Senegalese sharpshooter is a common West
African stereotype. Marielle Delorme informs me that "Y a bon " is a
publicity slogan for Banania, a commercial breakfast cocoa with
bananas. The picture illustrating the product shows a smiling Black
brandishing bananas and speaking pidgin French. The image of the
happy banana-eating African is perhaps most similar to the "Uncle
Tom" and" Aunt Jemima" stereotype of Black Americans.
***jaguar was finished in 1967. The catalog to which Rouch's
paper is appended lists a French version of 130 minutes. A 90-minute
version with English subtitles has been available in the United States
since 1972.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES
* English translation of "Situation et tendances du cmema en
Afrique" which appeared as an appendix, pp. 374-408, of the Premier
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Selectif International de Films Ethnographiques sur

EDITOR 'S NOTE. My apologies to Marie/le Delorme, translation consultant on this series, whose name was inadvertently transformed to
"Delorine " in th e Editor's Introdu ction to th e first issue of Studies
(Vol. 7 No. 7, p. 2). - SW
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REVIEWS AND DISCUSSION

The Old Ones of New Mexico. Robert Coles. Ph otographs by
Alex Harris. Albuquerqu e: University of New Mex ico
Press, 1973. 74 pp., 40 photographs. $7.95.
Reviewed by Edward T. Ha/1 1
Northwestern University
To the Spanish Americans of New Mexico, there are two
kinds of books : those by insiders and those by outsiders. The
Old Ones is by an outsider. However, an unwary reader could
be misled into believing that the people Coles interviewedan old woman , a storekeeper, an ex-janitor-farmer, and a
priest- are really presenting an inside view of Spanish American village life in New Mexico, for on first perusal one is left
with the impression that Coles learned something. As a
matter of fact, this impression prevailed among the outsiders
(predominantly Anglo) whom I interviewed about The Old
Ones. Almost without exception they liked the book and
said something to the effect that "this was a true to life
picture." They then commented on how well the book was
written. It seems, therefore, that if you are a liberal middleclass Anglo, the chances are that you will find yourself responding as many such do, and will accept this book at face
value.
As to Coles' proficiency as a writer, judging writing is like
judging art. One hesitates to criticize a "Pulitzer Prize"
winner for his writing, but this reviewer, having subjected
Coles' book to an old but reliable test, found the writing
wanting. The test is simplicity itself- does the writing improve or appear to deteriorate with each reading? Most slick
writing must stand up through at least the first reading, and
may stand a second, while only exceptional writing reveals
new insights, subtleties, and discoveries with each successive
reading. Some of the problem stems from the fact that Coles
was translating from Spanish to English, and Coles himself
admits to "broken or at best passable" Spanish (p. xv).
Several of my informants, the ones who really know New
Mexico, had never heard anyone talk the way Coles has his
subjects talking.
I do not want to give the impression that I am simply
"out to get Coles." Far from it. His stated intentions are
good, and I laud his concern for children and old people. I
agree with his introductory observations that the "gente" are
"strong, proud, vigorous, independent." I am not taking issue
with Coles personally or even with his manifest goals. Mine is
a deeper, subtler, more insidious target. I want to speak for
people everywhere against the kind of cultural imperalismthe naive meddling- the unstated sense of superiority, and
the condescension of the American intellectual establishment
whenever they discover something different which they think
they understand when quite clearly they do not. As a resident of New Mexico for over 50 years, I have found much to

object to in the traditional Anglo intellectual's view of our
Southwestern ethnic groups- be they Indian or Spanish.
These outside experts all too often distort their data and,
through unconscious selection of their material, reinforce the
very stereotypes they seek to break down. Books like this
one mislead the public about the complexity of interethnic
research, and at best they appear to condescend. Grantsmanship and status all too often involve treating one's data and
one's subjects as pawns on the chessboard of success. This
point is not lost on our Indian and Spanish friends when they
talk about these "rip-offs" by instant experts.
Admittedly, many of the outsiders who have written
about the cultures of the southwest were not consciously
putting us down; they were simply using the procedural,
analytic, and literary models bequeathed to them by their
elders and popular with their peers. It is these unconscious,
unevaluated, unquestioned models that should be unmasked.
This is not an easy task, for, as Einstein once said, ways of
thinking that one takes most for granted are imbibed
"practically with the mother's milk" and are reinforced from
that moment on.
The principal problem I face in criticizing Coles' book is
that those who know Spanish American culture well will
immediately recognize what I am tal king about, while others
will not. Let us therefore begin with a few questions, examples, and tests that might be applied to the book. Perhaps in
that way at least the outlines of my objections to much of
modern social science will begin to emerge.
Question 7. If one removed all the references that fix the
scene in a particular space/time frame (Northern New
Mexico, late twentieth century) would it be possible to distinguish the people Coles describes from any others in similar
circumstances in another part of the world? I think not.
They could be poor Greek or Asian villagers who are struggling with life and death and a marginal subsistence economy
in a rapidly changing world. All over the world people 's
problems are exacerbated by an encroaching complex technology controlled by other groups. This control may rest
with another class, caste, political, religious, or ethnic group.
What, then, is unique? In other words, where are the New
Mexico Spanish Americans in this book? Who paid enough
attention, who cared enough to find out who they really are?
What we see is reporting by cookie cutter. Find a people who
are living marginal lives and let them tell their stories in their
own words. How simple, yet how deceptive. What gets left
out is the core of their culture. Such decontexting omissions
by a psychiatrist of Coles' background are incomprehensible
to me.
Question 2. How does this conscious and unconscious
structuring of data distort the picture he presents? Coles frequently hides the identity of his villages (a social science
device designed ostensibly to "protect" one's subjects). If
there is one critical piece of information one needs to know
before anything else when evaluating a report about New
Mexico it is the identity of the particular village one is reporting about. Northern New Mexico villages may look alike
to outsiders, but they are not. Truchas is different from
Pojoaque, Pojoaque from Nambe and Jacona, Trampas from
Ojo Sarco and Penasco. Each has a distinctive character that
leaves its stamp on its residents. Villages near Santa Fe and
Albuquerque are different from those in Rio Arriba, and
REVIEWS AND DISCUSSION
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mountain villages from those in the valley. Each produces its
own characteristic gestalts for dealing with the environment.
Coles does name Cordova where Mrs. Garcia lives, but hides
the identity of the other three. Another point to understand
is that what impresses one the most about village life is that
it is made up of a complex web of strong personalities and
their relationships to each other set in the unconscious
matrix of Spanish culture. Yet there is no feeling in Coles'
book for the interplay of either personalities or culture at the
deeper levels. In fact, one is left with the impression that
these do not exist. These relationships are not discovered
overnight, and the Spanish, like every other ethnic group,
cannot describe the structure of the paradigms by which they
live. The observer has to be around long enough and be
involved enough to recognize and define these paradigms.
Unfortunately most research in social science is geared to
one- to five-year time spans, and the investigators must
"produce" within these times frames because that is the way
their work is funded. How can the results be anything but
superficial?
Question 3. How about the "facts" related to the people
Coles writes about. On page 16, he notes, "boredom or indifference" ... to "politics"!! Why this conclusion? Because
the Garcias don't listen to Walter Cronkite and John Chancellor. Why should they? Cronkite and Chancellor live in Coles'
world, not the world of the Garcias. The fact that it is a
different world does not make it less valid, involving, or
rewarding to live in. Politics in New Mexico are local- characteristically personal and intense. To give the impression that
indigenous New Mexicans are apolitical is a distortion of the
worst kind.
The importance of the church in New Mexican life comes
through and, if anything, is overemphasized, but I suspect
that the emphasis on God, church, and priest may be simply
an artifact of Coles' methodology. Coles (p. 14) seems surprised that the people are philosophers. What does he expect
when an Anglo outsider comes in and wants to immortalize
his subject's speech by putting it in a book? These people are
tal king for the record when Coles is not tal king for them, and
there is no way to tell which is which. However, what I
object to is not a particular sentence or word attributed to
his subjects but the totality of these texts and commentaries.
This book is like a Norman Rockwell painting or a portrait
by Bachrach, designed to appear more like the idealized
image than to convey a sense of reality. In this connection ,
when I questioned individuals who have Iived in New Mexico
all their lives and who have worked at the interface between
Anglo and Spanish American culture, their first comments
were how improbable the conversation sounded as reported
by Coles. "He is silent because he understands the world" (p.
23). Who ever heard "No habla porque entiende el mundo"
coming from the mouth of a Truchas villager?
For years, recording people's speech and juggling
sentences and situations to hide identities has been a popular
device of social science. Given the mass of raw data this
technique generates, it is an easy method for fieldworkers.
Yet the very convenience of the system obscures its defects
and pitfalls, of which there are a number. Unless one is extraordinarily gifted and has a deep feeling for pattern, the
people lose their dimensionality and become flat, pasteboard
figures, colorless and devoid of the juice of life and of all
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human frailty. The people in The Old Ones are unreal. The
Spanish Americans of New Mexico have blood in their veins
and are subject to the same negative human emotions, greed,
envy, lust, anger, and hate as the rest of humanity. None of
this comes out.
Some mention of Alex Harris (Coles' photographic collaborator and friend) is in order. Coles calls him a "pioneer."
He states that Harris's photographs are the first real efforts to
document the life of the people. All other photographers are
supposed to have been captivated by the country. Clearly,
Irving Rusinow's Camera Report on El Cerrito was overlooked, but no doubt the 1942 publication date had something to do with this. In discussing photographs it is very
important to remember that man does not see passively. He
paints his own picture of the world with his eyes, and even
more so with a camera. Harris's photographs are no exception. Another photographer would have told a different
story, and if the reader takes this to heart he will not be
misled. The Old Ones is a story by Coles and Harris. It is
their story, and a much better picture of what they see,
think, and value than it is of the people who mouth the
sentiments that Coles chose to include in the text. People are
always looking at things through their own eyes, which
would be all right if only they would realize that what they
see is not always what is there. We see this most graphically
in Harris's photographs- he repeats all of Coles' cliches and
thereby reinforces the middle-class stereotyped distortions.
One returns to the fact that one does not see passively. What
Harris sees, the Spanish do not like, which is one of the ways
we know that their visual models are different from ours.
Behind these differences one sees two cultures struggling to
reach each other with little or no awareness on the part of
either the social scientist or the photographer that cultural
differences are far from abstract, but are instead very real,
very deep, and extraordinarily subtle.

Note
1
This review is a slightly revised version of a review appearing in
the Rio Grande Sun (Santa Fe, New Mexico) , Vol. 1, No.4 , September5 , 1974.

CANCIAN REPLIES TO COLLIER

Frank Cancian
Stanford University
I thank the Book Review Editor for inviting me to reply
to John Collier's review of my Another Place: Photographs
of a Maya Community (Scrimshaw Press, 1974) which appears in the first number of this journal (Studies 1 :60-61,
1974).
I would like to respond to: (1) Collier's comment on the
message of the book; (2) his comments on the organization
of the book; (3) his speculations about my intent as a person
and an anthropologist; and (4) his exploration of the proper
nature of visual anthropology. First, I want to say that Collier has not really reviewed my book. He begins by stating
that "it offers a starting point for reasoning and exploring
further the contribution of visual communication for anthropology, for it places focus on the intellectual and creative
role of the anthropologist." In what follows, I serve as his
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straw anthropologist and the book serves as the foil against
which he expounds his conception of orthodoxy for visual
anthropology.
Collier ridicules the title and principal message of the
book by comparing it to the logically suspect "People have
to live somewhere, so everywhere there are some people."
"Zinacantan is another place where people live" (the final
line of my introduction) is clearly, in the context given it, a
phrasing of the standard message: despite their differences,
people share a common humanity. Anthropologists and
many other people are constantly struggling in life and work
with the distance between humans created by cultural difference. The fact that one more statement about common
humanity will not solve the problem does not justify Collier's
refusal to see it for what it is.
I believe it is useful to portray people in other cui tures in
a way that will permit the viewer to see commonalities. To
take some obvious examples from Another Place : young
people at the courtship age (pp. 11, 49), a young girl playing
at women's work (p. 25), a boy tightening and expanding his
body with his slingshot (pp. 87, 89). If Collier cannot feel
with these experiences, and/or can see no value in showing
them to occur among "exotic" people, I am at a loss to
respond. He is quite right that "the qualities of eyes and the
fluency and composure of bodies ... cannot be found in
Liberal, Kansas, or Sleepy Falls, Iowa." But, I hope the
message of commonality gets through often enough to the
viewer to make him or her identify with some Zinacanteco
experiences, and, thus, try to look through the cultural differences masking others.
The book also pictures the material and political realities
of Zinacanteco life; and a part of the introduction Collier
does not quote makes explicit the position of subjugation
they share with other Chiapas Indians and the positive ways
they use ethnic identity and community boundaries to build
their own world. Certainly Collier could see the contradiction between children living in the situation the book shows
and the message on the school blackboard. He might have
seen a similar message in the Coca Cola sign or in the
Mexican wedding in the city. And he could have picked up
the self-confidence and positive feeling in the religious officials, the farmers, and the judges, or the tension of people
in Mexican dominated situations.
These contradictory realities- human commonalities,
specific material and political superordination/subordination,
and construction of a bounded more tolerable ingroup- are
omnipresent, and showing them in the life of Zinacantecos is
simply another reminder that life is not simple. Collier's
search for further meaning (paragraph 4 of his review) is
unrewarded in part, I suppose, because I intended no further
meaning.
Collier also charges that "the book has no layout, no
sequential relationships; pictures tumble one upon the other
with little association." This is not so. Collier spots the introductory (pp. 7-15) and concluding (pp. 85-93) photographs
for what they are. He misses the interplay between photographs of specific activities outside the home, on the one
hand, and portraits and domestic scenes on the other. 1
The transitions from outside to inside are not marked
(except by content of the photographs), and the viewer
could easily miss them. It was not my purpose to have them

noticed, and that may have been a mistake in design of the
book, for many readers may want more structure than I give.
It is, however, characteristic of Collier's gratuitous negativism
that he fails to mention, and apparently fails to notice, that
each "outside" section begins with a full page devoted to a
short introductory paragraph.
The book is also organized, visually, in terms of self-conscious use sequences of righthand pages, and repeated use of
walking and weaving pictures. The layout is not hung on a
scientific framework, to be sure.
I will now go on to Collier's speculation about my intent
as a person and an anthropologist. He is concerned about
"doubt in the author's mind about photography's place in
anthropological research" (paragraph 5); "But as an anthropologist, what is he trying to explore in this book?" (paragraph 7, emphasis in original); and "why did Cancian want to
retreat from anthropology?" (paragraph 8).
Collier does not recognize the simple fact that I am a
photographer who is also an anthropologist. If I, or other
anthropologists who are also photographers, had to be one
"thing," and that was the thing he or she was "best" at, most
of us would probably be anthropologists. But, roles are not
that mutually exclusive. People do live with internal contradictions and conflicts, and across categories.
For me, Another Place is a coherent book. I say this as a
photographer who did not leave his anthropological role
behind when working on the book. I saw no point in separating the roles as long as the academic anthropologist did not
try to take over. As a consequence, it is hard to know clearly
in what sense the book is anthropology; but that is important
only if you have a high investment in the boundaries of
anthropology. In the academic world it is common to eschew
confusion and conflict and erect rigid intellectual boundaries.
I did not intend an academic book.
Finally, what about the contributions of visual communication for anthropology that Collier sets out to "explore"? They are complicated and apt to be very diverse, I
think. And they will range from pictures of artifacts used as
records, to stills and film used as a basis for behavioral analysis, to photographs used as interview aids, to photos, essays
and films that give people the "feel" of people and places.
The photograph as data, the photograph as illustration, and
the photograph as communication are all included.
I support Collier's exploration of the issues of the subjective and the objective, the humanistic and the scientific, the
nature of photography as assertion and description. But he
seems tired of the debate and determined to impose a unique
and fairly restricted solution. He seems ready for rules, not
exploration. Just as many people have begun to fully understand the limitations of "objective" science, to which Collier
refers, he seems ready to close up shop. In many ways he has
led visual anthropology to the edge of flourishing by his hard
work during the difficult times. I hope he agrees that if success is transformed into conformity, failure will be just
around the corner.

Note
1

0utside activities are school (pp. 17-21), fiestas (pp. 27-35), the
market city (pp. 41-45), men's agricultural work (pp. 51-59), the
Zinacantan political-legal system (pp. 65-71 ), and Zinacanteco curing
(pp. 77-83). The contrasting portraits and inside scenes fill pages
22-25, 36-39, 46-49, 60-63, and 72-75.
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DUNLOP REPLIES TO ROUCH

fan Dunlop
Film Australia
Lindfield, New South Wales
I am puzzled by Jean Rouch's references to my films in
"Man and the Camera" (SAVICOM 1:37-44, 1974). I know
that Rouch does not much care for Towards Baruya
Manhood. He has told me so in his frank, honest and
constructive manner. However, in this article he makes a
serious and unsubstantiated moral judgment, when he says,
"the Eskimo films of Asen Balikci, and lan Dunlop's recent
series on the New Guinea Baruya are for me examples of
what should never happen again - the intrusion of a group of
first rate technicians into a difficult field situation, even with
the aid of an anthropo logist" (my italics).
Rouch is arguing for the one man anthropologist/
filmmaker concept. I agree that for many field situations this
is the ideal; but it is certainly not the only way to make
ethnographic films as Rouch himself concedes. He states his
approval of Hadza, Emu Ritual at Ruguri, and The Feast.
What he does not exp lain is why in one case intrusion is
acceptable and in another reprehensible.
We all know, as Rouch says, that filmmaking causes
cultural disruption, but this app lies to any anthropological
study, not just fi lm . The degree of that disruption depends
not on ly upon the quantity, but also the quality of the
intruders, and on the field situation. Why does Rouch stand
in moral judgment on the intruders into Netsilik and Baruya
life in particular?
The Netsilik Eskimo films are a recreation of a bygone
way of life. Their makers did not intrude into an actual
situation at all. It is inconceivable that such films could have
been made without the willing, and, judging by the pictures,
happy cooperation of the actors. Rouch gives no evidence at
all to support his contention that morally these films should
not have been made.
The Baruya films portray an actua l situation. There was
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an intrusion of three film technicians into a valley community of about eight hundred tough, proud, resilient
Baruya. Anthropologist Maurice Godelier had been living
with the Baruya for three years. In consultation with them
he invited me to work with him. Godelier took responsibility
for our introduction into Baruya life. Thereafter the Baruya
judged us for themselves. Rouch implies that this intrusion
was so gross that the awkwardness of the film crew's
presence comes through. As evidence he cites only one
sequence, where a lecture to initiates turns into an address to
the anthropologist. During this the Baruya say that the films
may be shown in Australia but not in New Guinea. Rouch
claims this is an a posteriori rejection of the films by the
Baruya. I think he has misinterpreted this scene. The Baruya
are publicly accepting the presence of the anthropologist and
the film crew among them, and the film documents this.
Furthermore, when we screened the series back to the
ceremonial leaders of the Baruya there was no rejection.
They wholeheartedly approved of the films. Their only regret
was that we had not managed to film all the ceremonial
activity (it was physically impossible to do this). They still
maintained that the films could be screened in Australia, but
not, at the present time, publicly in New Guinea because of
their secret nature. They have given me an open invitation to
return to their valley for further film work in collaboration
with Maurice Godelier.
My confusion is compounded when Rouch goes on to say
"This ambiguity [what ambiguity?) doesn't appear in Dunlop's earlier Desert People series, owing no doubt to the
'piece of trail' shared by the filmmakers and the aboriginal
family they met." This sounds like wishful thinking. To
descend upon a single, fragile, isolated, nomadic family with
two landrovers and a ton of gear is going to cause a
monumental cultural disruption however sensitively you may
try to do it. I am still haunted by fears and doubts about
whether I had any right to do what I did then or not.
Walking into a large New Guinea village was less traumatic ... for everyone.
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4. Twenty-one Dollars or
Twenty-one Days
5. Inside Outside Station Nine

7yj
90

For further information on DER films and study guides,
telephone (617) 666-1750 or write to DER, 24 Dane
Street, Somerville, MA 02143.

NOTES AND NEWS

D THE DANCE NOTATION BUREAU (19 Union Square

Bushmen, the
Yanomamo Indians, and the Pittsburgh Police. Documentary Educational Resources is devoted to producing
large numbers of films and study guides on single cultures,
to be used for teaching anthropology. Under the direction
of Timothy Asch and John Marshall, DER (formerly the
Center for Documentary Anthropology) now distributes
18 films and 9 study guides on the Bushmen, 12 films on
the Yanomamo Indians of southern Venezuela, and 16
films on the Pittsburgh police. About 12 new films are in
production (see below for partial listing of DER films).
DER films, for the most part, center on a single series
of actions; they are straightforwardly edited and lightly
narrated. These short "sequences,, are excellent for
helping to teach students the ability to perceive unstructured data and to make sense of it through theory. DER
films attempt to create in students the experience of the
anthropologist in the field.
In addition, DE R publishes a complete series of study
guides to its films. Each study guide reviews a film in
detail, providing background information, and answers
important questions which the film raises. Study guideswhich can be used by both students and teachers-also
include maps, bibliographies, and a pronunciation guide.
Nine study guides, totaling 186 pages, are now available;
write DER for more information:

D INTENSIVE

FILM STUDIES of the

Partial List of DER Films and Study Guides
A. Bushman Series

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

An Argument About a Marriage
Bitter Melons
A Joking Relationship
Melon Tossing
N/um Tchai
The Wasp Nest
The Meat Fight

B. Yanomamo Series
1. A Man Called "Bee":
Studying the Yanomamo
2. Magical Death
3. The Feast
4. Yanomamo:
A Multi-Disciplinary Study
C.
1.
2.
3.

Pittsburgh Police Series
Three Domestics
Vagrant Woman
After the Game

Min.
18
30
12yj
14yj
19yj
20
14

40
29
30

Study Guide
yes (33 pp.)
yes (46 pp.)

yes (34 pp.)
yes (16 pp.)
yes (28 pp.)

yes*
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West, New York, NY 10003), who feel that application of
Laban movement analysis and notation might be of value
in their research, would like to offer a seminar for researchers conducting specific projects in non-verbal communications. Anyone interested should write for their
questionnaire.
D KALANI MEINECKE, Department of Anthropology,
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 4 7401, is compiling
a bibliography on non-verbal communication studies done
on Pacific cultures. Your contributions and suggestions
are welcome.
D 1976 CONFERENCE ON VISUAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Temple University, in conjunction with
ANNOUNCED
the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication, will sponsor its sixth Conference on Visual Anthropology on March 10-13, 1976. Persons interested in organizing symposia, workshops, discussion groups and/or submitting 16mm, Super-8 films, videotapes, or photographic
essays should write for submission forms. The deadline for
contributions is November 10, 1975. For further information write: Jay Ruby, COV A, Department of Anthropology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122.
D IBM has developed a "Selectric" typing element which

prints Labanotation symbols. The element was developed
in conjunction with the Dance Notation Bureau. The
Bureau has designed a chart showing the position of the
Labanotation symbols on the Selectric keyboard. The
element is available from any IBM supplier.
D THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
has established a Task Force on Environment and Behavior. Its goals are (1) to bring to the attention of APA
members the research and scholarly potential in the area
of environment and behavior; (2) to provide information
about alternative educational models and courses of instruction in environment and behavior; (3) to develop
interdisciplinary contacts, and (4) to promote application
and policy oriented research. For further information contact: Willo P. White, Office of Scientific Affairs, American
Psychological Association, 1200 17th St., N.W., Washington, DC 20036.

36yj

8
9

*Napoleon Chagnon, Studying the Yanomamo (Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1974).

EAST-WEST CENTER has published Selected
Abstracts of japanese Research on Mass Communication
(Hidetoshi Kato, editor). For a copy write to University
of Hawaii Press, 535 Ward Ave., Honolulu, HI 96814.

D THE
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0 THE FOLLOWING PERIODICALS are of interest to
scholars working in communication research in the Third
World:

0 SOCIOLOGICAL

CONFERENCE ON THE ARTS
AND PHOTO EXHIBIT The combined departments of
Sociology at the State Universities of New York at
Fredonia and Oswego, sponsored an informal conference
focusing on the relationship of Art and Sociology and on
the possible contributions of the Arts to theoretical and
empirical Sociology. SOCIAL THEORY AND THE ARTS
was held April 25-27.
In conjunction with the conference, the Michael C.
Rockefeller Arts Center Gallery, located at the State
University of New York at Fredonia will sponsor THE
HUMAN IMAGE: SOCIOLOGY AND PHOTOGRAPHY.
This exhibition of photographs by professional sociologists and photographers is an attempt to expand and explore visual sociology and the sociological imagination
through photography. The exhibit which ran from April
13 to May 7, will travel from July 1975 until August
1977.
For information on the conference and exhibit contact: A. Derral Cheatwood (Department of Sociology) or
Therold Lindquist (Department of Art), SUNY, Fredonia,
NY 14063.

Communications in Africa ($6.00/year; quarterly)
Publications Department, Rhodes University, Box
184, Grahamstown, 6140 South Africa
The African journalist ($2.00; quarterly) International
Press Institute, Munstergasse 9, Zurich, Switzerland
Leader: Malaysian journalism Review ($12.00/year;
quarterly) South East Press Center, 57 Klang Road,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Media ($1.80/year; monthly) Press Foundation of Asia,
1Oth Floor Magsaysay Blvd., Roxas Building,
Manila, Philippines
Indian Press ($5.00/year; monthly) Box 69 New Delhi
11001, India
Media Asia: an Asian Mass Communication Quarterly,
AMIC, Newton Road, Singapore 11
(Compiled by Sam G. Riley, Temple University)

FILMMAKERS
How would you like to have the use of a 16mm. Eclair NPR and double
system sound capabilities for 25 days a year each of 5 consecutive years for the
total cost of $3,000.00?*
The Institute for the Study of Man, Inc. (ISM I), the founder and owner of
the journal URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY is forming an anthropological filmmakers rental cooperative in order to provide Anthropologists with the
equipment they need for 16mm. double system cine sound filmmaking.
If you are interested please write for further information.
Before 1 May 1975

Dr. Jack R. Rollwagen
Apartado Postal C-95
Cuernavaca, Morelos
Mexico

After 1 May 1975

Dr. Jack R. Rollwagen
ISM I
113 Utica Street
Brockport, N.Y. 14420

Pass this information on to your friends.
*Value of equipment and services in this package totals $25,000.00.
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PUBLICATIONS
The following publications are available from SAVICOM, 1703 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20009. Payment must
accompany orders.
Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication
Studies is a publication of the Society. It is published two or three times a year and contains verbal and visual material describing and
analyzing research in the areas of interest described under the purposes of the Society. Studies also publishes reviews of relevant books and
larger review articles of groups of related books and other publications. It contains a section of correspondence and brief communication.
The publication committee encourages members as well as non-members to submit written and visual materials for publication. Write to the
Studies editor for additional instructions for submission.

From time to time SAVICOM will publish special publications related to the interests of its members. The following is a list of current
publications:
Films for Anthropological Teaching

The fifth edition of Karl Heider's Films for Anthropological Teaching lists over 500 films together with their distributors, bibliographic
references and has subject, distributor and author indices. The cost is $3.00 for Society members and $5.00 for non-members and
institutions.
Handbook for Proxemic Research

Edward T. Hall, author of the Silent Language, The Hidden Dimension and other works, is allowing SAVICOM to publish this new
handbook detailing his methodology for proxemic research. The Handbook includes computer programs, illustrations about the placement
of cameras and observers, and an extensive bibliography. It is available to members at $3.00 per copy and to non-members and institutions
at $5.00. In order to keep the price down for teachers, students and active workers in proxemic research, Hall is not accepting royalties on
sales to SA VICOM members. Bookstores, teachers and others wishing to place bulk orders should write to Sol Worth for ~pecial instructions.
All others wishing to obtain copies should write directly to SA VI COM.
News, Notes, Correspondence and Brief Communications

In addition to the section of correspondence and brief communications which appears in Studies, the Society is responsible for a
section of news and notes in the Anthropology Newsletter of the American Anthropological Association. All interested persons are
encouraged to contribute news of fieldwork, announcements of conferences, festivals, training opportunities and any other pertinent news
and notes to Jay Ruby, News and Notes Editor, Temple University, Department of Anthropology, Philadelphia, PA 19122. Members of the
Society who are not already members of AAA will regularly receive the Anthropology Newsletter without additional charge as· part of their
membership dues.

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS
STYLE. Issues of the current volume should be consulted, along with the Manual of Style of the University of Chicago Press. Major
subheadings should be kept to . a minimum and, where possible, roman numerals only should be used. Under no circumstances are
second-level subheadings to be used. MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION. Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced (including abstract,
quotations, notes and references cited) one side only on 8Y2 x 11 noncorrasable bond, with ample margins for editorial markings (at least
one inch on all sides). Do not break words at the ends of lines. Retype any page on which complicated corrections have been made. The
original and two copies must be submitted. Author should keep a copy. ABSTRACT. The text should be preceded by a 50-75 word
abstract and a list of up to five headings under which the paper should be indexed. FOOTNOTES. Footnotes appear as "Notes" at the end
of articles. Authors are advised to include footnote material in the text wherever possible. Notes are to be numbered consecutively
throughout the paper and are to be typed on a separate sheet (double-spaced). REFERENCES. The list of references which accompanies
an article should be limited to, and inclusive of, those publications actually cited in the text. References are not cited in footnotes but
carried within the text in parentheses with author's last name, the year of original publication, and page, e.g., (Kroeber 1948:205). Titles
and publication information on references appear as "References Cited" at the end of the article and should be listed alphabetically by
author and chronologically for each author. Write out the names of journals and other publications in full. Provide complete references
following the style of recent issues for form of citation, punctuation, capitalization, use of italics, etc. References cited should be typed on a
separate page (double-spaced). References not presented in the style required will be returned to the author for revision. TABLES. All
tabular material should be part of a separately numbered series of "Tables." Each table must be typed on a separate sheet and identified by
a short descriptive title. Footnotes for tables appear at the bottom of the tables and are marked *, t, :j:, §,~,etc., according to standard
usage. Marginal notation on manuscript should indicate approximately where tables are to appear. FIGURES. All illustrative material,
drawings, maps, diagrams, and photographs should be included in a single numbered series and designated "Figures." They must be
submitted in a form suitable for publication without redrawing. Drawings should be carefully done with India ink on either hard, white,
smooth-surfaced board or good quality tracing paper. Photographs should be glossy prints and should be numbered on the back to key with
captions. All figures should be numbered consecutively and all captions should be typed together on a separate sheet of paper
(double-spaced). Marginal notations on manuscript should indicate approximately where figures are to appear. PROOFS. Galley proofs are
sent to authors who are expected to check for typographic mistakes and errors in fact. No part of an article can be rewritten in galley proof.
Significant new data or an absolutely necessary comment may sometimes be added as a brief footnote. All changes and addenda submitted
by the author on his corrected galley proofs are suggestions only and may be disregarded at the discretion of the Editor. The corrected
proofs should be returned to the Editor within 48 hours of receipt. It will be impossible to make corrections not promptly received by the
Editor. REPRINTS will be supplied to authors who return with payment by the specified deadline reprint order forms mailed to them at
the time of publication of the journal.
Editor: SOL WORTH
Annenberg School of Communications
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia,PA 19174
Book Reviews: 0. MICHAEL WATSON
Department of Anthropology
Purdue University
Lafayette, IN 47907

Notes, News and Brief Communications: JAY RUBY
Department of Anthropology
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA 19122
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